Sustainability and Outreach: Analysis of Microfinance Banks in Nigeria by Ogunleye, Toyin S.
 
University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  
























School of Social Sciences and Humanities 





Toyin Segun Ogunleye 
Sustainability and Outreach: Analysis of Microfinance Banks in Nigeria  
Keywords: Mission Drift, Interest Rate, Loans, Repayment, Women, 
Outreach, Scaling up.  
The thesis empirically examined the implications of microfinance scaling up 
or sustainability on outreach in Nigeria. Basically, two methodologies were 
used namely, panel data econometric and survey methods. The panel 
dataset of 752 microfinance banks in Nigeria was used during the period 
2011-2014, while the survey was conducted on some selected microfinance 
banks in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in 2014. The findings from the 
thesis showed that, at the national level, yield, labour cost, orientation, 
efficiency, gender and size of loans are the major drivers of microfinance 
banks‟ sustainability in Nigeria. While at the state level, microfinance banks 
sustainability is driven by orientation and loan size. Findings also showed 
that sustainable MFBs tend to be more focused on the poor clients. The 
thesis showed that lending to female clients improves repayment rate of 
MFBs in Nigeria. Corroborating the regression result, the survey findings also 
suggest that lending to women had improved and enhanced repayment rate.  
In view of these findings, the thesis recommends that sustainability and 
outreach are not necessarily incompatible. However in pursuing sustainability 
greater attention should be on female clients, as greater lending to women 
would improve the repayment rate of MFBs and further engendered the 
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Globally, poverty is a stark reality and remains a global challenge especially 
in many developing countries. Poverty gained global attention in the year 
2000, when the United Nation Millennium Declaration culminated to signing 
of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a programme that seeks to 
halve the extreme poverty by the year 2015 (United Nation, 2014). Despite 
the declaration for over a decade, the menace of poverty and how to 
mitigate it still remains a major intimidating challenge.  
In Africa, poverty rate is alarming. The results of lived poverty survey on 16 
countries in Africa, Nigeria inclusive, indicated that 53 per cent of Africans 
face medical services shortages, 50 per cent face food shortages, 49 per 
cent are in shortages of clean water and four-in-ten go without cooking fuel 
(Dulani et al. 2013). For example, Nigeria was recently declared the biggest 
economy in Africa with the growth rate of 5.1, 6.7 and 7.9 per cent in 2011, 
2012 and 2013, respectively. Despite the robust growth, the country still 
faces mounting challenges of high incidence of poverty such that poverty 
rate was estimated at 84.5 per cent by the World Bank.  
Moreover, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) statistics showed that 
the absolute poverty in Nigeria defined in terms of minimal requirements 
necessary to afford minimal standards of food, clothing, healthcare and 
shelter was 54.7 per cent in 2004 and later rose to 60.9 per cent in 2010, 
2 
 
showing increase in the poverty level. Also, about 112 million people live on 
less than US$1 a day in Nigeria (NBS, 2010). The survey on total number of 
people excluded from formal financial institutions in Nigeria by Enhancing 
Financial Innovation & Access (EFlnA) report showed that about 64.1 per 
cent of adult population has never been banked, 3.4 per cent were 
previously banked while only 32.5 per cent of adult population are banked 
(EFInA, 2012). This factor, amongst others, contributed to increasing 
poverty level in Nigeria. Access to financial services provides opportunities 
for the poor to unlock their productive capacities; it opens up new 
possibilities for poverty reduction and is capable of instituting social change 
on a sustainable basis (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010).  
In developing countries lending to the poor by formal financial institutions is 
constrained by the twin problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). The shifting conditions poor countries 
make it difficult for the lending institutions to identify riskier borrowers; they 
therefore raise average interest rate to compensate probability of default 
arising from lending to riskier clients (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The second 
challenge arises from failure of lending institutions to monitor the proper use 
of investment capital by their customers, leading to moral hazard of clients 
absconding with the bank‟s money. These problems are further escalated 
where there is a weak legal system which does not encourage contract 
enforcement and by the high transaction costs usually associated with small 
loans (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
The revolution of microfinance started with the Grameen Bank‟s lending of 
small loan without collateral to the excluded poor people that had been 
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termed unprofitable by the formal financial institutions (Dehejia et al. 2012). 
Today through its innovative lending, microfinance has reduced the 
problems of information asymmetry and transaction costs associated with 
lending to the poor in developing countries and many feel it has proved to 
be a potent weapon to break the vicious circle of poverty (Cull et al. 2007).  
Microfinance institution, which forms the industry that focuses on the poor 
who are excluded from formal financial institution, is considered as a 
possible solution to poverty in many developing countries. As a result, 
microfinance came to limelight and became a global issue (Ditcher and 
Harper, 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2010). The industry has expanded its 
services to the poor by engaging in diverse forms of financial services to the 
poor such as saving mobilization, remittances services, insurance, credit, 
legal aid, micro pension, business management, group formation, book 
keeping training, nutrition training and education services (Corsi et al. 2006). 
The wisdom behind these expanded services of microfinance is to ultimately 
unlocked productive capacity of the poor, strengthening their skills, build 
business capacity of the poor and thereby reduce poverty. These micro 
services could be further explored to surmount poverty, especially in Africa, 
by empowering vast majority of the poor population through more expanded 
access to micro loans and credits, especially, to rural women who constitute 
majority of the poor borrowers.  
Recognising the possibility of microfinance services in combating poverty, 
policy makers, donors and academics are recently calling for scaling up of 
microfinance industry in order to improve scale of outreach (Paul and 
Conroy, 2000; Morduch, 2000; Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Thapa, 2007). 
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Scaling up ensures microfinance institutions reach wide range of poor 
clients on sustainable basis, since then, scaling up becomes centre 
thoughts in both policy and academic world (Paul and Conroy, 2000). The 
scaling up phenomenon is termed „microfinance sustainability‟, it is defines 
as ability to sustain „on-going concern‟ of microfinance institutions without 
recourse to subsidies, it also means viability of a microfinance programme 
without recourse to either domestic or foreign donors‟ assistance (Tuker and 
Miles, 2014; Pollinger et al. 2007). The concern for financial viability became 
prominent and eventually gains global attention in 1992 when Banco Sol, 
from Bolivia was commercialised and was listed in the capital market 
(Mersland and Strom, 2010). Micro Banking Bulletin (2007) shows that 
about 41% MFIs are financially self-sustainable out of the dataset of 704 
MFIs. Financial sustainability of microfinance is characterised with three 
main features namely competition, profitability and regulation (CGAP, 2001). 
For example, in most developing countries, commercialized microfinance 
banks (MFBs) are more profitable than non-commercialized ones; there is 
also competition among MFBs for financial liberalization, growing entrance 
of commercial banks to the industry and focus of government regulatory 
policy on the industry (Mersland and Strom, 2010). 
 The call for microfinance sustainability emanates from institutionalists that 
believe that financial sustainable microfinance institutions would increase 
depth of outreach (Robinson, 2001; Drake and Rhyne, 2002). Their 
argument is spurred by the belief that a sustainable institution would enjoy 
economic of scale, gain access to private capital and better-off borrowers 
through giving of larger loans (Gibbons and Meehan, 1999). They advocate 
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the use high interest rate that could cover and above operating costs of 
microfinance institutions and that would sustain microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in business (Robinson, 2001; CGAP, 2004). 
However, the welfarists advocate the opposing views by favouring the use 
of credit subsidization and low interest rate thereby increase the breath of 
outreach and improve the welfare of the clients (Woller et al. 1999; Woller 
2002; Hermes et al. 2011). Based on welfarists‟ proposition, many 
developing countries in the early 1970s and late 1980s adopted interest rate 
cap or loans subsidization with particular emphasis on directive lending to 
the preferred sectors of the economy (Dehejia et al. 2012). Nevertheless, 
subsidized lending was not without challenges as greater parts of the loans 
go to wrong hands as a result of political interferences (Dehejia et al. 2012). 
In view of the weaknesses of subsidized lending, the institutionalists‟ argue 
that credit subsidization, instead of facilitating poverty reduction, could 
promote inefficiency and misallocation of resources and eventually 
aggravate poverty; they therefore advocate profit maximisation by raising 
interest rate (Morduch, 1999). Indeed, previous efforts by the Nigerian 
government to promote lending to the poor through interest rate caps and 
subsidized credit most often result to other challenges such as resources 
diversion and allocating loans to political favoured members of the societies 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011). The views of institutionalists are counter-opposed by 
the welfarists, they argue that high interest rate induced by profit 
maximisation would crowd out the poor, promote moral hazard, leading to 




In view of the opposing opinions of institutionalists and welfarists, the 
possible role of interest rate in microfinance industry, the effects of interest 
rate on outreach and repayment became an issue in microfinance debate 
(CGAP, 2004). Microfinance institutions primary rely on interest rate 
charges to cover their costs on microloans. These costs include cost of 
money lending to clients, cost of loan defaults and transaction costs (CGAP, 
2004; Nwachukwu, 2014; Zhang, 2014). Therefore, microfinance charge 
high interest rates to remain in business, their charge rates are relatively 
higher than formal banking rates because of high transaction costs 
(Morduch, 1999; Campion et al., 2010; Susannah, 2012; Dehejia et al., 
2012; Kar and Swain, 2014). This is sometimes justified by the argument 
that microfinance clients are more concerned about access to microloans 
than high interest rate (CGAP, 2004; Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). This 
assertion is confirmed by the high patronage enjoyed by the village money 
lenders despite that their charges are far above what average microfinance 
institutions charge as interest rate (CGAP, 2004). As assertive as reasons 
for high interest rate seem to be, others are of the view that high interest 
rate could indeed crowd out the poor clients who are the sole target of 
microfinance and exacerbate moral hazard, adverse selection and low 
repayment (Dehejia et al., 2012). 
More also, these contending issues have sparked other debate as to 
whether the drive for microfinance sustainability could lead to mission drift 
(Mersland and Strom, 2010). Microfinance institutions primary focus on the 
poor with the purpose to eliminate poverty but recent focus on sustainability 
through profit maximization and charging of high interest rate could drift the 
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industry away from its initial mission. This phenomenon is termed „mission 
drift‟. Some of the critics that hold this view argue that it could lead MFBs 
losing sight of its original social objective of poverty reduction (Mersland and 
Strom, 2010; Ditcher and Harper, 2007). Prominent among these critics is 
the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mohammad Yunus, who claimed that too 
much focus on profit could crowd out poorer clients of MFIs (Christen and 
Drake, 2002). This claim of crowding out of the poor or mission drift was 
based on the argument that higher profits lead to lower outreach (Mersland 
and Strom, 2010). However, the assertion of mission drift has been 
challenged by the proponents of commercialisation of microfinance, they 
argue that instead of mission drift, sustainability would rather reduce, 
operating costs, meet the magnitude of the enormous demand for 
microfinance services and thereby lead to increase in the depth of outreach 
(Gonzallenz-Vega et al. 1996; Kar 2013).  
Mission drift occurs when the composition of new existing microfinance 
clients shifted from the poorer to wealthier ones (Cull et al. 2007). 
Copestake (2007) defines mission drift as action taken by microfinance 
institutions   that bring about shift in focus on poverty reduction. The 
concern for mission drift emanated from the socially driven and poverty 
focused microfinance institutions that argue that sustainability could lead to 
shift in the composition of new clients to the wealthier ones (Cull, et al. 
2007). Mission drift implies shifting focus from the original promise of 
lending more to the rural poor, especially women, which is original social 
commitment of microfinance. Some of the reasons adduced to justify the 
process of scaling-up which might invariably lead to mission drift include, 
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targeting wealthier clients would minimise costs, avoid loan arrears and 
attracting profit-oriented donors to get more resources 
However, the contending issue is that, too much focus on financial 
sustainability at the expense of outreach could have serious implications on 
microfinance impact on the poor. The views of the two contending school of 
thoughts also differ on this issue while welfarists affirm the thought, the 
institutionalists oppose it.  More also, recent empirical findings on the issue 
of trade-off differ. For example, CGAP (2001), Cull et al. (2007), Hishigsuren 
(2007), Serrano-Cinca and Gutierrez-Nieto (2014) and Abrar and Javaid 
(2014) proved the existence of mission drift in their findings. Others such as 
Christen (2000), Frank (2008) and Mersland and Strom (2010) refuted such 
claims. The phenomenon of MFIs mission drift is germane and very crucial 
because of the divergence of views on the issue, more also; it is yet to be 
empirically tested in Nigeria. Also, mission drift has severe policy 
implications for the industry, regulatory bodies and the poor community who 
provide justification for the existence of microfinance services. 
In addition to these debates, of recent some studies have shown and 
painted the success story of microfinance high repayment rate, despite 
commercialization because of its focus on women clients (Sharma and 
Zeller, 1997; Godquin, 2004; D‟epallier et al. 2011 & 2013). The vast 
majority of microfinance poor clients have good repayment record and this 
success has been celebrated over the years (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). 
The success story of microfinance is often ascribed to its focus on women 
because women are generally seen to be more conservative in investments, 
good credit risk and possess lower moral hazard than their male counterpart 
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(D‟espallier et al. 2011).  These virtues of women motivate many multilateral 
and bilateral development aid agencies and microfinance advocacy 
networks and sponsors to encourage lending to women (D‟espallier et al. 
2011). For example, Daley-Harris (2006) showed that beneficiaries of 
microfinance services increased from 13.5 million to 113.3 million between 
1997 and 2005, of these beneficiaries, women constituted about 84 per 
cent. Also, World Bank survey in 1996 on world microfinance indicated that 
61 per cent of the beneficiaries were women. In addition, lending to women 
constituted about 95 and 72 percent for notable microfinance institutions 
such as Grameen Bank and BancoSol in Bangladesh, respectively (World 
Bank, 1997; Yunus, 2003).   
Indeed past studies conducted on microfinance programmes and projects 
across the globe confirm the success story of microfinance institutions in 
term of high repayment, especially female clients‟ repayment records. For 
example in the early 1990s, Hulme (1991) shows that 92 per cent female 
clients pay on time compared with male counterpart of 83 per cent while 
Gibbon and Kasim (1991) indicate that 95 per cent of women in Malaysia 
pay back their loan, but the repayment of male clients was about 72 per 
cent. Other studies such as Armendariz and Morduch (2005), Hossain 
(1998), Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Kevane and Wydick (2001) confirm 
similar findings, pointing to the fact that women have better repayment 
records than their male counterpart. However, some studies after controlling 
for other factors attributing the enhanced female repayment to other factors 
such as focus on nonfinancial services, adaptation of loan methodologies to 
local contexts, local economic opportunities and group lending methodology 
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(Godquin, 2004; Bhatt and Tang, 2002; Brehanu and Fufa, 2008). Other 
such as Armendariz and Morduch (2005) show that BRI in Indonesia did not 
focus on women and yet achieve nearly 100 per cent repayment rate for 
several years. These findings show diverse opinions on the issue, but there 
is still consensus that lending to women enhances repayment rate. 
Despite the insightful nature of past studies, their findings were mainly 
based on survey of microfinance institutions‟ programmes and projects, 
which make their application limited to other regions of the world. Indeed, 
these studies lacked rigorous empirical estimation, no paper except one, 
provides detailed empirical estimation on gender and repayment 
relationship on global scale. The first rigorous and empirical estimation was 
conducted by D‟espallier et al. (2011). They use global data set of 350 
microfinance institutions in 70 countries to examine gender-repayment 
impact in a panel data framework. Although, the findings from the study 
were insightful, the findings also spur the need to empirically examine this 
relationship in other cases and countries especially in country such as 
Nigeria where the microfinance institutions confront different challenges. 
This thesis sets to do this.  
In Nigeria, microfinance institutions face many challenges. Analysis of the 
four years data used for this study show that, on average, portfolio at risk of 
microfinance banks was 26 per cent and the loan write-off rate in the 
industry, on average, was 9 per cent for all microfinance banks. Also, the 
data further shows that over the study period of four years, women clients, 
on average, accounted for 45 per cent while male clients accounted for 55 
per cent of the total active clients of microfinance banks in Nigeria. 
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Moreover, past literature showed that male clients are more associated with 
loans defaults (Hossain, 1998; Khandker et al., 1995; Sharma and Zeller, 
1997; Hulme, 1991; Gibbons and Kasim, 1991). In view of these facts, can 
increased lending to female clients improve microfinance performances and 
repayment rate in Nigeria? These questions have not been previously and 
adequately answered in Nigeria due to non-availability of data. Past studies 
on Nigeria such as Ugwumba et al. (2008), Mkpado et al. (2010) and Julius 
and Aminant (2011) were conducted through survey of microfinance 
institutions and are limited in methodology and analysis. The study by 
Onyeagocha et al. (2012) that used empirical data is limited in scope 
because of non-availability of data and other studies did not address 
gender- repayment issues.  
In view of the contradictory views on these aforementioned issues and 
concerns in the literature and more importantly that these contentious 
Issues have not been empirically tested in Nigeria, it becomes expedient for 
a study of this nature to be conducted on Nigeria. The first large cross- 
sectional study on these issues was conducted by Cull et al. (2007) using 
124 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 49 developing countries, but the 
static nature of the study limited it general application to other countries. 
The work of Jegede et al. (2012) attempted to deal with outreach and 
sustainability in Nigeria using panel data analysis but their study was limited 
in scope as it only covers Lagos and Ondo States in the Western Region 
and failed to account for drivers of sustainability, repayment and to answer 
mission drift and high interest rate issues. Other studies on microfinance in 
Nigeria such as Akanji (2002); Anyanwu (2004); Kalu (2006); Iganiga 
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(2008); Okpara (2010); Aigbokhan and Asemota (2011); Abiola, (2011); 
Awojobi and Bein, (2011) only focus on growth and poverty related issues. 
In view of weaknesses of the previous studies, this thesis on Nigeria, 
therefore, intends to fill this gap by using larger data that captures country-
specific and state-specific factors driving microfinance sustainability and to 
answer mission drift, high interest rates, women lending and repayment 
questions in Nigeria. 
1.2 Significance of the Research 
Microfinance could serve as a tool to combat the challenge of poverty 
globally. The importance of microfinance is further reinforced by ever 
increasing demand for its services which are currently outstripped its supply. 
With the recent call for scaling up to meet the unmet demand in the industry, 
this thesis seeks to shed light on the possible factors that drive sustainability 
of the industry, especially in Nigeria. Moreover, past studies have also 
shown the possibility of microfinance institutions to be drifted away in the 
process of scaling up, this thesis will help to gain insight into whether the 
process of scaling up in Nigeria has caused microfinance banks to lose 
focus on the poor or not. The thesis will also answer some questions as to 
whether high interest rate is detrimental to high repayment rate. In addition, 
the thesis will also test if focusing on female clients will indeed improve 
microfinance repayment, this will help policy makers and microfinance 
institutions to reduce the challenge of low repayment in the industry. There 
is this concern in microfinance industry that experience of other countries 
cannot be replicated in another country due to state-specific factors. The 
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thesis will contribute to this, by comparing Nigeria-specific experience with 
the experience of Abuja, Federal Capital territory, in the Nigeria.  
1.3 Aims and Objectives and Research Questions 
The broad objectives of this thesis are to examine the drivers of 
microfinance sustainability and to answer questions related to impact of high 
interest rate on repayment in Nigeria. It also examines whether „mission 
drift‟ is an illusion in Nigeria or not and also tests for factors that could 
improve repayment rate in Nigeria. In order to achieve these objectives the 
thesis utilized the panel dataset of 752 microfinance banks in Nigeria during 
2011-2014. The goal is to shed more light and enhance our understanding 
of the issues that surround sustainability debate and thereby draw policy 
prescriptions and contribute to the existing body of knowledge. The thesis 
specifically: 
 Review literature on microfinance sustainability, interest rate, mission 
drift and the role of women lending on repayment. The review intends 
to identify gaps in the literature and review definitional, conceptual, 
interest rate debate, relevant   theories of microfinance and 
methodological issues in microfinance. 
 Investigate empirically, the drivers of microfinance sustainability in 
Nigeria. 
 Test for the presence of mission drift in Nigeria. 
 Determine the effect of increasing interest rate on microfinance 
repayment rate. 
 Test if lending to women improve repayment rate  
 Identify research gaps for future research. 
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To put this thesis under proper perspective, the research will attempt to 
answer the following questions: 
 What are the drivers of microfinance sustainability in Nigeria?  
 What is the effect of interest rate on microfinance repayment in 
Nigeria?  
 Does microfinance sustainability lead to mission drift in Nigeria?  
 Lastly, does increase in women outreach improve repayment rate in 
Nigeria? 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis is a pioneering work in Nigeria, being the first thesis that uses 
large data of 752 microfinance banks in Nigeria, the use of these data in a 
panel data framework to determine sustainability and the factors that drive 
it, is the first of its kind in Nigeria. Specifically;  
 The thesis will help to deepen interest rate policy formulation, chart 
the path to appropriate interest rates and regulatory agencies to 
design policies that encourage competitiveness among MFIs, which 
will reduce high costs associated with microfinance services in 
Nigeria which are detrimental to the poverty reduction objective of the 
government.  
 Identifying factors that drive sustainability of microfinance will help 
the design of regulatory framework that ensures stability of 
microfinance industry, improve the depth of outreach and eventually 
help poverty reduction efforts of the government.  
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1.5 Data and Methodology 
The thesis used a more detailed panel data on 752 microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) collected by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The data set used 
for this study covers 94.0 per cent of the data submitted to the CBN by 
about 800 microfinance banks in Nigeria. The remaining 6.0 per constitutes 
microfinance banks whose licenses are either been revoked, suspended or 
whose data are not useable. The methodology used for the thesis is 
unbalanced panel data analysis during 2011-2014 and survey method 
conducted in 2014 on some selected microfinance banks in FCT, Abuja. 
Some variables used for the panel data method, amongst others, included 
operating self-sufficiency ratio, a proxy for sustainability, interest rate proxy 
by yield, labour cost, and orientation proxy by loans to assets ratio. Other 
variables included, total assets, a proxy for history, measure of efficiency 
and gender, a proxy for women borrowers. Also, three measures of 
repayment, namely, portfolio-at-risk, write-off rate and provision expense 
rate are used to test the effect of female lending on repayment. The main 
equations are subsequently allowed to vary by lending types to test the 
effect of lending models on dependent variables in some cases. The choice 
of this methodology is predicated on the grounds that panel data analysis 
addresses associated problems with static cross sectional and ordinary 
regression analysis by partially accounting for variation in the data, within 
the short span of observations available here. It takes care of problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity commonly associated with cross sectional 
studies and accounts for idiosyncratic error. These problems are time-
16 
 
constant factors and time-varying error that affect the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2006).  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into six chapters. Following this introduction is 
chapter two. It reviews studies conducted in the last twenty years on 
microfinance institutions. The focus is to identify gaps in the literature and 
examines definitional, conceptual, debates, theories and methodological 
issues of microfinance.  
Chapter three focuses on the history, regulations and performance of 
microfinance institutions in Nigeria. It traces the history and characteristics 
of native microfinance, financial cooperatives, NGOs and government 
microfinance initiatives and reviews the regulatory framework of 
microfinance in Nigeria. The second part deals with performance of 
microfinance banks in Nigeria.  
Chapter four focuses on data, methodology and presentation of results. The 
empirical framework adopted is based on one-way error component panel 
data regression model where error composed into the unobserved MFI-
specific effect and the idiosyncratic error i.e. i ~ ),0(
2
IIN and independent 
of iv ~ ),0(
2
vIIN  . Using a more detailed panel data on 752 microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) collected by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during 
2011-2014 to estimate the model using relevant variables.  
Chapter five focuses on the operations and performance analysis of 
microfinance banks in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).  Two 
methodologies are adopted in this chapter; it uses data of MFBs in the FCT, 
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Abuja available with the CBN to examine sustainability and outreach issues 
within the FCT, Abuja. One-way error component panel data regression 
model framework is adopted to achieve this purpose. The objective is to test 
whether the pattern displayed for the whole country in the previous chapters 
can be replicated in a single state.  
Chapter six presents the summary of the main findings, contributions, policy 

















Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter review studies conducted in the last two decades on the 
drivers of microfinance sustainability, interest rate and mission drift issues 
and lastly the role of women outreach on repayment. The review intends to 
identify gaps in the literature and explains definitional, conceptual, theories 
and methodological issues for which analysis of microfinance will be 
evaluated. The first part of the section examines the definitional and 
conceptual issues; while the second part reviews some relevant theories of 
microfinance. The third part of the section reviews findings of microfinance 
impact analysis studies in developing countries. The last part assesses 
issues arising from methodologies of the impact studies. 
2.2 Definitional and Conceptual Issues 
This section will examine the philosophy behind microfinance and poverty 
reduction and also explores the definitional and conceptual issues. The 
world “microfinance” came to fore in 1983 when Muhammad Yunus termed 
it as a strategy for poverty eradication in his country Bangladesh. Yunus 
based his ideology of microfinance as a means to meet observed individual 
economic and social behaviour. He believes that poverty is not as a result of 
market failure in developing countries, but failure of capitalist system to 
capture the economic and social behaviour of individual member of the 
society. He argues that free market has capacity to reduce poverty if social 
component is incorporated into economic systems to meet observed 
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individual behaviour (Yunus, 2007). The link between poverty and 
microfinance come to fore because the poor lack access to financial 
services to meet both their short-term and long-run needs such as 
consumption needs, emergencies, income and expenses fluctuations. 
These needs are categorised into three groups namely, opportunities i.e. 
buying land and other assets, unanticipated situation such as sudden death 
of the love ones, loss of employment and sickness; lastly, life-cycle needs 
such as burial, marriage and education (Stewart et al. 2010). 
Prior to 1980s, in the 1970‟s, the word “micro-credit” had been in existence, 
it is a means of providing loans to the poor to finance income earning 
projects (Stewart et al. 2010). In a simple term, micro-credit and micro-
savings is a mechanism that allows the poor, especially, the women in the 
rural areas to invest their money in the future with the aim of lifting 
themselves from poverty (Stewart et al. 2010). This implies that 
microfinance provides an avenue where micro or small scale financial 
services are provided to the unbanked poor people who are excluded from 
the formal banking system. Microfinance is generally defines as institutions 
that provide saving, small credit and other financial services such as 
insurance services to economically and socially excluded poor individual 
with initially most borrowers rural poor women (Pillai and Nadarajan, 2010). 
Otero (1999) defines microfinance as provision of financial services to the 
poor clients who are self-employed with low income. Such financial services 
generally include provision of credit, savings, insurance and other financial 
payment services (Ledgerwood, 1999). Schreiner and Colombet (2001) 
describe it as medium of improving access of poor households who are 
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excluded from formal financial institution to small deposits and loans. These 
definitions imply that microfinance provides loans or credit to small 
enterprises, the poor and very poor self-employed households who cannot 
access credit from commercial banks due the conditionality attach to it.   
Moreover, Robinson (2001) defines microfinance as institutions that provide 
credit and deposits to micro enterprises that involve in production process 
with the aim of making gain or profit. Microfinance institutions initially  got 
their financial support from international donors, development institutions 
and NGOs often below market interest rate, and the institutions in turn, 
onward lend to actively poor economic agents (Hermes and Lensink, 2007).   
However, in the recent times, some microfinance institutions are now 
mobilizing resources from members‟ savings and place less reliance on 
donors‟ aid for sustainability reasons. MixMarket statistics indicated that 
average loan though varies for different countries, was estimated for about 
$470 in 2005. In 2010, average loan balance per borrower was $362.6, 
$1,049.8 and $141.8 in Africa, Latin America and South Asia, respectively. 
For the same period, the number of the active borrowers was 5.1 million, 
15.7 million and 58.6 million, while their assets were US$6.8 billion, 
US$29.2 billion and US$11.4 billion for the respective regions. The 
importance of microfinance became a central issue, especially, in 
developing countries, due to general consensus in the development 
literature that the majority of the actively poor people are excluded from 
formal financial services because they lack requisite collateral and are too 
risky borrowers (Aigbokhan and Asemota, 2011). Therefore, the rationale 
for promoting microfinance in developing countries is based on the fact that 
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enhancing access to credit by the poor would increase income of the poor 
and alleviate poverty. The next section examines microfinance interest rate 
debate.  
2.3 Microfinance Interest Rate Debate 
In recent years, the on-going debate in microfinance industry has focused 
on growing controversy that surround interest rates, profit and mission drift 
(Kar and Swain, 2014). A plethora of recent evidences show that MFIs 
charge high interest rates on micro loans to poor borrowers (Morduch, 1999; 
Campion et al., 2010; Susannah, 2012; Dehejia et al., 2012; Kar and Swain, 
2014; Zhang, 2014). There are concern that high interest rate of MFIs could 
truncate the primary objective of the institution that seeks to help the poor 
(CGAP 2004; Deheija et al. 2012). Zhang (2014, pp.101) noted that „high 
cost of microfinance is a fundamental cause of the high interest rates‟. High 
interest rate arises because greater inherent risks and costs are associated 
with small loans to the poor (CGAP, 2004; Zhang, 2014). Such costs include 
administrative costs, cost of fund for on-lending and the cost of loan loss, 
out of these, administrative costs appear most challenging to MFIs (CGAP, 
2004; Nwachukwu, 2014). For example, Susannah (2012) showed that, on 
average, it cost about 26 per cent for Equitas Microfinance in Indian to 
reach out to their potential customers. Also, Zhang (2014) alluded that 
though a single transaction is low in India about US$0.25 but the transaction 
costs of the loan balance accounted up to 25 per cent. Most of these costs 
come from the administrative costs of MFIs which involve cost of identifying, 
and selection of potential clients, cost of processing loan application and 
disbursement, cost of repayments and non-repayment (CGAP, 2004).  
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In view of the high costs associated with small loans lending, for MFIs to 
remain in business they charge enough interest rates on small loans that 
cover these costs, else, they fall back to subsidies which are uncertain and 
limited in supply (Nwachukwu, 2014; CGAP, 2004). For example, nominal 
average portfolio yield, a proxy widely used for interest rate, was about 34 
per cent for sample of 426 MFIs in Asia, though, there were variations 
across regions with South Asia MFIs accounted for the lowest of about 23 
per cent while the East Asia MFIs, the largest was about 39 per cent 
(Nwachukwu, 2014). 
Opposing view to high interest is based on  believe that demand for capital 
is elastic to change in interest rates and therefore,  high interest rate on 
working capital would reduce demand for loan and would drain profit of 
micro-businesses and thereby leave the borrowers with little or no gain 
(Adams et al. 1984; Homer and Sylla, 1996). This motivated most 
developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s to restrict interest rate on 
micro loans to lower level to enable poor borrowers to have access to loans. 
The interest rate caps were often accompanied with directives who to 
benefit from the subsidized loans and for what purpose the subsidized loans 
(Dehejia et al., 2012).  For example, in the early 1970s, interest rates on 
working capital were capped at 17 per cent per year in Brazil not minding 
the inflation rate that ranged between 20 to 40 per cent per year (Sayad, 
1983). CGAP (2004) noted that about fourty countries retained some forms 
of interest rate ceilings in 2004, and these countries had large volumes of 
credit at subsidized rates to the poor and some preferred sectors. However, 
the subsidized credits in most these countries often resulted to heavy 
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annual losses that are funded from the treasury (CGAP, 2004). The 
subsidized credits were also characterized by low scale due to limited 
government budget constraint; also, the existing micro loan often went to 
non-poor members of the society due to undue political interferences 
leading to poor quality of financial services (Dehejia et al., 2012). 
Eventually, the poor who are the primary targets of interest rate ceiling are 
often missed out.  
If subsidized interest rates do not necessarily protect the poor but rather 
hurt them and denied them access to credit, the question is what motivates 
the poor to afford high interest rate of MFIs? Evidences confirm that the 
poor are more concern with ongoing access to credit than high interest rate, 
which is the cost of credit (CGAP, 2004; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; 
Zhang, 2014). The poor belief that since the amount of loans is small, they 
can completely bear a little higher interest rate (Zhang, 2014). Indeed, 
evidences justified that high interest rates have not excluded the poor. For 
example, The MIX data in 2004 showed that profit seeking MFIs reached 
large number of poor clients measured in term of average loan balance per 
borrower of less than 20 per cent of GDP per capital (CGAP, 2004).  Also 
support to this fact, is the good repayment records of most profit seeking 
MFIs‟ clients (Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Godquin, 2004; D‟epallier et al. 
2011 & 2013). Other reason adduced to support high interest rate was that 
since poor borrowers could sustain money lender in business by paying 
100% interest rate on loans, the poor would be willingly pay half of such 
interest rate on micro loans, this ranged between 20% and 50% (Dehejia et 
al., 2012).  
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2.4 Review of Relevant Theories of Microfinance 
This section reviews relevant theories of microfinance so as to understand 
some theoretical underpinning microfinance institutions and operations. To 
this end, two relevant theories of microfinance are examined, namely, social 
welfare function and indifference- possibility curves approach to mission drift 
to shed light on mechanism by which microfinance affect the welfare of the 
society. 
2.4.1 Social Welfare function of Microfinance   
The social welfare function of Morduch (1999), shed light on how 
microfinance programme impact on the welfare of the society by putting into 
consideration the views of both welfarists and instutionalists in a social 
function. Social welfare function of a society (W) was represented by a 
stream of individual households‟ welfare i.e. . The 
social welfare of the entire population was derived by the addition of 
individual welfare, such that  , where  stands for social welfare 
parameter for the ith household and i = 1, 2 ….n and  is the household‟s 
welfare. The model further assumed that household‟s welfare is divided into 
two components of base income  and borrowed income , such that 
The total loan borrowed is symbolized by  while average 
return per unit for borrower is represented which could be in the form of 
monetary return or non-monetary return and the average interest that 
borrower pay as interest is represented by  as shown in equation 2.1. He 
further assumed that , which is the borrowed income, is a function of total 



















amount of loan , interest rate and the difference between average 
return per unit such that . Therefore, changes in social 
welfare owing to changes in subsidies now become: 
……………………(2.1) 
The equation 2.1 above illustrates changes in social welfare resulting 
from changes in interest rate .  Morduch (1999) concluded that the 
debate between welfarist and institutionalist about subsidies and 
sustainability stem from different views and weights attached to social 
welfare parameter . The institutionalist that oppose subsidies tend to 
assume equal distribution of social weights by assuming positive 
relationship between interest rate and returns  , low 
responsiveness of credit demand to interest rate , and negative 
externalities of subsidized credit programme. On the other hand, welfarist 
places greater emphasis on social weight by assuming that demand for 
credit is highly sensitive to interest rate, and place more premiums on 
consumption of the poor.  
2.4.2 Indifference-possibility Curves Approach to Mission Drift 
The theoretical framework for microfinance mission drift was provided by 
Copestake (2007) which illustrates microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
preferences using a set of indifference curves of F1, F2 and F3 as in the 
figure 2.1 below: The vertical axis of the graph represents social 
performance of MFIs (SP) and horizontal axis denotes the financial 
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performance of MFIs (FP). The negative relationship between SP and FP 
implies that the more MFIs focus on social objectives, the less is able to 
achieve its financial objective of making profit, the reverse holds when it 
focus more on financial performance. 
Figure 2.1: Strategic Options Facing MFI  
 
Source: Adapted from Copestake (2007) 
 
The Copestake (2007) as illustrated in graph above assumes a trade-off 
between social and financial performance of microfinance institutions. The 
indifference curves F1, F2 and F3 represent different levels of combinations 
of financial and social performances whereby MFIs‟ utilities are the same, 
and movement to higher indifference curve implies higher level of overall 
performance of MFIs. Point m1 represents current performance of MFIs 
whereby it operates below the optimum level. The line m2-m4 is the 
possibilities curve whereby MFIs can transform to higher level of 
indifference curve (F2) or higher level of performance through innovations, 
operational reforms, investment reforms and policy change. The vertical 
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arrow (2), below the possibility curve (m2-m4), represents strategy, 
whereby, social objective of MFIs would not worsen financial performance, 
while the horizontal arrow (4) represents MFIs‟ strategy whereby improving 
financial performance would not worsen social performance. The arrow 
pointing to m3, where possibility curve intersects with indifference curve 
(F2), represents the optimum strategy of MFIs. While the arrow pointing to 
m2 shows a trade-off, whereby, MFIs give more attention to social 
objectives at the expense of financial performance. However, the arrow 
pointing to m4 represents a trade-off strategy of MFIs that gives more 
preference to financial performance at the expense of social performance. 
Copestake (2007) noted that these strategic options available to MFIs in 
their decision making process, illustrate the possibility of MFIs‟ mission drift. 
An MFI that adopt policies that intentionally aimed at improving its current 
performance from (m1) to optimum level at point (m3), but if it eventually 
ends up at point m4 where more attention is given to financial performance 
at expense of social performance,  Copestake (2007) termed such 
phenomenon as mission failure. If at this new point m4, an MFI fails to adopt 
deliberate policies to return to its original target m3, he called such 
phenomenon MFIs “mission drift”. Mission drift occurs when there is a shift 
in the composition of MFIs‟ from the poor clients to the wealthier ones (Cull, 
et al. 2007).This illustrate the concern expressed in Yunus‟ proposition that 
the demand for higher profit (financial performance) by MFIs might crowd 




2.5 Empirical Literature Review 
This subsection in chapter 2 reviews relevant empirical literature on the 
issues this thesis tries to addressed. These issues include literature on 
drivers of sustainability, interest rate, mission drift and women outreach and 
repayment rate of microfinance institutions mostly in developing countries.    
2.5.1 Empirical Literature on Drivers of Sustainability: A Review 
The recent empirical literature tries to shed light on microfinance 
sustainability; the microfinance sustainability came to limelight because of 
paradox between sustainability and poverty reduction objective of 
microfinance. Sustainability simply means ability to sustain “ongoing 
concern” of microfinance institutions without the use of subsidies. Various 
authors, such as Sharma and Nepal (1997), Woolcock (1999), Woller et al. 
(1999), Tucker and Miles (2004), and Pollinger et al. (2007) expressed their 
views on sustainability. It is defined as the ability to sustain viability of a 
program without recourse to both domestic and foreign subsidies; surplus of 
operating income over operating cost; and ability to cover annual budgets 
without donations, grants and other fundraising. The emphasis on 
microfinance sustainability is spurred by the belief that it can help MFIs to 
gain economies of scale and reach larger numbers of borrowers. Gibbons 
and Meehan (1999) noted that sustainable microfinance institutions easily 
gain access to private capital or loans which empower them to lend more to 
their clients and in turn improve repayment rate. Sustainability is attained 
through profit seeking by raising interest rate but not necessarily implies 
total eradication of subsidies (Tucker and Miles, 2004). In the work of 
Brewer et al. (1996) on Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) 
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performance during 1958 – 1996 pointed to the danger subsidies such as 
having access to subsidized funding. While Gulli (1998) emphasizes the 
need for microfinance institutions to charge enough interest rate to cover 
operational costs. The reason for continuous reliance on subsidies was 
identified in the work of Tang et al. (2002) as failure to charge sufficient 
interest rate within the ambit of law to cover associated expenses and risks 
of microfinance operations. 
The drive for profit seeking moves microfinance toward sustainability but not 
without other challenges. For example, Tucker and Miles (2004) noted that 
sustainability could threaten poverty reduction objective of microfinance by 
limiting access of the poor to capital. The increasing scale of microfinance 
resulting from microfinance sustainability, if not properly managed, can itself 
increase portfolio at risk and bad debts of microfinance institutions (Gulli, 
1998).  
CGAP (2004) shows that interest rate ceilings as obtainable in about 40 
developing and transitional countries could hurt the poor by making 
recovery of high administrative cost of small loans impossible, cause 
unintended effects and reduce transparency about true cost of loans. The 
study suggests that the best way to reduce interest on micro loans without 
promoting microfinance un-sustainability was to encourage innovation and 
competition in the industry as this would improve efficiency and lower 
prices. Whereas, abusive lending with no regard to repayment capacity, 
unacceptable collection techniques and deceptive terms of contracts could 
harm the poor more than high interest rate. The increasing drive and call to 
profit oriented microfinance motivated Roberts (2013) to examine 
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relationship between interest rate and commercialized of microfinance 
institutions. The study consistently affirmed positive relationship between 
profits oriented MFIs and high interest, but the result also showed that 
higher interest rate did not translate to higher profitability.  To test the fear 
by some that profit maximizing interest rate would make MFIs to 
compromise its original objective, Dehejia et al. (2012) examined the impact 
of increasing interest rate on MFIs loans in the slums of Dhaka. They 
estimated interest elasticity that range between -0.73 to -1.04 using 
unanticipated between-branch variations in prices with the result pointing to 
the upper end of the range. The result of the study shows that increase in 
income of MFIs arising from high interest was from increased earnings from 
better off customers, but the demand for loans by new and smaller-scale 
clients fell.  
Wambugu and Ngugi (2012) emphasized the necessity of microfinance 
institutions to be sustainable in order to reach more poor in the society as 
this would help the industry to source more capital instead of relying on 
subsidies. In achieving such objective, the study investigates factors that 
could aid sustainability using random sampling of 30 per cent of the total 
population of 135 lower and middle staff of Women Finance Trust Deposit 
taking microfinance institution in Kenya. The findings from the study show 
that branch network, services delivery, capital adequacy and staff training 
are four important variables influencing sustainability. Contributing in a 
pragmatic way to eliminate poverty in Africa, Tehulu (2013) pointed out that 
microfinance institutions must be sustainable. Giving that in focus and 
prevalence of poverty in East Africa, the author was compelled to examine 
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empirically the determinants of financial sustainability of microfinance 
institutions in this region. The study basically used unbalanced panel data of 
23 microfinance institutions in East Africa during 2004-2009. The findings 
from the study show that financial sustainability is driven positively by size 
and loan intensity, it also shows that portfolio at risk and management 
inefficiency has negative influence on sustainability while the impact of 
deposit mobilization and outreach were not significant.  
Moreover, Adongo and Stork (2005) used ordinary least square in cross-
sectional framework to examine factors driving the financial sustainability of 
some microfinance institutions in Namibia. The study found that most 
microfinance institutions in Namibia are unsustainable and the degree of un-
sustainability is worse for the multi-purpose co-operative than micro-lender. 
Further finding shows that at the start of business, donor funding has strong 
influence on financial sustainability. Also, Kimando et al. (2012) show that 
the prominence of microfinance as a strategy for poverty reduction in the 
recent past but  acknowledged that many operators of microfinance services 
still struggle with sustainability of the institution. The study therefore probed 
into the factors the influence microfinance sustainability within the Muranga 
Municipality. The finding from the study indicated that financial sustainability 
is highly influenced by factors such as volume of credit, number of clients 
served, financial regulations and financial coverage but these factors are 
interwoven and interconnected. 
In addition, knowing the key objective of microfinance institutions as poverty 
reduction, Rahman and Mazlan (2014) examined factors that influence 
financial self-sustainability of microfinance institutions in Bangladesh. Their 
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findings show that the greater number of microfinance institutions in 
Bangladesh is financially sustainable. It further shows that financial 
sustainability is positively driven by yield on gross loan portfolio, cost per 
borrower, personnel productivity ratio and size of MFIs, while number of 
active borrowers, age, operating expenses ratio, average loan balance per 
borrowers and debt to equity ratio have negative influence of sustainability. 
For microfinance to achieve its primary objective of poverty reduction, Ayayi 
and Sene (2010) observed that microfinance has become a profitable 
venture. They therefore sought to know empirically the factors that drive 
sustainability of the industry using data of 217 MFIs in 101 countries during 
1998-2006. They discovered from the study that sustainability is driven 
strongly by high interest rate and high quality of credit. Further findings also 
show that age and client outreach helped the attainment of financial 
sustainability but the impact was relatively small, while the influence of 
women was negative and insignificant.  
The study conducted by Nadiya et al. (2012) showed the danger of 
neglecting factors that could derail microfinance institutions‟ objective in 
India. The study used 50 Indian MFIs during 2005-2009 to examine factors 
that affect operational self-sustainability in India using multiple regression 
analysis.  Findings from the study indicate that cost efficiency factor, 
revenue generation factor and growth factor positively impacted on self-
sustainability, while average loan size per borrower, portfolio risk factor and 
development factor impacted negatively.  
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2.5.2 Empirical Literature on Mission Drift: A Review 
2.5.2.1 Mission Drift Measurement Issues 
In the recent time, various studies such as Ghost and Van Tassel (2008), 
Copestake (2007), Cull et al. (2007), Rosenberg (2009), Mersland and 
Strom (2010), Schreiner (2010), Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) and 
Hermes et al. (2011). They have measured mission drift with different 
indicators, such as average loan size, percentage of women borrowers, 
lending methodology, the percentage of clients in the bottom half of the 
population, poverty gap ratio and poverty scorecards. However, there is 
consensus that average loan size serves as a simple proxy indictor and 
therefore most studies adopt average loan size as an indicator of mission 
drift. For example, Cull et al. (2007) uses average loan size and percentage 
of women borrowers, while Mersland and Strom (2010) employs MFIs‟ main 
market, borrower‟s gender and lending methodology as indicators of 
mission drift. Hermes et al. (2011) uses other indicators such as average 
saving balance, average loan balance and the percentage of clients in the 
bottom half of the population. Ghost and Van Tassel (2008) and Schreiner 
(2010) suggest the use of poverty gap ratio and poverty scorecards, 
respectively, however, in actual practice, the last two measures are difficult 
to implement. This thesis uses average loan size and percentage of lending 
to women as measures of mission drift. Thus, a reduction in average loan 
size, a proxy for outreach, is likely to be associated with the increase in the 
depth of outreach, while the reverse holds when there is increase in 




There is paucity of studies that try to shed light on growing concern of 
microfinance mission drift in Nigeria. However, in other developing countries 
there are plethora of studies on this issue, however, their findings are at 
variance, with some affirming mission drift; others refute it while some call 
for further research on the issue. Studies such as CGAP (2001), Milgram 
(2001), Dichter (2002) as cited by Hishigsuren 2004, Dehejia et al. (2005), 
Coleman (2006), Cull et al. (2007), Hishigsuren (2007), Cull et al. (2009), 
Maskay (2011), Serrano-Cinca and Gutierrez-Nieto (2014) and Abrar and 
Javaid (2014) empirically proved the existence of mission drift. Others such 
as Gonzales-Vega et al. (1997), Christen (2000), Navajas et al. (2000), 
Hishigsuren (2007), Frank (2008) and Mersland and Strom (2010) did not 
find evidence of mission drift in their studies, while the study by Campion 
and White (1999) called for further research and Armendariz and Szafarz 
(2009), and  D‟Espallier and Szafarz (2013) could not ascertain whether 
mission drift occurred or not. 
In the early 2000s, the growing entrance of commercialized microfinance 
institutions and the rising levels of competition, profitability and 
predominance of regulated institutions in Latin America prompted the CGAP 
to conduct a study that assessed the effect of new entry of players to the 
industry. The result of the study shows that the new entries promote market 
deepening, penetration and saturate the market. The result also indicates 
that larger loan balances of commercial oriented MFIs suggest that they 
have been driven away from their primary objective of serving the poor 
(CGAP, 2001).   
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The study conducted by Milgram (2001) in northern Philippines contrasting 
self-sustaining and pro-poor new microfinance program, the author 
discovered that the quest to become self-sustaining makes microfinance 
institution (MFI) susceptible to target not-so-poor clients. While Ditcher 
(2002) as cited by Hishigsuren (2004) used clients profiles such as 
rural/urban, poor/better-off and rural/urban of the NGOs MFIs to study 
mission drift, he found that MFIs lend more short-term loans to retail and 
trade in urban areas as against lending to the poor in rural area, thereby 
shifting focus from the poorest. Also, Dehejia et al. (2005) uses SafeSave 
MFI working in slums in Dakha, Bangladesh to examine sensitivity of clients 
to high interest associated with sustainable microfinance, they found that 
poor clients are more sensitive to variations in interest rate than the 
wealthier clients and thereby bank‟s portfolio shifts away from the poorest 
clients.  
Moreover, Cull et al. (2007) employed cross-country data to examine the 
possibility of MFIs having profit motive and still serving the poor and 
confirmed trade-off between profitability and poverty reduction motive, which 
implies mission drift syndrome. Also, Cull et al. (2009) further corroborates 
their earlier finding of mission drift, using gender and average loan size to 
test the effect of microfinance commercialization on poverty reduction. They 
concluded that commercialization of microfinance is indeed a bad news for 
the poor, as it is associated with increasing loan size and less focus on 
women. The methodology proposed by Hishigsuren (2007) to better 
understand scaling up and social mission shows that mission drift is not a 
deliberate policy of MFIs‟ management but the product of the process of 
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scaling up. The changing priority and performance which many argued 
could lead to MFIs abandoning its original mission of improving welfare of 
the poor prompted Maskay (2011) to study Paschimanchal Grameen Bikas 
Bank (PGBB) founded in 1995 in Western Development Region of Nepal. 
The author used both quantitative approaches to examine factors that 
influence mission drift namely, politics, policy and institutional environment. 
The study found that evidence of mission drift for one and a half decade that 
spanned through 1995/96 – 2010/201, the finding also shows that out of 
three indicators used to test the performance of PGBB during the period, 
institutional environment is the most significant factor; the study calls for 
effective microfinance policy to minimize the occurrence of mission drift in 
Nepal.   
More also, the increased drive to achieve financial sustainability motivate 
Wagenaar (2012) to investigate evidence of mission drift among 
transformed MFIs from non-profit MFIs using panel data analysis of 1,558 
MFIs spanning fifteen years. The finding based on 8,794 observations 
indicated significantly higher average loans and significantly lower 
percentage of women borrower for profit MFIs than for non-profit MFIs. 
From the same study, the result of the smaller sample of 3,818 observations 
for both non-transformed and transformed NGOs out of which 511 
observations are for transformed NGOs show that transformation of NGOs 
to profit-oriented MFIs could lead to mission drift. The results indicate that 
the transformed MFIs have higher average loan and lower lending to 
women clients than non-transformed NGOs. To test for who benefit from 
microfinance services between the poor and wealthy in Northeast Thailand 
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villages, Coleman (2006) exploited survey method sample of participants of 
microfinance services and non-participants i.e. those that had not benefited 
from the programmes. The aim was test measure the success of the 
microfinance programme, if the programme had succeeded in reaching the 
poorest of the poor. The results from the survey show that the programme 
had not reached the poor as much as to the wealthy and that the wealthy 
clients circumvent the rules and use their influence to borrow significant 
loans when compared with the rank-and-file clients. In view of the findings, 
the study recommended strict focus on the poor and enforcement of 
eligibility criteria.  
Moreover, Serrano-Cinca and Gutierrez-Nieto (2014) used the long tail 
theory which is based on Pareto‟s 80/20 Principle to prove that some MFIs 
have lost focus of their mission of poverty reduction. They pointed out that 
MFIs mission is to empower women in rural communities that were 
excluded from formal financial services. Applying Pareto principle which 
asserts that wealth distribution within a population exhibits unequal pattern 
(long tail) rather than normal distribution of bell-curve. They show that MFIs 
clients fall into the tail of the wealth distribution category whereby 
transactional costs are high, need for subsidies to augment low revenue and 
lack of deposit. They argue that MFIs paying more attention on financial 
performance could lead to mission drift, they therefore, suggest efficient use 
of technology by leveraging on e-commerce to reduce high yield associated 
with tail end of wealth distribution where MFIs operates. Contributing to the 
debate of microfinance commercialization and mission drift, Abrar and 
Javad (2014) used data of microfinance institutions from 72 countries from 
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the six regions of the world, in a panel data framework to test for mission 
drift. The result from the random effect model confirms existence of mission 
drift owing to commercialization of microfinance and support the claim by 
Yunus that the industry is heading to mission drift by ignoring social 
objective of empowering the poor.  
However, the work of Christen (2000) on MFIs in Latin America using 
average loan size did not empirically find evidence of mission drift of MFIs 
due to commercialization. Also, Navajas et al. (2000) uses different 
indicators of outreach in Bolivia such as depth, breadth and length of 
outreach, worth to users and scope of output to test for mission drift. Their 
finding rather shows that the depth of outreach to the poorest improves, 
which implies the absence of mission drift. The work of Hishigsuren (2007) 
gives insight to socially minded process of scaling up. Using Activists for 
Social Alternatives (ASA) as a case study to examine the extent by which 
socially minded MFIs drifting away from the mission of poverty reduction in 
the process of scaling up.  The result of the findings show that mission drift 
was not as a result of management deliberate decisions but challenges 
associated with the process of scaling up.    Frank (2008) focuses on the 
effect of transformation process on some selected control 25 MFIs vis-à-vis 
non-governmental organizations‟ (NGOs) MFIs. He uses average loan size, 
portfolio growth, saving mobilization, client, profitability and shareholding 
structure indicators for the analysis. The finding re-affirms that 




To clear doubt express by Yunus and other welfarists that 
commercialization could possibly drift away MFIs from its primary goal of 
targeting the poor for poverty reduction, Mersland and Strom (2010) used 
data from rated MFIs in seventy-four (74) countries during 1998-2008 in 
panel date econometric framework to test mission drift. The finding of their 
study shows no evidence of mission drift but confirms positive and 
significant relationship between increases in average loan size and average 
profit and average operational costs. They conclude that rather than 
focusing on MFIs commercialization, attention should be focused on 
reducing costs to reach out to poorer segment of the society.    
Also, Campion and White (1999) employs data from K-Rep, CARD and 
MiBanco to test and to answer some mission drift issues using loan size 
indicator, they find evidence of shift toward the poorer clients, conflict in 
customer relation and increased transaction cost. Armendariz and Szafarz 
(2009) opined that phenomenon of microfinance mission drift was poorly 
understood and that the process of scaling-up is not limited to transaction 
cost reduction but also a product of interplay of cost differentials between 
poor and unbanked rich clients, MFIs mission and other country specific 
heterogeneous factors. Contributing to the MFIs mission drift, D‟Espallier 
and Szafarz (2013) observe that substantial numbers of MFIs are still 
subsidized despite increasing call self-sustainability in reaching more poor. 
The study compared unsubsidized MFIs‟ performances with that of 
subsidized MFIs with the aim to test whether each category actually 
achieves its aim of poverty reduction taking into cognizance their 
geographical disparities. Their overall finding shows that subsidized MFIs 
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are better-off in meeting its social objective. However, the performances of 
unsubsidized MFIs vary across regions, Africa unsubsidized MFIs charge 
higher interest rate to compensate for non-subsidization, while unsubsidized 
MFIs Central Asia target less poor customers and that of Latin American 
reduces lending to women clients to compensate non-subsidization. The 
study shows that absence of subsidies does not necessarily imply profit 
orientation but regional characteristics matters.     
In a study by Christen (2000) on Latin America testing for relationship 
between microfinance commercialization and mission drift, he concluded 
that commercialization of microfinance did not show any significant 
difference effect on loan size between non-regulated and regulated 
microfinance institutions. However, the subsequent work by Olivares-
Polanco (2005) on 28 Latin America MFIs using multiple regression analysis 
indicated that more competition lead to larger loan sizes and less depth of 
outreach  and point to the existence of trade-off between sustainability and 
depth of outreach in Latin America. Zerai and Rani (2012) tested trade-off 
between outreach to the poor and financial sustainability in India using 2009 
data of 85 microfinance institutions in correlation matric framework. The 
study denied the existence of trade-off between outreach and financial 
sustainability; it however, confirmed significant positive relationship between 
the breadth of outreach proxy by number of active borrowers and 
operational sustainability. 
Moreover, to answer questions that relate to profit maximizing microfinance-
lending organizations and their outreach to the poor borrowers, Conning 
(1999) analysed 72 profit maximizing microfinance organizations around the 
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world. The finding from the study shows that delegation costs and moral 
hazard arising from the inter-relationship among loan staff, borrowers, 
investors and equity-owners and endogenous monitoring influenced the 
outcomes of trade-off between sustainability and outreach to the poor. He 
recommended higher interest rates for profit-maximising organization in 
pursuance of sustainability. Also, Hermes et al. (2011) provides new insight 
to the trade-off between sustainability and outreach of MFIs employing 435 
MFIs data during 1997-2007. The study uses cost efficiency as a proxy for 
sustainability vis-à-vis the depth out outreach proxy by percentage of 
women borrowers and average loan size in a stochastic frontier analysis 
framework. The findings from their study affirm strong evidence negative 
relationship between efficiency and outreach; it further shows that less 
efficiency was associated with outreach to the poor.  
Bringing to bear the importance of regulation as it affects MFIs‟ performance 
and the attendant effects on outreach, Cull et al. (2011) used data of 245 
microfinance institutions to test the relationship. The authors show that 
prudential regulation and supervision had enabled MFIs to raise deposit 
from the public but at the same time tend to raise the cost of MFIs‟ lending. 
The study finding shows that though supervision was positively related with 
the average loan size, it was negatively related to the percentage of women 
borrowers.  Contributing to the literature on whether the increased self-
sustainability drive has displaced the target audience of MFIs, Louis et al. 
(2013) uses 2011 cross-country data sample of 650 MFI to investigate the 
issue.  The finding confirms positive relationship between financial efficiency 
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and social outreach; however, the result did not suggest rise in social 
performance even in the face of less financial efficiency.  
2.5.3 Empirical Literature on Women Outreach and Repayment: A 
Review 
Previous literature shed light on the relationship between gender and 
repayment but their findings remain unclear; there are divergences of views 
on the issue. Some studies claim positive relation exists between lending to 
women and repayment, some other studies provide explanations for the 
existence of positive relationship. Some after some controls attribute high 
repayment to other factors aside lending to women while some refute the 
claim of positive relationship between gender and repayment.  
In the work of D‟espallier et al. (2011) the impact of gender on microfinance 
repayment of loans was examined. Global dataset of 350 MFIs that cut 
across 70 countries was used to probe the belief that female clients of MFIs 
exhibit better credit risks than male counterpart. Their findings revealed that 
higher proportion of female lending was associated negatively with all 
indicators of repayment namely, portfolio at risk, provision expense rate and 
write-off rate. Their results further show that their interaction effects still 
confirm that lending to women generally enhances repayment rate and that 
the effect was more pronounced in regulated MFIs, NGOs based MFIs and 
individual lending model. Aside that gender enhances microfinance loans 
repayment, the subsequent work of D‟espallier et al. (2013) probes 
evidences of likely consequences of having conscious gender bias toward 
female clients in microfinance. The study uses global dataset of 379 
observations that cut across 73 countries to explain the possible bias that 
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gender bias institutions could have on financial performance. The result of 
this second study indicates that women bias microfinance institutions would, 
though, enhance repayment, but overall would not beneficial to financial 
performance. The finding further reveals that higher cost of smaller loan 
arising from focusing on women would offset the positive effect of gender on 
repayment. The study conducted by Godquin (2004) however supports the 
claim that gender enhances microfinance repayment. The study used a 
quasi-experimental survey data in a probit regression framework to examine 
the determinants of repayment performance in Bangladesh during 1991-
1992. Although, the study shows that gender coefficient was negative which 
implies that smaller loans are allocated to female clients, and bias against 
women borrowing, it however shows that female clients did not have lower 
repayment when compare with the male clients. 
 Moreover, in trying to understand the determinants of repayment 
performance in Bangladesh, Sharma and Zeller (1997) analysed repayment 
rates of 128 credit groups that belong to three major microfinance 
institutions namely, Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service, Association for Social 
Advancement and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. The 
result of the TOBIT regression indicates that repayment rate could be 
improved even in the remote villages if microfinance institutions adhere to 
basic prudential principles. The finding further reveals that the coefficient of 
gender was significant and negative on the loans delinquency dependent 
variable which is an indication that default rate decreases as lending to 
women improves. Also, Roslan and Karim (2009) examine drivers of loan 
repayment among microcredit borrowers from Agrobank in Malaysia. In all 
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2630 respondents from 86 branches of the bank were surveyed to generate 
data for probit and logit models used in the study. Their results show that 
gender of borrower significantly influence loan repayment so also the 
repayment period, type of business activities, training and loan size. Further 
analysis of their result also indicates female borrowers‟ default probability is 
lower than male borrowers. Besides, their finding shows that borrowers in 
productive activities have higher probability of default than those in service/ 
support services.  
Notwithstanding the high repayment rate records of the clients of 
microfinance Institute Esperanza International in Dominican Republic, 
Salazar (2008) examines possible cause of the remaining 3 to 5 per cent 
default rate. The study analyses   15,104 loans shared amongst 8,991 
clients during 2005 and 2007 vis-a-vis loan repayment variables which 
included gender and the result shows the four variables namely regional 
office, education gender and marital status explain variation in  default rates. 
The result further shows that married and widowed women and those with 
less education default less.  In attempt to examine factors driving 
microfinance loans repayment rate in Malaysia, Nawai and Shariff (2012) 
employed data from the survey on 309 respondents of TEKUN Nasional 
clients, Peninsular using multinomial logit model framework. The result of 
the study confirms that gender significantly influenced loans repayment with 
other variables and that pressure from microfinance institutions contribute to 
the delay in repayment of loans.  
To test the assertion that female clients are better risks than male clients, 
Saravia-Matus and Saravia-Matus (2012) use a logit model that takes 
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cognisance of loans, economic situations and borrowers‟ characteristics to 
test gender impact on repayment performance. The study utilized 
Nicaraguan microfinance institution‟s loans during 2003 and 2004, the result 
was insightful as evidence shown that female clients‟ repayment out-
performed that of the male clients at the conventional level, but when other 
exogenous economic conditions were factored in, the perceived difference 
in gender risk was lower than expected, pointing to significance of economic 
environment not gender in determining factors that influence repayment 
performance.    
In trying to explain why women exhibit higher repayment of loan, Boehe and 
Cruz (2013) combined qualitative data provided by Desjardins International 
Development (DID) mission report on eight developing countries during 
1970-2010, 250 pages of transcribed in-depth interview and other mission 
reports to examine why female clients of  cooperative MFIs affect debt 
repayment rate. The findings of the study show that under some constraints 
such as limited access to education, limited professional opportunities and 
restricted mobility which limit women economic activities to informal market, 
women develop more relationship and managerial capacities than their male 
counterpart. These constraints consequently make women more focus on 
their micro business which eventually help them to pay their loans.  
Contrary to earlier findings the work of Crabb and Keller (2006) suggest that 
lending to women would rather worsening portfolio at risk rather than 
improving it. They use large cross sectional data from many microfinance 
institutions of the world to examine risk factors in portfolios and found 
consistently that lending to women raises portfolio at risk which implies low 
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repayment. The finding also shows that the effect gender lending is 
mitigated by group lending, and therefore calls for the usage of both group 
and individual lending models in the process of scaling up the industry. Also, 
Afrane and Adusei (2014) test the validity of female clients‟ superiority to 
men clients in loan repayment using data of 754 loan customers from three 
microfinance institutions in Ghana.  The results of their logistic regression 
model suggest that male clients are better-off than female clients in term of 
repayment of loans because male clients are less likely to default on their 
loans than female clients. 
Moreover, Kamanza (2014) studied causes of default on micro-credit 
through survey questionnaire among women micro-entrepreneurs in Kenya 
using Women Enterprise Development Fund (WEDF) as a case study. The 
finding from the study shows that because of loans given to clients were 
small and not sufficient for their micro businesses the returns were low 
leading to defaults in repayment of loans. Also, the competing gender roles 
among borrowers robbed majority of the clients from focusing on their 
business thereby contributing to default rate. The findings from the study 
further show that desperate conditions and other domestic challenges of the 
clients influence them to divert loans for other purposes order than the 
intending purposes and this was predominant among married women.    
There are studies that exist on Nigeria, they include Njoku and Odii (1991), 
Oke et al. (2007), Eze and Ibekwe (2007), Ugwumba et al. (2008), 
Ugbomeh (2008), Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008), Mkpado et al. (2010), 
Julius and Aminant (2011), Onyeagocha et al. (2012) and Nwosu et al. 
(2014). For example, Njoku and Odii (1991) examine factors that account 
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for the low repayment rate of about 27 per cent under the Special 
Emergency Loan Scheme (SEALS) in Imo state, Southeastern Nigeria, a 
scheme that seek at providing short-term micro loans to smallholders for 
food production. The finding from the study shows that cumbersome loan 
application processes, political influence, loan diversion and low returns, 
amongst others significant factors, contribute to low repayment rate.  
On average, microcredit repayment rate in Southwestern Nigeria rate was 
estimated to be 90 per cent by Oke et al. (2007). The study employs linear 
multiple regression analysis to examine variables that could explain iis high 
repayment rate using multi-stage stratified random sampling method to 
generate the data from 200 clients of microfinance institutions in the area. 
Their result shows that, although, clients of microcredit institutions are credit 
worthy but the remaining 10 per cent loan defaults was due to poverty of 
members.  Also, Eze and Ibekwe (2007) randomly survey fifteen 
communities in Orlu Local Government of Imo State to examine factors that 
influence indigenous financial institutions‟ clients‟ loan repayment and it was 
found that loan size, age of the clients, occupation years of educations and 
household size are the principal variables that drive microcredit repayment 
rate. 
In trying to understand the drivers of microfinance cooperators‟ loan 
repayment in Anambra State, Ugwumba et al. (2008) surveyed 95 
cooperative societies that got loans from NACRDB in central Senatorial 
Zone of Anambra State which made up of 7 local government areas. The 
findings from the study show that over 62 per cent of the co-operators repay 
their loans as at when due and that other variables such as cost of 
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investment, access to information, social cultural activities and amount of 
loan significantly and positively related on repayment of loan. Although this 
study was based on survey methodology which could be subject to 
sampling bias, it did not cover the impact of gender which is the focus of this 
thesis. Ugbomeh (2008) also examines the determinants of loan repayment 
from some selected women self-help groups in Bayelsa state Nigeria. 
Multistage sampling technique was used to survey about 112 clients who 
are women farmers and had benefited from microcredit. The finding from 
the study shows that women household heads, household size and interest 
rate account for the 17.3 per cent default rate while group formation and 
price stability of farm proceeds drive the 83.7 per cent of the repayment 
rate. The study conducted by Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008) seeks to 
understand socio-economic factors driving loan repayment among small 
scale farmers in Ogbomosho agricultural zone of Oyo state in Nigeria. Five 
local government areas were selected for the study and multi-stage 
sampling technique was also adopted for the selected 100 respondents 
within the selected areas. The data generated from the survey was 
analysed using ordinary least square multiple regression technique. Their 
finding shows that loan size, level of education and years of experience of 
farmers significantly and positively influences loan repayment while age of 
farmers negatively impacted on loan repayment. 
Also, the study conducted by Mkpado et al. (2010), survey a total of 45 
micro-credit group in nine local government of area of Enugu State using 
multi-stage sampling techniques. The results of their study suggest the 
significance of gender, social cohesion, occupation, distance and residency 
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in explaining micro-credit repayment. The study is limited in coverage which 
limits its general application and could also subject to sampling errors.  
Moreover, Julius and Aminant (2011) use Chi-square non-parametric 
method of analysis to understand factors that underlie conscious gender 
bias toward women in Nigeria. A stratified random sampling technique was 
applied to select states, local governments and people living in rural areas 
in the survey. The finding from their study suggests that targeting women is 
not significant by targeting the poor as a whole. The study did not really 
shows the effect of focusing on gender on repayment of microfinance 
institutions in Nigeria.  
In the empirical work Onyeagocha et al. (2012) that attempted to 
understand the determinants of loan repayment of microfinance institutions 
in the Southeast States of Nigeria. The coverage was limited to three states 
namely Imo, Ebonyi and Enugu out of five states from southeast region. The 
authors used cross-sectional data and multi-stage sampling technique to 
select 36 MFIs from the three states. The findings from the study indicates 
that the repayment rates for formal, semi-formal and informal microfinance 
institutions are 56.6, 84.9 and 100 per cent, respectively, and average 
repayment for institution is 80.5 per cent. The finding further shows that 
gender variable is not significant in explaining repayment but training 
duration, loan size, outreach and experience of credit officers have 
significant impacts. A similar study was conducted by Nwosu et al. (2014) 
that examine access to loan and repayment performance of livestock 
farmers under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund in Southeast, 
Nigeria. Out of the existing five states in the Southeast, two states were 
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choosing for the analysis namely, Imo and Ebonyi states and the data 
generated from the simple random survey technique were used to estimate 
regression model. The result of the factors influencing loan repayment 
shows that total income, education, age, livestock value and household size 
significantly influencing loan repayment.  
A critical appraisal of studies conducted on Nigeria show that first, they are 
limited in scope; second, they are majorly based on survey methodology 
and third, they focus on general determinants of loan repayment. For 
example, the scope of most of the reviewed studies are either limited to two 
or three states out of the 36 existing states or at maximum, on one geo-
political zone out of six existing zones in Nigeria. This defect makes it 
difficult to apply majority of the findings to the entire country as a whole. 
Second, nearly all the reviewed studies are based on simple random survey 
techniques which are prone to measurements errors and other estimation 
biases.  Lastly, these studies did not specifically address the research 
question, whether greater focus on women could improve microfinance loan 
repayment.  
2.5.4 Review of Approaches of Impact Studies  
This section reviews different approaches of microfinance impact studies. It 
reviews the existing empirical literature on these approaches in the past two 
decades with a view to bring to fore various methodologies, outcome 
variables and findings on the subject matter. See appendix 3 for the details 
of the review.  
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Estimating the impact analysis of microfinance has been an onerous task 
because measuring relationship between microfinance credit and outcome 
variable of interest is influenced by the focus or level of analysis and 
methodological challenges. For instance, different levels for which 
microfinance impact is analysed, which could be individual, household, 
enterprise, community, institutional can affect the outcome variables 
(FEMIP, 2008).  Moreover, country specific effects such as political 
instability, macroeconomic environment, economic depression, amongst 
others, which are not integrated in the impact models can influence the final 
result (FEMIP, 2008). More importantly, Hulme (2000) identified major 
methodological problems of selection bias and fungibility which could arise 
because of differences in invisible characteristics between treated and 
control group, locational selection and micro credit fungibility amongst 
others. Fungibility arises if the micro credit or loan is not use for the 
intended purposes. Fungibility of credit remains critical unresolved issue in 
microfinance impact analysis. It arises mainly from inability of poor 
households to separate household activities from micro enterprises and 
could lead to over estimation of microfinance impact analysis (Khandker, 
1998b and Husain, 1998).  
The review of methodological approaches to microfinance identified five 
methods of measuring the impact of microfinance on the outcome variables 
namely, randomised control trials approach (RCTs), pipeline approach, 
with/without approach, analytical approach and natural experiments 
approach (Duvendack et al. 2011). These approaches are explained in 




This section has examined the conceptual and theoretical issue of 
microfinance. Conceptual issues focus on definition of microfinance while 
the theoretical examined the transmission mechanism by which 
microfinance affects development. It has also carefully reviewed the existing 
empirical studies on drivers of microfinance sustainability, interest rate, 
mission drift and women outreach and repayment. Also, there are 
divergences of findings owing to differences in methodologies and focus of 
studies over the review periods. From the reviewed empirical literature, it 
becomes clear that divergence of views exist on these issues that call for 
empirical re-examination, especially in Nigeria, where some of these issues 
have not been subjected to empirical test. In some few cases where related 
studies had been conducted in Nigeria, such studies often lack reliable data 
and wider coverage of the industry. In addition, the thesis reviewed 











Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria: History, Regulatory Framework 
and Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the history of evolution, regulations and 
performance of microfinance institutions in Nigeria. The first section traces 
the history of microfinance institutions. It reviews the regulatory framework 
of microfinance banks in Nigeria. The chapter also appraised the 
performance of microfinance banks in Nigeria during 2011 – 2014.  
3.2 History of Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria 
The history of microfinance institutions in Nigeria has evolved over the years 
from native microfinance institution to financial cooperative, NGOs and 
government microfinance initiatives (Table 3.1). 








History of native MFIs dated back to the practice of 
rotating savings and credit association (RoSCA) 
among the Yoruba in the western region of the 
country in the 16th century (Seibel, 2004). 
   The members contribute financial resources and 
later allocate it to members in form of loan (Seibel, 
1970).  
  Savings are usually high among members. 
  Siebel and Marx (1984) showed that monthly 
saving contribution of each member on esusu 
averaged US$4.03 with average loan size of about 
US$2.00. capital averaged US$3,027.14 in 1984,    
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  Deposit collections from members are usually done 
on market days which could be daily, weekly and 
monthly or through house to house personal visit of 
members by the collectors (Seibel, 2004) 
  Group delivery methodology is a common feature 
of native microfinance in Nigeria. People of 
common interest usually form thrift groups, the 
common interest may be as a result of age group, 
common trade and profession 
  Leadership selection processes is usually not 
formal but are strongly influenced by norms and 
ethics of the society such as family background, 
stature in the society and moral characters 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The mode of operations of native microfinance in 
Nigeria is informal; it does not strictly adhere to 
written document, the mode of operations change 
as situation and time changes (Ehigiamusoe, 
2011) 
  The pricing i.e. interest on loans of native 
microfinance are usually low because they are 
limited in scope and their objective is not profit 
making but welfare of members, who are mostly 




Financial cooperatives originated from formation of 
two cocoa farmer associations namely the Ibadan 
Agricultural Society and Agege Planters Union in 
1904 and 1907 in the western part of Nigeria, 
respectively (Agbo, 2009). 
  The associations were set up primarily to extend 
credit to members to improve the quality of their 
cocoa products ( Agbetunde, 2007). 
  The growth subsequently attracted government 
attention and recognition which resulted in 
establishment of fermentaries which later became 
modern cooperative societies in Nigeria 
(Ighomereho et al. 2012).  
  The total number of registered thrift and credit 
societies subsequently grew significantly by 466 
per cent from 32 in 1939/40 to 181 in 1943/44, the 
number further increased to 314 in 1949/50. 
Membership number of the societies also grew 
from 1,203 in 1939/40 to 5,908 and 14,285 in 
1943/44 and 1949/50, respectively (Ehigiamusoe, 
2011).  
  The discovery of oil and subsequent huge revenue 
from oil inflow motivated government to intervene 
in cooperative societies by providing external 
subsidies to make the cooperatives more attractive 
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(Marx and Seibel, 2012).  
  The external subsidies did not produce the 
expected results, it rather generated unnecessary 
political inference, tribalism and lesser procedures 
for granting of loans which eventually led to lower 
loan recovery, lower saving propensity and the 
predominance of external loans and total liabilities 






The emergence of NGOs microfinance was 
motivated by social and developmental challenges 
in the 1980s such as low education, human right 
violations, and large number of unbanked 
population, epidemic and environmental 
degradation, amongst others (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The early NGOs therefore focused primarily on 
poverty alleviation but over time microfinance 
started to be their leading 
programme.(Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  The early NGOs microfinance mostly dependent 
on donor funding, because their initial capital were 
small and the contributions from borrowers were 
inadequate to meet the demand for loans 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011) 
  The scope of their outreach is often limited by their 
defined objectives because they are not out to offer 
different range of services (Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  Most early NGO-MFIs in Nigeria focus in reaching 
out to rural women (Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  The NGO-MFIs in Nigeria commonly employed 
group delivery methodology to reach out their 
clients. Clients are asked to organize into group, 
but where there are some existing age groups or 
business groups, they leverage on the existing 
groups, because rural beneficiaries live 
communally because they often belong to the 





(a) Peoples Bank of Nigeria 
  Peoples Bank was established in 1989 as a direct 
response to undesirable effects of SAP introduced 
in 1986 (Enendu et al. 2010; Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
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  The bank was wholly owned by the government 
and tailored to replicate Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh with the idea to be a pro-poor bank. 
The bank focused on the poor and basically 
targeted petty traders, artisans and farmers 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  The bank used group delivery system to reach out 
to its clients and intending borrowers which are 
usually member of the same community were 
asked to form credit groups before they could 
receive credit (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The initial total assets of the bank of about 
US$30.6 million in 1990 fell to about US$60.0 
million in 1998, however, the rate of the assets 
growth fell from 57.4 per cent in 1992 to 19.9 per 
cent in 1998, showing the dwindling fortune of the 
bank owning to poor repayment rate (Enendu et al. 
20100; Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  The systemic distress of banking industry in 
Nigeria led to the total collapse and closure of the 
Peoples Bank in 2004 (Enendu et al. 20100; 
Ehigiamusoe, 2011)  
  (b) Community Banking 
  Community banking was introduced in 1991 in 
Nigeria to complement the then existing Peoples 
Bank (Enendu et al. 2010); Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  Community banking was designed to be operated 
and capitalized by the local community rather the 
government (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The aim was to extend the financial services to low 
income people especially the rural and urban poor 
who usually operate in the informal sector 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The community bank was to be giving loan beyond 
what Peoples Bank could give and which 
commercial bank would deem too small to give to 
the local farmers and for those in food processing 
projects (Enendu et al. 2010). 
  Data from the National Board for Community 
Banks showed that within six months of its 
formation 1,055 applications for licensing were 
received, 593 applications were approved, 93 
community banks were incorporated and 30 
community banks were issued licenses. 
  Community banks were operated between 1991 
and 2004, within the period of its operations, the 
numbers of community banks grew significantly, it 




  During this period, the average deposit liabilities of 
the existing community banks was N2.88 million or 
US$0.13 million while the average loans and 
advances was estimated  N1.07 million or US$0.05 
million (CBN, 2005). 
  In 1997, the numbers of community banks 
decreased by 26% from 1,368 in the previous year, 
the number further declined to 769 and 753 in 
2002 and 2004, respectively (Enendu et al. 2010). 
However, the average deposit liabilities and 
average loans and advances improved (Enendu et 
al. 2010). The average deposit liabilities of 
community banks during 1997 to 2004 was 
estimated N20.21 million or US$0.15 million while 
the average loans and advances was N9.92 million 
or US$0.07 million (Enendu et al. 2010).   
  Challenges of community bank included  non-
performing loans which hindered them from 
meeting the demand of the depositors, under-
capitalisation, poor governance, lack of 
involvement of the local community and lack of 
adequate qualified manpower in many community 
banks ((Enendu et al. 2010; Ehigiamusoe, 2011).   
  In 2004, all existing community banks were asked 
to change to microfinance banks provided they 
meet the stipulated requirements of the central 
bank (Enendu et al. 20100; Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  (c) Family Economic Advancement Programme 
(FEAP) 
  FEAP was initiated 1997 by the government with 
the initial capital of N4.3 billion or US$0.80 billion.  
  FEAP aims at providing loan to the poor directly at 
ward level to enable them run cottage enterprises, 
engage in training activities and promote 
production and thereby reducing unemployment 
and rural-urban migration.  
  To access the fund, the intended borrowers were 
requested to either join existing cooperatives or 
form new ones. The cooperatives were then 
mandated to produce 10% of the counterpart 
funding of the loan they applied for. The loan 
applied for must be tied to approved projects that 
are within the coverage of FEAP.  
  The interest rates on loans are far below the 
prevailing market rates as only 10% interest on 
loan was charged for all categories of projects. The 
disbursement of the fund was done through the 




  The fund was fully owned by the government, it 
was subject to all kind of abuses and political 
interference which eventually defeated the 
objectives of the fund 
  (d) Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme 
  The scheme was initiated in 1977 in response to 
commercial banks‟ refusal to lend to farmers due to 
high risks involved (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  It provides guarantees to both principal and 
interest on loans commercial banks lend to 
agricultural sector of the economy.  The fund, at 
inception guarantee 75% of machinery inputs for 
both food and cash crops such as bananas, 
vegetables, cereals, groundnuts, tubers, 
pineapples, beans, oil palm, cotton, rubber, coffee, 
tea and cocoa (Anyanwu et al. 2010).  
  Since the scheme inception between 1978 and 
2006, a total sum of US$116.4 million had been 
guaranteed (Anyanwu et al. 2010). 
  Interests on loans were fixed by the government, at 
inception of the scheme, interest rate was fixed at 
5% but the rate had been subsequently reviewed 
over time (Anyanwu et al. 2010; Ehigiamusoe, 
2011). 
  In order to encourage more participation of farmers 
and improve repayment rate, the Interest Draw 
Back (IDB) incentives was introduced to the fund in 
2003 (Anyanwu et al. 2010). The incentive rewards 
borrowers who were able to repay their loans 
within a period not exceeding three months of due 
date with the refund 40% of the interest charged on 
loans (Anyanwu et al. 2010).  
  The drawbacks of the fund includes poor public 
perception that loans are part of share of national 
cake, lack of total commitment of successive 
governments, partial commitment of commercial 
banks and exclusion of rural intended 
beneficiaries, especially rural women 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  (e) Other Government Credit Schemes 
  In attempt to promote medium scale enterprises 
and create employment, government of Nigeria at 
various periods had initiated affordable credit 
schemes such as employment creation loan 
scheme, small scale industries credit scheme, 
mature people loan scheme, small and medium 




  The objectives of these schemes included 
providing loan to unemployed graduates, small 
sclae industries and provide opportunities for 
enterprising individuals. 




  Money-lenders are not under the purview of the 
regulatory agency and their operations cover both 
rural and urban areas. 
  In Nigeria, money-lenders enjoy regular patronage 
because of the huge gap between demand for 
credits by poor and the supply of credits by the 
formal financial institutions (Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
   Major features of money-lenders in Nigeria 
included  high interest rates well above the rates 
charged by the commercial banks, their capital are 
purely private, easy access to their loans and 
repayment period are short (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  (b) Mobile Savings Collectors 
  Mobile savings collectors are thrift minded 
individuals who have informal arrangement to be 
receiving some specific amount of money, or 
contributions from the willing members of the 
society on regular basis; the contributions could be 
weekly or daily depending on the terms of 
agreement (Ehigiamusoe, 2011).  
  The collectors simply move about to visit the 
contributors in their houses, shops, market places 
to collect the money (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
  The collectors lend money to needing members of 
the general society with high interest rate. The 
success of mobile saving collector is solely based 
on trust, such trust emanate from long-term 
observations, integrity, wealth and family 
background of the collectors (Ehigiamusoe, 2011). 
 
3.3 Review of Legal and Regulatory Framework of Microfinance in 
Nigeria 
The CBN is responsible for licensing of microfinance banks in Nigeria. After 
approval-in-principle for licensing is granted by the CBN, would-be 
microfinance banks are required to register with the Corporate Affairs 
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Commission (CAC), in compliance with the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act (CAMA) 1990. The CBN drives its regulatory powers from section 33 
subsection (1)(b) of the CBN Act 7 of 2007 and the provisions of Section 61-
63 of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Other Financial Institutions Act 
(BOFIA) 25 of 1991 (as amended). Prior to 2005 there was no regulatory 
and supervisory framework for microfinance banks in Nigeria, a formal 
regulatory and supervisory framework was released by the CBN in 
December 2005, being the apex bank in Nigeria. In the revised regulatory 
guidelines released in December 2012, the definition microfinance bank was 
clearly stated as “ any company licensed by the CBN to carry on the 
business of providing financial services such as savings and deposits, 
loans, domestic fund transfers, other financial and non-financial services to 
microfinance clients”. The remaining section of the chapter will examine 
these provisions from the perspective of the practice of microfinance banks 
in Nigeria. 
3.3.1 Policy Objectives of Microfinance  
The 2005 CBN regulatory and supervisory framework specifically states that 
the policy objectives of microfinance in Nigeria to include: making financial 
services accessible to unbanked population, integrating informal subsector 
into the formal financial system, enhancing microfinance service delivery to 
micro, small and medium entrepreneurs and transforming rural areas 
through micro loans.  
3.3.2 Ownership and Licensing Requirements 
The ownership and licensing requirements was not explicitly stated in the 
2005 regulatory framework but came to fore in the 2012 revised guidelines.  
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Under the 2012 guidelines microfinance banks are permitted to be 
established by community development associations, individuals, foreign 
investors, groups of individuals and private corporate entities.  The 
guidelines also group microfinance banks into three categories namely unit 
microfinance bank, state microfinance bank and national microfinance bank. 
A unit microfinance bank is confined to a particular location or locality with 
one head office and one branch within the locality and prohibited from 
having branches outside it locality, and required to have a paid-up capital of 
N20 million or US$0.13 million. While a state microfinance bank enjoys a 
wider scope of operation, is allowed to operate within a state and Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), it is permitted to open branches in any part of the 
approved state subject to the CBN approval. It is also required to pay 
minimum paid-up capital of N100 million or US$0.63 million The third 
category of microfinance, national microfinance bank, is required to have a 
minimum paid-up capital for N2.0 billion or US$12.71 million and can 
operate and open branches in any part of the country subject to regulatory 
approval. However, different categories of microfinance banks are allowed 
to transform from one category to other provided the minimum regulation 
requirements of such categories are met. 
3.3.3 Privileges and Prohibitions 
According to section 2 (1 and 2) of the 2012 CBN guidelines, upon licensing 
approval from the CBN, microfinance banks enjoy privileges of receiving 
different deposits from individuals, associations and groups with exception 
of public sector deposits.  It can grant credit to both informal and formal 
associations, self-help group and individual clients and is allowed to receive 
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and to pay interest on services render to clients in line with the existing 
guidelines. Registered microfinance banks are permitted to render ancillary 
banking services such as domestic remittance of funds and safe custody, 
guarantee its customers to access better credit, receiving of refinancing 
from CBN and other sources, operate micro leasing facilities and issuance 
of redeemable debentures to interested parties prior to CBN‟s approval. 
Other services and activities of microfinance banks include investment in 
cottage industries and income generating projects, provision of services to 
hedge risks, provision of professional advice to low income people, 
technical assistance and training to microenterprises and business 
development services. 
Microfinance banks are prohibited from engaging in foreign exchange 
transactions, international commercial papers, international corporate 
finance, international electronic funds transfer, clearing house activities, 
land speculative purposes, financing gambling, drug-trafficking, firearms and 
leasing renting and sale/purchase to directors, officers or individual that own 
5 per cent equity of the MFB without the approval of the CBN.   
3.3.4 Prudential Requirements 
To ensure the soundness of microfinance banks in Nigeria, the revised 
regulatory guidelines clearly outlined some general prudential requirements 
which all MFBs are to comply with; some of these requirements are outlined 





Table 3.2: Prudential Requirements  
 Benchmarks Requirements 
Compulsory Investment 
in Treasury Bills 
An MFB is required to invest not less than 5% of its 
deposit liabilities in Treasury Bills (TBs) but such 
investment must not exceed 10% at any given 
period, failure to comply would attract 1% of the 
amount not invested 
 
Liquidity Ratio 
 Capital Funds Adequacy Maintenance of minimum ratio of 20% of deposit 
liabilities in liquid assets, including the investment in 
TBs. Capital adequacy ratio which is measured by 
(Capital/Risk weighted Assets Ration) is capped at 
10%, in addition, every MFB is required to maintain 
1:10 ratio of shareholders fund unimpaired by losses 
to the net credits. These requirements are subject to 
changes as may be prescribed by the CBN 
depending on the risks associated with lending. 
Failure to meet these benchmarks, such MFB would 
be prohibited from granting credit, undertaking 
investment, payment of dividend to shareholders, 
borrowing from the investing public and opening 
branches until the required ratio is restored. 
Limit of Investment in 
Fixed Assets 
20% of the shareholders' fund unimpaired by losses 
is the maximum amount that a MFB could invest in 
fixed assets, contravention of this provision attract a 
penalty of 1% of the excess investment in fixed 
assets. 
Revaluation of Fixed 
Assets  
An MFB is required to seek consent and approval of 
the CBN for revaluation surplus on fixed assets, the 
revaluation only apply to own premises for the 
period of 5 years after the date of the purchase of 
the assets. 
Fixed Assets/ Long-term 
Investments and Branch 
Expansion 
An MFB could only finance acquisition of fixed 
assets, long term investments and branch 
expansion from the shareholders‟ funds unimpaired 
by losses and that must be done with the regulator. 
Maintenance of Capital 
Funds 
 To guard against erosion of capital through 
delinquent risk assets, MFBs are mandated to set 
aside some amount from profit after tax every year 
to ensure maintenance of capital funds. 
 
Restrictions on 
Declaration of Dividend 
 
Before an MFB could pay dividend, it is required to 
have made provision for pre-operational expenses, 
non-performing loans, and erosion of asset value, 
satisfy the minimum capital adequacy ratio and 
meet all matured obligations. Contravention of this 




Limit of lending to a 
Single Borrower and 
Related Party 
  
Exposure to individual borrower, Director or related 
borrowers is limit to 1% of shareholders‟ fund 
unimpaired losses while group borrowers is capped 
at maximum of 5%, though subject to changes as 
CBN deem appropriate from to time, contraventions 
attract sanction of N250,000.00 or US$1,587.00 and 




 Loan portfolio composition is made of 20% for 
micro loans and 20% for small and medium 






Maximum of 7.5% of shareholders‟ fund unimpaired 
by losses is allowed in equity investment.  
Source: Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance Banks in Nigeria 
 
Table 3.3: Provision for Classified Assets  
Days at Risk (No. of 
days missed payment) 
Description Provisioning Requirement 
of Allowance for Probable 
Loss (%) 
0 Performing 1 
1 - 30 days Pass and Watch 5 
31 - 60 days Substandard 20 
6- 90 days Doubtful 50 
91 or more days and for 
restructured loans Lost 100 
Note Adopted from the Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance in Nigeria 
 
3.3.5 Other Prudential Standards 
In order to reflect and accommodate microfinance banks‟ peculiarities some 
other prudential requirements are spelt out in the 2012 revised guidelines. 
For example, unsecure loan in excess of N50, 000.00 or US$318.00 to an 
individual person is not permitted; however, where an individual client could 
be guaranteed by a group or third part, such guarantee would be acceptable 
and qualify as collateral.  
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3.3.6 Managerial Capacity Requirements 
The revised guidelines provides for prudential, governance and managerial 
credibility.  The managerial aspect provides for capacity building that helps 
to achieve sustainability in the long run while the governance aspect covers 
overall management strategy that leads the operations of individual 
microfinance bank.  Therefore, managerial requirements cover critical 
functions and operations of microfinance bank such as governance, human 
resources management, accounts and financial management and internal 
audit and control system. 
3.3.6.1 Governance 
The revised guidelines recognise Board of Directors as the strategic apex 
body that determines governance of each microfinance bank. The board set 
policy direction, ensuring compliance to legal requirements and 
management accountability. Section 4(1) of the CBN revised regulatory and 
supervisory framework specifically state the composition and qualifications 
of member of the board of director for microfinance bank in Nigeria. The 
guidelines approve maximum of seven (7) and minimum of five (5) member 
of board of directors for a Unit MFB, but for a State and National MFB, the 
composition of the board of directors is at the discretion of the regulatory 
agency. To qualify as a Director in an MFB, the guidelines state that the 
nominee must not be an employee of any financial institution. It is also 
required that two (2) members of the Board other the Executive 
Management should have banking related experience. The executive 
member of the Board are permitted to hold office for a fixed period of five (5) 
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year and could be renewable once while the non-executive directors could 
only serve for fixed term of four years (4) and may be renewed twice. 
3.3.6.2 Human Resources Management 
The managing director is responsible for day to day operations of an MFB 
and recruitment of other employees. Section 4.1, subsection (2) of the 
revised guidelines specifically state the qualifications and experiences for 
top management positions such as managing directors and heads of 
departments. For example, the minimum qualification for managing director 
is first degree in any discipline with eight (8) years post-qualification 
experience, proven skills in microfinance and certification in microfinance 
banking. While the would-be head of departments are required to possess 
minimum of four years post-qualification experience and other requirements 
as apply to managing directors. 
3.3.7 Accounts and Financial Management 
The section 5.2(a) of the guidelines ensures that MFB keep account of all 
transactions that would reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs which 
must be compliance with the Nigerian General Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Signed copy of monthly returns on statement of account and other 
memorandum item are require to be submitted to the Directors of Financial 
Policy and Regulation Department of the CBN and Special Insured 
Institutions Department of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
for proper supervision of MFBs operations. 
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3.3.8 Internal Controls 
The guidelines require every MFB to have internal audit unit that ensure all 
operations conform to internal rules and regulations and the existing laws in 
Nigeria. The internal control framework covers areas such as control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and 
communication and monitoring of an MFB. As part of the audit requirements 
a statement signed off by at least two members of the Board on the 
effectiveness of the internal control that reflect the inherent risks in the 
operations of the MFB and the control put in place to mitigate such risks are 
required from every MFB. Any act of unethical behavior or attempted fraud 
by the officers of any MFB is reported to the regulatory agencies for 
appropriate sanctions. Every MFB is required to appoint an approved 
external auditor who must be a member of a recognized professional 
accountancy body Nigeria and must not in any way has interest in the 
organization or related to the Director or indebted to the MFB. In order to 
promote and encourage transparency in reporting, an audit firm could only 
serve an MFB for maximum of ten years. The external auditor serves as 
whistle-blower to regulatory agencies in case of any infraction to existing 
laws and regulation by the MFB which could jeopardize the interest of 
depositors or creditors.  
3.3.9  Reporting Requirements 
Section 5(3) of the revised guidelines place great premium on accuracy and 
timely rendition of returns and punishes every infraction in compliance with 
the provisions of section 58(2) of BFIA, 1991 (as amended). The guidelines 
require rendition of returns from every licensed MFB on the statement of 
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assets and liabilities, profit and loss account, schedule of loans and 
investments on sector basis, schedule of liabilities (deposits) on maturity 
basis, interest rate structure, schedule of balance held with banks and other 
financial institutions. They are also require to send returns on borrowing 
from other MFBs, credit to other MFBs, credits to Directors, credits to 
management staff and credits to related parties. All MFBs are also to send 
returns on non-performing credits, off balance sheet engagements, non-
performing other assets and other memorandum items to the CBN.        
3.3.10  Provisions for Other Existing Participating Financial 
Institutions 
The regulatory and supervisory guidelines recognize the existence of other 
financial institutions such as deposit money banks (DMBs) and NGO-MFIs 
who are interested in microfinance activities in Nigeria. Section 17(1) makes 
provision for DMBs who are under the purview of the CBN but wishing to 
engage in microfinance services through its subsidiaries. Such DMBs are 
required to appoint experience Management team to manage microfinance 
unit with adequate internal control and procedure, detailed manual of 
operations, effective Management Information System (MIS) and loan 
tracking mechanism. The guidelines also mandated any DMB engaging in 
microfinance services submit separate returns of its microfinance portfolio 
apart from its normal lending activities to the regulatory authorities on 
monthly basis.  
Section 17(2) of the guidelines recognize and make provision for the 
existing NGO-MFIs and membership-based MFIs who engage in credit only. 
These are MFIs being supervised by other government ministry but are not 
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under the supervision of the CBN; the guidelines restrict them from 
mobilizing deposit from the general public but are allow them providing 
credit to targeted population and raise deposits from their members. An 
NGO-MFI wishing to be fully licensed as microfinance bank and come under 
the supervision of the CBN, such organization is required to meet the 
stipulated provision as enshrined in the regulatory and supervisory 
guidelines of MFBs in Nigeria. In addition, prior to licensing, the activities of 
such NGO-MFI would be assessed by a recognized rating agency; the 
assessment focuses on the financial viability of such institution, its risk 
management policy, governance structure, human resource, control 
procedures, management information system and its accounting system. 
The application for transformation to MFB must state the objectives, 
specifying business plan, proposed name of the MFB and details of the 
assets and liabilities to transfer to the MFB, coupled with the draft 
memorandum and articles of association. However, deposit of minimum 
paid-up capital is not required for an existing institution if its existing capital 
institution is judged to be adequate by the regulatory agency. 
3.4 Performance of Microfinance Banks in Nigeria 
The performance analysis was conducted on seven hundred and seventy 
(752) MFBs that had its data readily available with the central Bank of 
Nigeria during 2011 - 2014. It comprises of five (5) National MFBs, eighty 




3.4.1 Total Assets 
The total asset of microfinance banks increased from US$516 million in 
2011 to US$1.46 billion in 2012, this represent 183 per cent rise in assets. 
In 2013, the assets also rose by 20.5 per cent but later fell by 6.3 per cent in 
2014 (table 3.1). Further analysis showed that average asset of MFB during 
2011-2014 was US$2.27 million. The average assets of National, State and 
Unit MFBs were US66.76 million, US$5.62 million and US$1.28 million, 
respectively, indicating that National MFBs had the highest assets, on 
average.  
Figure 3.1: Total Assets of MFBs  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing during 2011 - 2014 
3.4.2 Loans Disbursement 
A total loans of US$219 million was disbursed to about 1.6 million active 
borrowers with women accounting for 37. per cent of the total loans 
disbursement in 2011. The total loans disbursed improved by 233 and 33.8 


























respectively. The number of active borrowers also rose to 2.2 million and 
2.3 million during the same period,  with women accounted for 70.6 and 
48.2 per cent, respectively. The performance of MFBs interm of loan 
disbusement however fell in 2014 by 8.3 per cent to US$895 million but the 
number of active borrowers increased to 3.7 million.  
Figure 3.2: Total Loans of MFBs 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing during 2011 - 2014 
 
Further analysis in term of average loans size among different types of 
MFBs during 2011-2014 showed that national MFBs had the highest 
average loan size of US$2,460 while average loans size state and unit 
MFBs were US$1,850 and US1,500, respectively. The national MFBs also 
recorded highest lending of 62 per cent to women.  
The high lending by national microfinance to women is not surprising as 





















Force (NPF) microfinance bank and Lift Above poverty Organisation (LAPO) 
microfinance Bank are strictly women focused . The NPF microfinace is 
owned by the association of wives of Nigerian police officers while LAPO 
microfinance was modelled after Gramen Bank focusing on women 
empowerment. The unit MFBs which hadaverage loans size of US$1,500 
alsorecorded the least lending to women of about 47 per cent.  
Figure 3.3: Average Loans Size of MFBs  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing during 2011 - 2014 
 
The third category, state MFBs has average loans of about US$1,860 and 
































Number of Microfinance Banks 5 82 665 
Portfolio-At-Risk (%) 5 15 28 
Average Loans Size (US$) 2,460 1,860 1,500 
Average Interest  Rates 47 27 31 
Percentage of Women Borrowers (%) 62 49 47 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing during 2011 – 2014. 
 
3.4.3 Lending Models  
Analysis of lending methodology of MFBs showed that, most MFBs initially 
preferred individual lending model as it accounted for 71.1 per cent of the 
total lending in 2011. The second notable methodology is solidarity group 
lending which accounted for only 9.1 per cent in 2011. However, the trend 
analysis showed that the proportion of individual lending methodology fell 
consecutively over the years. The proportion of individual lending 
methodology fell from 2011 position to 57.2, 50.8 and 42.9 per cent in 2012, 
2013 and 2014, respectively (figure 3.4). The solidarity group lending which 
initially accounted for 9.1 per cent of the total lending however increased 
consecutively to 30.9, 37.6 and 42.9 per cent in 2012, 2013 and 2014, 






Figure 3.4: MFBs’ Loans by Lending Model  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs during 2011 - 2014 
 
The remaining lending methods namely neighbourhood and small revolving 
fund lending, village banking and others only averaged and accounted for 
5.7, 1.8 and 6.1, during 2011 – 2014.   
Table 3.5: MFBs’ Loans by Lending Models  
 % distribution 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Individual Lending 71.1 57.2 50.8 46.4 
Solidarity Group Lending 9.1 30.9 37.6 42.9 
Neighbourhood and Small Revolving Funds Lending 8.5 4.3 4.6 5.4 
Village Banking Lending 2.3 1.0 2 1.7 
Others 9.1 6.6 5.1 3.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
 Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs from  CBN  
 
3.4.4 Sectoral Allocation of Loans 
Analysis of sectoral allocation of loans by the MFBs indicated that trade and 
commerce subsector received highest loan allocation. It accounts for 55.7 
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In Nigeria, most MFBs prefer to lend to market women and men who can 
quickly use the loans for trading with promising returns, this could explain 
the larger share of trade and commerce in the MFBs lending pattern.  
Surprisingly, the agricultural and forestry that engaged greater percentage 
of the poor in Nigeria only had 7.3 per cent of the total loan during the 
period. Agriculture and forestry sector‟ lending in Nigeria is associated with 
higher volatility due to unpredictable weather conditions, therefore most of 
the commercial and MFBs try to avoid lending to the sector to minimize 
risks. Other critical activities such as health, education and transport and 
communication did not receive noticeable patronage as they only account 
for 0.9, 3.1 and 3.6 per cent, respectively. The neglect of MFBs lending to 
critical sectors that employ greater percentage of the poor in Nigeria might 
suggests possibility of mission drift but is not sufficient to prove it. However, 
consumer/personal received a noticeable number of loans of about 10.2 per 
cent of the total number of loans disbursed. 
Figure 3.5: Sectoral Allocation of Loans (%) 
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Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs during 2011 - 2014 
 
3.4.5 Interest Rates 
It is common knowledge that interest rate charges on micro loans by MFBs 
in developing countries are generally high and some argue that it could lead 
to mission drift while other argue that it would increase the depth of 
outreach. Analysis of interest rate in this section is quite revealing, interest 
rates of MFBs in Nigeria averaged 31 per cent. Further analysis showed 
that interest rates are diverse among various types of microfinance banks, 
in some cases they are very high, while in other cases moderate. For 
example, average interest rate of national MFBs is as high as 47 per cent 
on annualised basis, compared with average interest rates of 31 and 27 per 
cent for unit and state MFBs. In general, these interest rates could be said 
to be relatively high which might suggests that in Nigeria, poor borrowers 
care less about interest rates but access to credit as emphasised by the 
promoters of sustainability. 
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Figure 3.6: Interest on Loans and Advances 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs during 2011 - 2014 
3.4.6 Performing and Non-performing Loans 
Analysis of non-performing loans for the whole MFBs industry during 2011 - 
2014 showed that portfolio-at-risk, provision for bad debt and write-off rate 
were 26, 15.6 and 2.9 per cent. Whereas, the total performing loans of 
MFBs was over 70 per cent of the total loans (figure 3.7).  
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Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
   
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing 905 during 2011-2014. 
 
Further analysis showed that unit MFBs which recorded the lowest average 
loan size had the highest portfolio-at-risk and provision for bad debt of 28 
and 11 per cent, respectively. However, the national MFB that had the 
highest average loan size was associated with the lowest portfolio-at-risk of 
5 per cent and provision for bad debt of 1 per cent. This implies the unit 
MFB might be more vulnerable to loan defaults. The state MFB maintained 
the middle position of 15 per cent of portfolio-at-risk and 2 per cent for 
provision for bad debt (figure 3.8) 
Figure 3.8: Loan Classification by MFB Types 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
Note: Analysis was based on data from 752 MFBs existing during 2011-2014 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the evolution and reviewed regulatory framework of 
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lending to the poor have evolved over time from ROSCAs with average loan 
of US$2.00 to regulated MFBs with average loan of US$1,590. The native 
microfinance institutions which is an offshoot of ROSCA is characterized 
with high savings, group lending and informal mode of operation. The 
transition from ROSCA to modern microfinance bank witnessed different 
interventions by both private and public initiatives such as cooperative, 
NGOs, money lenders and government initiatives. Most private initiatives, 
especially, NGOs mainly depended on donor funding, operate group 
delivery methodology and are limited in outreach and women focused. 
Whereas, government initiatives such as Peoples Bank, Community 
Banking and FEAP are pro-poor institutions and often loss their focus, 
because of poor governance, lack of requisite manpower, under-
capitalization, lack local community involvement and political interference, 
amongst others. The review of legal and regulatory framework of 
microfinance bank shows that there was no regulatory and supervisory 
framework prior 2005. However, the framework released by the CBN in 
2005 which was subsequently reviewed in 2012 clearly specified the 
objectives, ownership structure, capital requirements and other prudential 
guidelines for microfinance banks in Nigeria.  
The analysis of microfinance banks reveals that national MFBs had the 
highest average loan size with lowest portfolio-at-risk, while unit MFBs 
which had the lowest average loan size was associated with highest 
portfolio-at-risk. Also, the analysis reveals that most MFBs initially preferred 
individual lending model but of recent the trend had change in favour of 
group lending methodology. Sectoral allocation of loans show that MFBs 
80 
 
prefer lending to trade and commerce subsector at the expense of other 
sectors such as agriculture and forestry that employ greater percentage of 

























Data, Methodology and Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the methodology. The first part discusses the 
sources of data; the second section deals with variables description. The 
third section presents and explains the summary statistics while the last part 
discusses the adopted methodology and the research hypotheses for the 
thesis. The last section presents the results of various regression analysis.  
4.2 Sources of Data 
Data on the Nigerian microfinance institutions can be obtained from different 
sources each with advantages and disadvantages. Data on Nigerian MFIs is 
available in a non-governmental organization, Microfinance Information 
Exchange (the MIX). The MIX collects data on microfinance institutions and 
enhances dissemination of information on the industry. However, 
Microfinance Information Exchange data only capture a few microfinance 
institutions which are not representative of the microfinance industry in 
Nigeria. This study employed a more detailed panel data on 752 
microfinance banks (MFBs) collected by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 
The CBN is the regulatory authority charged with the responsibility of 
regulating microfinance institutions in Nigeria. The revised microfinance 
regulatory framework for Nigeria mandated MFBs to submit monthly 
statements of liabilities and assets, income statement and other 
memorandum items electronically (FinA Off-Site Surveillance System) to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. Majority of the registered MFBs have fully complied 
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with the CBN directive. Therefore, the data set used for this study only 
covers useable MFBs‟ data that are available with the CBN.  
The CBN data is considered more appropriate because it covers wide range 
of information on assets and liabilities, income and other relevant 
information on MFBs in Nigeria. The study used 2011- 2014 MFBs returns 
to CBN which cover 752 microfinance banks. The MFBs dataset for 2014 
has the highest rate of returns from MFBs compared with other periods. The 
dataset allows an in-depth evaluation of MFBs‟ performance in Nigeria using 
panel data methodology.  
 4.3 Variables Description  
The name of variables use for the study and its measurements are 











Table 4.1: Variables Description  
   
Variable Name Measurement Source 
Sustainability (OPSS) 
(Total financial revenues)/ 
(financial expenses + loan 
loss provision + operating 
expenses)  




Is the total amount of loans 
outstanding 











(Personnel and administrative 
expenses)/Period average of 
gross loan portfolio 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria Data 
Base 
Scale Log of total assets 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria Data 
Base 
Average Loan Size 
(AVLOAN) 
 (Total loan portfolio, end 
period/total number of 
outstanding loans, end of 
period)  
 




Yield on gross loan portfolio 
(Cash Financial revenue from 
loan portfolio/Average gross 
loan portfolio) 




Percentage of women 
borrowers 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria Data 
Base 
Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 
Non-performing loan (Sum of 
pass& watch, sub-standard, 
and doubtful)  
Central Bank of 
Nigeria Data 
Base 
Provision Expense Rate 
Is the loss loan provision as 
percentage of the total loan 
portfolio 




Is the portion of the total loan 
portfolio that has been written 
off and accepted as a loss  






4.4 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics results in table 4.2 shows that the mean assets 
(SCALE) of MFBs worth US$2.27 million and the maximum assets of about 
US$262.58 million. Further analysis from table 4.3 shows that microfinance 
banks are divergent in size. For example, national MFBs has the largest 
size, on average, of about US$66.76 million followed by state MFBs of 
about US$5.62 million and unit MFBs of about US$1.28 million. The 
national, unit and state MFBs has maximum assets of US$216.16 million, 
US$87.10 million and US$262.57 million, respectively, showing divergence 
of sizes of MFBs within the industry. The dichotomy in the sizes of MFBs in 
Nigerian is a reflection categorization of microfinance banks into national, 
state and unit with different capital base.  The national MFBs are allowed to 
open branches and operate in all the states within the federation, while a 
state MFBs can operate within a state and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 
and a unit MFBs are confined to a particular location. The categorization of 
MFBs could be the reasons behind divergence in MFB sizes in Nigeria.  
Measure of sustainability, operating self-sufficiency ratio (OPSS), the mean 
ratio of 0.56 in table 4.2 is an indication that, on average, MFBs as a whole 
in Nigeria could be said to be unsustainable, because the ratio is below 
1.00. Further analysis from table 4.3 also shows that means of the operating 
self-sufficiency ratio (OPSS) of the three categories of MFBs are 
unsustainable. It indicates 0.33, 0.58 and 0.56 for national, state and unit 
MFBs, respectively, showing that, on the average, state microfinance banks 
are better off compared with the remaining two categories of MFBs. In term 
of the spread within each category of MFB, the unit MFBs has the highest 
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standard deviation of 0.73 ratio compared with the standard deviation of 
0.44 and 0.31 for state and national MFBs, respectively. This implies that 
though unit MFBs is less sustainable, it has the highest spread .The 
average loan size per borrower for the industry as a whole is estimated 
US$1,590 but the average loan size differs when considering each category 
of MFB (Table 4.2 and 4.3). For example, the average loan size of state 
MFBs and unit MFBs are comparable, indicating US$1,860 for the state 
MFBs and US$1,500 for the unit MFBs. The national MFBs has the highest 
average loan size of about US$2,460 per borrower.  










0.56 -0.96 22.00 
AVLOAN  
 Average loan 
balance per 
borrower  
1.59 0.001 47.15 
LOAN Total Loan Size 1,190 0.83 234,603 
LABCOST Labour Cost 0.57 0 6.6 
EFF Efficiency 0.35 0 20.28 
SCALE Total assets 2,269 8.97 262,577 
LOASS 
Loans to Assets 
Ratio 
0.51 -0.003 19.75 





0.45 0 1 
YIELD 
Yield on gross 
loan portfolio  
0.31 -0.35 20.31 




0.09 -0.24 26.30 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria's FinA Off-Site Surveillance System, data base. The 
values of AVLOAN, LOAN and SCALE are in US$'000 
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The data for female clients from table 4.2 shows that, on average, female 
clients constitute 45 per cent of total active borrowers indicating that 
microfinance banks in Nigeria lend more to male clients than female clients. 
The analysis also shows that some microfinance banks wholly focus on 
women while some other cases on male clients. Further analysis from table 
4.3 shows that the percentage of women borrowers suggests that national 
MFBs lend more to women than state and unit MFBs. On the average, 
national MFBs lend 62 per cent of its loans to women, while state and unit 
MFBs lend 49 and 47 per cent of their loans to women, respectively. The 
pattern of MFBs lending to women clients as indicated by the minimum ratio 
of zero (0) and maximum of one (1) especially for unit MFBs, implies that in 
some MFBs lend 100 per cent of their loans to women clients while some 
other MFBs lend 100 per cent of their loans to male clients.  
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics  
 
  State MFBs Unit MFBs National MFBs 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
OPSS 0.58 0.44 0.04 2.66 0.56 0.73 -0.96 22.00 0.33 0.31 0.03 1.19 
GENDER 0.49 0.19 0.02 1 0.47 0.20 0 1 0.62 0.25 0.26 1 
AVLOAN 1.86 3.16 0.02 23.45 1.50 3.18 0.001 47.15 2.46 3.83 0.23 14.10 
PAR 0.15 0.19 0 0.99 0.28 0.41 -0.16 6.92 0.05 0.09 0.001 0.30 
LABCOST 0.04 0.03 0.003 0.33 0.06 0.18 0 6.6 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.08 
LOASS 0.50 0.26 0.03 2.06 0.50 0.70 0.003 19.75 0.51 0.35 0.03 0.90 
EFF 0.19 0.19 0.02 1.81 0.37 1.14 0 20.28 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.49 
YIELD 0.27 0.26 0.02 2 0.31 0.79 -0.35 20.31 0.47 0.58 0.11 1.99 
PROBAD 0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.36 0.11 0.86 -0.24 26.30 0.01 0.01 -0.001 0.03 
WRFR 0.004 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.40 -0.30 3.62 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 
LOAN 2797.99 5342.82 33.38 65485.26 659.18 6377.91 0.83 234602.54 39326.98 49141.88 484.53 183104.42 
SCALE 5624.60 7942.80 209.29 87101.76 1280.88 8885.09 8.97 262576.83 66756.82 48630.86 2433.88 216164.94 
Source: Author's calculation based on the data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. The values of Outreach, Loan and 




Analysing the repayment variables, on average, portfolio at risk is 0.26, 
which implies that 26 per cent of the total loan portfolio is more overdue. 
Also, a kin look shows high disparity of portfolio at risk in the industry as 
some as high as 99 per cent while other have very low portfolio at risk. From 
table 4.3, the risk profile of the three categories of MFBs differ, on the 
average, unit MFBs has 28 per cent portfolio at risk, while state and national 
have risks of about 2 and 1 per cent, respectively. This implies that unit 
MFBs has the highest exposure to risk; whereas, the national MFBs 
recorded the lowest risk profile of about 1 per cent. The standard deviation 
of portfolio at risks for the three categories of MFBs still show that unit MFBs 
recorded the highest spread of about 41 per cent whereas state and 
national MFBs has 19 and 9 per cent, respectively.  The risk profile of 
microfinance institutions is also divergent as reflected in maximum and 
minimum portfolio at risk (PAR) of 6.9 and -0.2 for unit MFBs, 0.99 and 0 for 
state and 0.30 and 0.001 for national MFBs. This implies some microfinance 
institutions have zero portfolios at risk while some have high risk profile or 
exposure. However, the loans to assets ratio (LOASS) which is a measure 
of orientation and indicator of business practices indicated that, on the 
average, national, unit and state MFBs has the ratio of 0.51, 0.50 and 0.50, 
respectively. Indicating that although national MFBs has the lowest risk 
profile, it business practices is poor. The write-off rate and provision 
expense rate, on average, is both 9 per cent. Further analysis shows that 
write-off rate and provision expense rate are less than 1 per for both state 
and national MFBs, whereas, unit MFBs is as high as 11 per cent for both.  
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From table 4.3, it seems there are no more differences in MFBs labour cost 
for each category of MFBs. For example, average labour costs for state and 
national MFBs are the same at 4 per cent while that of unit MFBs is 6 per 
cent. The average interest rate for the whole industry is about 31 per cent, 
but further analysis shows that average the interest rate charged by national 
MFBs is around 47 per cent with spread of about 0.58 which indicates 
divergent within the group. The unit and state MFBs averaged 31 and 27 
per cent with standard deviations of 0.795 and 0.26, respectively.  
4.5  Methodology 
The thesis employs one-way error component panel data regression model 
which takes the general form: 
itiiitit uZXy      
;,........1 Ni    Tt ,.......1 )1.4.....(..............................  
where ity is the dependent variable with subscript i  representing individual 
microfinance bank and cross-section aspect of the model. The subscript  t  
denoting time and represents time series dimension of the model.   is 
)1( K vector of coefficients on itX  
and itX is a )1( K vector of observed 
microfinance bank-specific characteristics that vary over time and individual 
MFBs. However, iZ is a )1( p vector of time-invariant variables that do not 
vary with time but vary only over individual MFBs, while  represents )1( p
vector of coefficients on iZ . itu is the error term which is composed into two 
parts itiit vu   , i is the unobserved MFI-specific effect, It captures 
unobserved heterogeneity commonly associated with cross sectional MFIs, 
while itv  is the idiosyncratic error, it accounts for other factors that affect the 
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dependent variable that are not included in the model. This is a one-way 
error component regression model where i ~ ),0(
2
IIN and independent of 
iv ~ ),0(
2
vIIN  . 
Borrowing from the literature, two panel data models usually are estimated 
namely, fixed effects model (FE) and random effects model (RE). The FE 
estimator employs the orthogonality assumption whereby the regressors are 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error 0)( ititvXCov and 0)( itivZCov . 
The fixed effects method simply transformed variables by removing 
averages of individual MFB from the annual observation, by this, individual 
MFB heterogeneity is removed i.e. the fixed effects together with the 
intercept are removed (Mersland and Strom, 2010). It implies that all higher 
level of variance is removed from the model living out lower level of variance 
which makes more realistic the assumption of exogeneity (Allison, 2009). 
The strengths of using FE model are because it controls higher level of 
variance and avoiding correlation. It equally allows the coefficient estimates 
for the covariate(s) to be estimated with time variant part, but the basic 
weakness is that it cannot accommodate time invariant variables (Bell and 
Jones, 2012). The RE estimator assumes higher and additional 
orthogonality conditions that the regressors are not related or uncorrelated 
with the individual-specific error. The RE estimator assumed that fixed 
effects error is included in the error term (Mersland and Strom, 2010). The 
RE model assumes that the individual-specific effects such that 
0)( , iit uXCov and 0)( , ii uZCov , the estimator allows the use of dummy 
variables or the time-constant variables subject to some restrictive 
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assumptions. We have random effects when the individual-specific effects
i are uncorrelated with the independent variables in itX  
and iZ i.e. if i
form part of itu  
or if i does not influence the regressors. The orthogonality 
assumption implies that the parameters of the RE can be estimated by 
ordinary least square (OLS) or between estimator, but not necessarily 
implies efficient estimators. Thus, if we assume that 0)( , iit uXCov  holds, 
the RE estimator becomes more appropriate. However, if the assumption 
breaks down such that exogeneity assumption does not holds
0)( , iit uXCov , the RE estimator becomes biased.  
To choose for the appropriate model between fixed effects model and 
random-effect model, the additional orthogonality assumptions of over-
identifying restrictions of the random effects is tested using Hausman fixed-
vs-random effects test under conditional homoskedasticity. Rejection of 
additional orthogonality assumptions of the random-effects model implies 
that the fixed effect model is preferred (Baltagi, 2005).  
The choice of panel data methodology is predicated on the grounds that it 
addresses associated problems with static cross sectional and ordinary 
regression analysis by accounting for changes in the data. It takes care of 
problems of unobserved heterogeneity commonly associated with cross 
sectional studies and accounts for idiosyncratic error. These problems are 
time-constant factors and time-varying error that affect the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2006).  
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4.6  The Hypotheses 
This thesis uses Nigeria as a case study to examine drivers of sustainability 
indicator namely operating self-sufficiency and to test for the role of interest 
rate in microfinance banks‟ sustainability in Nigeria. The objective is test 
whether the replica of findings from cross sectional studies that involve 
multiple countries can be obtained on a single country, Nigeria.  
The first part of the hypothesis aims to explain sustainability with a series of 
variables including interest rate, capital cost, efficiency, loan to assets ratio, 
gender, with particular emphases on interest rate. The hypothesis tests 
relationship between MFBs‟ sustainability with a series of variables with 
special emphasis on interest rate. For example, proponents of MFBs 
sustainability argued that sufficient income should be generated by MFBs to 
remain in business by raising interest rate. They based argument on the 
following reasons that increase in interest rates would amongst others, not 
reduce demand for loan as the poor are more concerned about accessing 
loans, could lead to higher profitability and reduce dependency on donations 
(Christen et al. 1995, Rhyne 1998 and Rosenberg 2002). On the other 
hand, others believed that the borrowing costs needed to be subsidized 
because the poor borrowers could not afford to bear full costs of loans 
(Christen 1997). In view of the divergence views the hypothesis seeks to 
examine the relationship between sustainability and interest rates. It further 
examine the impact of high interest rates on repayment rate, this would 




The second hypothesis focused on a major debate in the literature „mission 
drift‟, the main argument of socially-driven microfinance banks is that 
commercialization of microfinance leads to mission drift. The concern 
among the socially-driven MFBs is that increase in average loan size as 
result of pursuit of profit and cost-effective way of operation could shift focus 
from the poor borrowers to the wealthier borrowers that have capacity to 
absorb bigger loans and the same time compromise outreach to the poor 
that have much better guarantee of repayment.  
Lastly, the third hypothesis seeks to explain the likely effect of lending to 
women on the repayment rate. There is general view that because women 
are better managers than men, they tend to have higher repayment of micro 
loans than their male counterpart. This assertion will be put to empirical 
scrutiny to ascertain what could be obtainable in Nigeria.   
4.7 Model Specification (Drivers of Sustainability) 
Putting into consideration the empirical framework of one-way error 
component of panel data in equation (4.1), the study utilized the panel 
dataset of 752 microfinance institutions in Nigeria during 2011-2014 to 
examine drivers of sustainability in Nigeria. In specifying the model, we 
leverage on past studies that examined drivers of microfinance 
sustainability, such studies included Cull et al. (2007), Ayayi and Sene 
(2010), Nadiya (2012), Rahman and Mazlan (2014). These studies used 
different variables such as size of MFIs, yield on gross loan portfolio, 
personnel productivity ratio, average loan balance per borrower, cost per 
borrower, age of MFIs, operating expense ratio, debt to equity ratio, number 
of active borrowers, labour cost, portfolio-at-risk, number of loan per staff 
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member, number of women borrowers and efficiency ratio, orientation, to 
explain dependent variables such as operational self-sufficiency ratio  and 
financial self-sufficiency ratio. This thesis will use some of these variables, 
depending on data availability, to examine drivers of operating self-
sufficiency in Nigeria.  The majority of studies conducted on developing 
countries on this issue are either ordinary least square (OLS) or cross-
sectional regression. OLS and Cross sectional regression fail to account for 
individual heterogeneity of microfinance for each individual country and 
cross-section dependence. Failure of cross section and regression studies 
to control these, especially, for heterogeneity usually results to obtaining 
biased estimate and unreliable coefficients (Moulton 1986; Baltagi, 2005).  
In view of these major weaknesses, this thesis uses panel data. Panel data 
analysis has the advantage of controlling for heterogeneity which improves 
the reliability of estimates. It allows for more variability and information in 
data, less collinearity among variables and more efficient estimates (Baltagi, 
2005). Subsequent study by Mersland and Strom (2010) tried to address 
these challenges by adopting a panel dataset of MFIs from 74 countries 
during 2001-2006. However, the study only focused on cross-country 
analysis.  
In developing countries such as Nigeria, microfinance institutions provide 
dual functions of providing access to financial services (outreach) while at 
the same time striving to cover operating costs (sustainability). They also 
aim for profitability owing to the increased competition in the industry for 
donor funding.  The thesis adopted study conducted by Cull et al. (2007) 
using measures of sustainability, operating self-sufficiency (OPSS) as 
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dependent variable, putting into consideration theoretical factors that drive 
them with special attention on interest rate, cost of labour and loan size. The 
models take the following form: 
)2.4........(........................................it
j
itjit uXOPSS    
itOPSS  is the operating self-sufficiency ratio of i  MFI at a time t . It 
represents the dependent variable and is derived by dividing total financial 
revenues by the sum of financial expenses, loan loss provision and 
operating expenses (Cull et al. 2007, Muller and Uhde, 2008). If the value is 
above one, it implies sustainability i.e. microfinance institution earns enough 
revenue to cover its total operating cost.(Arunachalam, 2006, Cull et al. 
2007, Muller and Uhde, 2008), but if the value is below one, it is an 
indication the MFB depletes its capital base to provide services to clients 
which could jeopardize long-term sustainability of the institution 
(Ehigiamusoe, 2011). Drawing from past studies, especially, Cull et al 
(2007), we use operating self-sufficiency as a proxy for sustainability of 
microfinance institutions, where  is the constant of the regression model 
and jitX  is vector of MFB-specific characteristics (j) of MFB i  in Nigeria 
which included yield, a proxy for interest rate, labour cost, loan to assets 
ratio, a proxy for orientation, loan size, efficiency and gender at time t . 














ityield  stands for the interest rate charged by the lender of i  MFB at a time 
t  while 1 represents its coefficient, it shows the effect of interest rate on 
operational self-sufficiency. 2  is the coefficient of matrix of interest rate 
varied by lending types which include individual and group lending 
methodologies. It is expected that increase in interest rate should have 
positive effect on operational self-sufficiency (Cull et al. 2007), but the 
interactive term test for whether this impact varies by lending type. itLabCost  
is the labour cost of i  MFI at a time t , and is defined as the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets (Cull et al. 2007), 3 shows the effect of 
labour cost on the operational self-sufficiency, the effect of matrix of labour 
cost varies by lending types is represented by 4 . A prior expectation is that 
high labour cost will exact negative influence on operational self-sufficiency. 
Also, itLoass  is a measure of orientation, it is loans to assets ratio of i  MFI 
at a time t , it measures business practices of microfinance institutions (Cull 
et al. 2007). The higher the ratio, the more risky is the microfinance 
institutions to higher defaults, it also an indication of low liquidity. This 
implies negative relationship with operational self-sufficiency. Loan is the 
total loan size of i  MFI at a time t , it is expected that a rise in loan size will 
improve sustainability. 
Other independent variables included measures of Eff  and Gender  . Eff is 
measured  as the ratio of non-financial expenses (personnel and 
administrative expense) to period-average gross loan portfolio (Yaron and 
Manos, 2006).  It is expected that an improvement in the efficiency will be 
positively related to the dependent variable or improvement in sustainability. 
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To measure the effect of gender on operational self-sufficiency, the ratio of 
female borrowers to the total borrowers is used as a proxy forGender  . In 
some countries female borrowers have better repayment records so it is 
expected that the ratio will be positively related with operational self-
sufficiency. Dynamism is introduced into the equation in the form of a 
squared valued if at high rates of interest it is riskier borrowers who take out 
loans then overall profitability will fall. The quadratic form of yield is 
therefore introduced into the model across various lending types to examine 
it effect on sustainability (Cull et al. 2007). 
A further analysis is conducted to shed more light on the relationship 
between yield and portfolio at risk Par  to shed light on whether risk is 
associated with high interest rate, Cull et al. (2007) tested the impact of 
yield and yield-squared with other control variables on the portfolio-at-risk, 
as the dependent variable. This thesis also introduced dynamism into the 
equation in the form of a squared valued if high interest rates could lead to 
increase in loans delinquency in Nigeria, and the equation is also varied 
with lending types. Thus, the model is specified below:  
iitityititititit
ueLendingTypYieldYieldeLendingTypYieldYieldPar  4321 2^ 
.... (4.4) 
The dependent variable is portfolio-at-risk, Par  , it is an indication of loan 
delinquency and it is measured by the sum of pass watch, sub-standard and 
doubtful loans. The higher the interest rate or yield, the higher the portfolio-
at-risk and by implication, the lower the repayment rate, therefore a prior 
expectation is that yield-squared would be positively related with portfolio-at-
risk (Cull et al. 2007).  
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4.8 Model Specification (Mission Drift) 
In specifying model for mission drift, we follow the method adopted by Cull 
et al. (2007) average loan size (AVLOAN) as the dependent variable was 
explained with other relevant explanatory variables such as sustainability 
proxy by operating self-sufficiency (OPSS), interest rate proxy by yield 
(YIELD), labour cost (LABCOST), a measure of efficiency (EFF) and 
orientation proxy by loans to assets ratio (LOASS) as independent 
variables. To test the effect of lending types which included individual and 
group lending models on the equations, same point re interaction term 
made earlier applies here, especially on sustainability indicator and labour 












 where AVLOAN  is the average loan size and also the dependent variable 
in the specified model above. It is measured by dividing total loan portfolio, 
end of period by total number of outstanding loans, end of period (UNCDF, 
2002). There is general consensus that poor always demand for smaller 
loans, thus, variations in such loan always reflect poverty condition of the 
poor. Therefore, a decrease in average loan size is synonymous with the 
increase in the depth of lending to the poor; on the other hand, a rise in loan 
size is seen as deviating resources from the poor (Mosley, 1996; 
Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). It implies that a reduction in average loan 
size is associated with the increase in the depth of lending to the poor, while 
increase in loan size is seen as deviating resources from the poor. The 
OPSS  is operating self-sufficiency, Therefore, the a prior expectation is that 
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the coefficient of operating self-sufficiency (OPSS) ratio to be positively 
related with average loan size for mission drift to exist (Cull et al. 2007; 
Muller and Uhde, 2008; Freixas and Rochet 2008; Mersland and Strom 
2010; Abrar and Javaid 2014).   
SCALE  is the size of MFBs measured by total assets and is expected to 
have positive relationship (Abrar and Javaid 2014). Moreover, LABCOST  is 
the labour cost, an increase in labour cost is expected to be negatively 
related with the dependent variable. EFF represents microfinance banks‟ 
efficiency and would be negative if MFBs are less efficient while positive 
coefficient implies the reverse. More also, LOASS is a measure of 
orientation; the higher ratio implies that the more at risk is the MFB to higher 
defaults. In the second set of panel models for mission drift, to test for the 
impact of gender we use the percentage of active women borrowers to total 
borrowers as the dependent variable with other control independent 
variables earlier explained above (Cull et al. 2007; Mersland and Strom 
2010). The a prior expectation is that the coefficients of sustainability 
( )OPSS  would be negatively related with the dependent variable )(GENDER
, (i.e. percentage of lending to women) for mission drift to exist, while 
positive coefficient implies shift to larger better off borrower (Freixas and 












4.9 Model Specification (Women Outreach and Repayment) 
To examine impact of female clients on repayment, we adopt D‟espallier et 
al. (2011) which model of the impact proportion of female clients on 
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repayment variables, namely portfolio at risk and provision expense rate.. 
To ensure robust of the model estimation,   kin attention is also paid to other 
important variables that affect the repayment aside percentage of female 
clients are included as control variables in the model (D‟espallier et al. 
2011). Thus the first equation is specified as follow: 
.......................................... (4.7) 
where itPAR  
is the portfolio at risk for MFB i  in year t and itGENDER is the 
proportion of female clients. itZ is a matrix of MFB-specific control variables 
such as operating self-sufficiency, yield, labour cost, orientation, scale and 
efficiency. Also, two variables in the model, namely yield and labour cost 
were varied by the individual and solidarity lending types. itu is the error 
term, it is sub- divided into two, such that itiit vu   , the i is the 
unobserved MFB-specific effect (D‟espallier et al. 2011). Thus equation 












where the OPSS  is operating self-sufficiency, It is an indicator of 
sustainability, and the expectation is that a more sustainable microfinance 
banks would be associated with a reduced portfolio at risk and that implies 
high repayment rate. LABCOST  is the labour cost, in most developing 
countries labour cost of most microfinance institutions is high and that 
implies that high labour cost is expected to be associated with high portfolio 
at risk.  
1 2it it it itPAR GENDER Z u     
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 For EFF   variable, a prior expectation is that the coefficient of ratio would 
be positive if MFBs lend more to women clients while negative coefficient is 
expected if lending to women clients reduce. More also, LOASS is measured 
by the ratio of total loans to total assets. The higher ratio implies that the 
more risky is the MFBs to higher defaults; therefore, it is expected to have 
negative impact on women outreach. PAR  is the portfolio at risk, in this 
case, It is a proxy for repayment rate, higher portfolio at risk ratio implies low 
repayment rate while the reverse implies improvement in repayment. A prior 
expectation is that increase lending to women clients is expected to be 
negatively related with portfolio at risk, which also implies increased 
repayment (D‟espallier et al. 2011).   
4.10 Analysis and Presentation of Results 
4.10.1  Correlation Coefficients  
Correlation coefficient shows the strength of relationship between two 
variables. Generally, the results of the correlation coefficients show that 
some of the variables of interest are significant at 5 per cent, however the 
strength of relationship in most cases are weak. This is also an indication 
that subsequent regression on the data might not suffer from the problem of 
multicollinearity.  
The correlation coefficients in table 4.4 suggest that four variables are 
significantly associated with sustainability (OPSS) namely labour cost 
(LABCOST), efficiency (EFF), orientation (LOASS) and size of MFBs 
(SCALE) at 5 per cent significant level. The coefficient of EFF in relation to 
OPSS is expected to be positive, but -0.1 is contrary to expectation, 
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suggesting that management skills of most MFBs as presently constituted is 
inefficient. The coefficient of size of MFBs (SCALE) is significantly and 
positively correlated with sustainability in line with a prior expectations, while 
-0.1 coefficient for GENDER is negative and significant, contrary to 
expectation.  
Using average loan size (AVLOAN) as a proxy for outreach of microfinance 
banks, the correlation coefficient between average loan and sustainability 
(OPSS) is 0.02 and not significant. Even though the coefficient is positive 
but since is not significant it cannot be concluded there is evidence of 
mission drift. Judging from the correlation coefficients of these two 
indicators with average loan size, we cannot affirm the presence of mission 
drift in Nigeria‟s microfinance banks. The results further indicate that five 
variables are associated with outreach of MFBs in Nigeria; labour cost, loan-
assets ratio, efficiency, interest rate (YIELD), gender  and size of MFBs.   
Using another measure of outreach i.e. ratio of women clients to total active 
borrowers (GENDER), the result in table 4.4 still suggests that the claim of 
mission drift cannot be ascertained. The coefficient of women borrowers 
(GENDER) and sustainability (OPSS) is negative (-0.1) and significant, it 







Table 4.4: Correlation Coefficient  
   
  GENDER OPSS LABCOST LOASS EFF YIELD AVLOAN SCALE 
GENDER 1 
       OPSS -0.13* 1 
 
     LABCOST 0.01 -0.08* 1 
 
    LOASS 0.01 -0.07* 0.08* 1 
 
   EFF -0.01 -0.06* 0.46* -0.10* 1 
 
  YIELD -0.004 -0.001 0.15* -0.10* 0.70* 1 
 
 AVLOAN -0.12* 0.02 -0.06* 0.08* -0.09* -0.08* 1 
 
SCALE 0.04 0.10* -0.15* -0.09* -0.18* -0.05* 0.18* 1 
Source: Author's own calculations from the CBN data. Coefficients are statistically significant at 5% (*p<0.05)  
Other factors that could drive interest rate include labour cost, ratio of loan 
to asset and level of managerial efficiency. The positive (0.2) correlation 
coefficient of labour cost in relation with interest rate possibly suggest high 
per unit cost of labour might account for high interest rate of MFBs due to 
the high cost per loan of servicing small loans. The negative coefficient of 
the ratio of loan to asset suggests restrictions on loans limit the supply of 
credit and push up interest rates and an expansion of loan/capitals reduces 
rates.  
4.10.2  Sustainability Regression Results 
To test for the factors that drive microfinance sustainability in Nigeria, we 
focus mainly on the role of yield, which is a proxy for interest rate using 
operational self-sufficiency ratio (OPSS) as a measure of sustainability. For 
this measure, fixed effect and random effect panel data equations were 
estimated as indicated in column 1 and 2, in table 4.5. Equation in column 
(1) was chosen and interpreted based on the Hausman test out of the two 
equations.  The results of operational self-sufficiency as indicated in column 
(1) shows that all variables included in the model significantly explained 
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microfinance sustainability in Nigeria. These variables include the interest 
rate (YIELD), labour costs, gender, loan to asset ratio, efficiency ratio and 
loan size. The coefficient of interest rate was positive and conforms to a 
prior expectation, as 1 per cent increases in interest rate elicits 0.6 per cent 
changes in sustainability of microfinance banks in Nigeria. It implies that the 
higher the interest rate, the higher the profit accrued to MFBs. This result 
corroborates that of Cull et al. (2007) who find that yield is positively related 
to all measures of microfinance sustainability. The coefficients of other 
independent variables are rightly signed except gender which was negative 
(-0.4) contrary to expectation. The coefficient of labour to asset ratio is 
negatively related with operational self-sufficiency ratio as expected. The 
result also confirms negative coefficient (-0.7) of labour cost on operational 
self-sufficiency by Cull et al. (2007). This result implies that 1 per cent 
increase in labour cost of MFBs in Nigeria could reduce microfinance 
sustainability by 0.3 per cent. The coefficient of the size of loan is also 
significant with the expected positive sign; this shows that 1 per cent 
increase in loan size will improve sustainability of microfinance banks by 0.3 
per cent. The coefficient of loan to asset ratio (LOASS) is negative as 
expected, lower ratio means improvement in business practices (Cull et al. 
2007), the coefficient -0.1 implies 1 per cent reduction in microfinance the 






Table 4.5: Sustainability Regression  
 






  1 2 
Yield 0.62*** 0.06*** 
 
(2.77) (2.81) 
Gender  -0.39*** -0.39*** 
 
(-6.69) (-6.62) 
Labour costs to Assets 
(LABCOST) -0.13* -0.13* 
 
(-1.86) (-1.80) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 
(-3.77) (-3.84) 
log of Loan (LLOAN)  0.27*** 0.03*** 
 
(2.72) (-2.63) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.04** -0.04** 
 
(-2.35) (-2.32) 
Constant 0.46*** 0.47*** 
 
(4.16) (4.27) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (1&2) shows Chi2(8)=-2.20, with the Prob>Chi2=0.0361, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. Based on 
Hausman test, Fixed effect in column 1 is chosen for this analysis. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the CBN. 
 
Borrowing from Cull et al. (2007), we allow interaction between gross 
portfolio yield, labour cost, and two lending models of microfinance, namely, 
individual and group lending models. The data series on the amount that 
each MFB lend under group and individual methodologies were generated 
separately and are allowed to interact with the gross portfolio yield and 
labour cost and their effects on sustainability measure. Based on the 
Hausman test, equation in column 4 of table 4.6 was analysed, the result 
from the model indicated that individual lending interest rate was significant 
in explaining sustainability in Nigeria. The result confirms earlier findings 
from Cull et al. (2007) findings that individual lending model is significantly 
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important and positively related to sustainability measures. An increase in 
individual lending interest rate elicits 0.1 per cent impact on sustainability of 
MFBs while the coefficient of 0.03 of group lending interest rate was not 
significant in explaining sustainability. This shows that interest rate is 
associated with improved sustainability for individual-based lenders. 
In addition, labour cost is allowed to interact with the various lending models 
namely individual and solidarity lending models (Cull et al. 2007). The 
results show that interaction of labour cost with individual and group lending 
model were significant in explaining sustainability but both lending models 
were negatively related with sustainability as expected. It implies that 
increases in labour costs are associated with reduction in sustainability for 
both individual-based and group-based lenders.. Other significant factors 
that drive sustainability included percentage of women clients (GENDER), 
and efficiency (EFF). The GENDER has coefficients of -0.3 contrary to a 









Table 4.6: Sustainability Regression By  Lending Models 
 






  3 4 
Yield -0.12 -0.13 
 
(-0.58) (-0.64) 
Yield x Individual Lending Model 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 
(3.80) (3.85) 
Yield x Group Lending Model 0.03 0.03 
 
(1.39) (1.45) 
LabCost 3.92*** 4.00*** 
 
(3.35) (3.43) 
LabCost x Individual Lending 
Model -0.25** -0.27** 
 
  (-2.42) (-2.54) 
LabCost x Group Lending Model -0.37*** -0.36*** 
 
(-3.41) (-3.38) 
Log of Loan 0.02 0.01 
 
(1.46) (1.40) 
Gender -0.25*** -0.24*** 
 
(-3.57) (-3.50) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.91) (0.88) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.42*** -0.41*** 
 
(-4.87) (-4.84) 
Constant 0.47*** 0.47*** 
 
(3.12) (3.16) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (3&4) shows Chi2(10)=6.51, with the Prob>Chi2=0.7704, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. Based on 
Hausman test, Random effect in column 4 is chosen for this analysis. 




In developing countries, it is believed that the costs of information 
asymmetry and lack of collateral by borrowers are generally reflected in 
higher interest rate by the lenders which invariably aggravates problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. There are arguments that high interest 
rates can aggravate sharp reduction in the demand for loans and lower loan 
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repayment by the borrowers which can result to fall in profitability of 
microfinance institutions  (Cull et al. (2007); Armendariz and Morduch, 
2010). In view of this, we extend the analysis to test further the implications 
of the agency theory i.e the effects of high interest rate on sustainability. To 
achieve this, the quadratic form of gross portfolio yield is introduced to the 
base model as specified in column (5) and (6) in table 4.7 (Cull et al. 2007). 
The Hausman fixed-random test favour fixed effect model in column 6, 
therefore analysis of the model is based on the equation in column 6. The 
results of the random effect model show that the coefficients of gross 
portfolio yield is positive on sustainability as earlier confirmed, however, 
0.004 coefficient of squared interest rate is negative, and strongly 
significant. This implies that at relative high interest rate only riskier 
borrowers have access to loan, the result also corroborates earlier finding of 
-0.2 coefficient of yield-squared by Cull et al. (2007). This result also affirms 
the earlier finding of Robert (2013) which initially finds positive relationship 
between profits oriented MFls and interest rate but inimical to profitability at 
high interest rate. By this result, it clearly shows that high interest rate is 
detrimental to microfinance sustainability in Nigeria, contrary to the popular 
opinion that the poor only concern about access to loans but not concern 
about interest rates by the promoters of commercialization (CGAP, 2004; 





Table 4.7: Sustainability Regression (Squared) 
 






  5 6 
Yield 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 
(2.80) (2.97) 
Yield^2 -0.004 -0.004* 
 
(-1.55) (-1.72) 
Gender -0.39*** -0.39*** 
 
(-6.69) (-6.63) 
Labcost  -0.15** -0.15** 
 
(-2.11) (-2.08) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 
(-3.57) (-3.63) 
log of Loan (LLoan)  0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(2.89) (2.82) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.04** -0.04** 
 
(-2.39) (-2.37) 
Constant 0.43*** 0.43*** 
 
(3.78) (3.84) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (5&6) shows Chi2(7)=6.80, with the Prob>Chi2=0.4503, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random effect in column 6 is chosen for this analysis. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the CBN. 
 
In the study conducted by Cull et al (2007), the effect of high interest rate 
was test on loan repayment using portfolio-at-risk as the dependent 
variable. In this thesis, we also examine the impact of high interest rate on 
loan repayment; it is generally believed that too high interest rate is capable 
of affecting loan repayment due to adverse selection and moral hazard on 
the part of the borrowers (Cull et al. (2007); Armendariz and Morduch, 
2010). We therefore tested the impact of squared gross portfolio yield on the 
portfolio at risk. The result in column (8) from table 4.8 shows that gross 
portfolio yield is highly significant in explaining loan repayment as both the 
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coefficients of its linear and squared coefficient significantly affect portfolio 
at risk. This corroborates Cull et al. (2007) results on the same issue. It 
suggests, by this result, that high interest rate in Nigeria might translate to 
loans delinquency. However, when we allow gross portfolio yield and labour 
cost to interact with different lending models, the coefficients of both 
individual and group lending models were negative and significant in 
explaining changes on portfolio at risk. It implies that a unit increase in 
individual and group lending interest rate could increase portfolio at risk by 
0.2 and 0.1 per cent, respectively. This is slightly different from Cull et al 
(2007), their results show that only interest rate that related with group lend 
that was significant in explaining portfolio-at-risk. Further analysis of the 
regression result indicates that labour cost and individual labour cost were 
not significant but only group labour cost was significant. An increase in 
group lending labour cost would increase PAR by 0. 2 per cent, also, the 
impact of coefficients of efficiency on portfolio-at-risk was significant at 0.4 









Table 4.8: Repayment (Portfolio at risk) Regression 
 
  Fixed Effect Random Effect 
  
Portfolio at risk 
(PAR) 
Portfolio at risk 
(PAR) 
  7 8 
Yield 3.01*** 2.99*** 
 
(6.89) (6.87) 
Yield^2 -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 
(-5.24) (-5.20) 
Yield x Individual Lending 
Model -0.16**** -0.16*** 
 
(-4.93) (-4.90) 
Yield x Group Lending Model -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
(-4.57) (-4.58) 
Labour Cost -1.68 -1.70 
 
(-1.43) (-1.45) 
Labour Cost x Individual 
Lending Model 0.12 0.12 
 
(1.14) (1.15)         
Labour Cost x Group Lending 
Model 0.20** -0.20** 
 
(1.97) (-1.93) 
Log of Loan -0.02 -0.2 
 
(-1.30) (-1.27) 
Gender -0.08 -0.08 
 
(-1.22) (-1.13) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) 0.03* 0.03* 
 
(1.82) (1.86) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.42*** -0.43*** 
 
(4.50) (-4.57) 
Constant 0.42** 0.41** 
 
(2.57) (2.53) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (7&8) shows Chi2(11)=0.93, with the Prob>Chi2=1.000, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random effect in column 8 is chosen for this analysis. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the CBN. 
 
4.10.3 Regression Results for Mission Drift 
To test for mission drift in Nigeria, we borrow from Cull et al. (2007) and 
Mersland and Strom (2010) that tested impact of sustainability indicator on 
different outreach variables namely average loan size, percentage of 
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women borrowers and main market. However, in this thesis, the impact 
sustainability OPSS is tested against only two measures of outreach, 
namely, average loan size (AVLOAN) and ratio of women clients to total 
active borrowers (GENDER). Aside OPSS, other control variables were 
added to the model as independent variables (Cull et al. (2007). We further 
interact some of the independent variables with individual and group lending 
variables to know the extent to which lending models affect mission drift 
(Cull et al. (2007).   
In the first mission drift model, average loan size (AVLOAN) was used as 
dependent variable vis-à-vis other independent variables interacted with 
lending model in column 9 and 11 of table 4.9. A prior expectation is that 
average loan size should be positively associated with the sustainability if 
there is increase in the depth of outreach of microfinance banks (Cull et al. 
2009; Olivares-Polanco, 2005). Freixas and Rochet (2008) noted that 
average loan size rises with the profits per loan client. The models results 









Table 4.9: Mission Drift Regressions  
 
 





















(OPSS) -0.06*** -0.16 -0.06** -0.15 
 
(-3.78) (-1.52) (-3.71) (-1.46) 
Yield -0.18** 2.77*** -0.17** 2.74*** 
 
(-2.00) (4.55) (-1.93) (4.50) 
Yield x Individual Lending 
Model -0.02** -0.07 -0.02** -0.07 
 
(-2.33) (-1.46) (-2.25) (-1.42) 
Yield x Group Lending 
Model 0.03*** -0.30*** 0.03*** -0.30*** 
 
(3.03) (-4.36) (2.98) (-4.34) 
Labour Cost x Individual 
Lending Model -0.06* 0.05 -0.07** 0.05 
 
(1.84) (0.21) (1.96) (0.21) 
Labour Cost x Group 
Lending Model 0.09** 0.09 0.09** 0.09 
 
(2.09) (0.33) (2.23) (0.33) 
Log of Scale (LSCALE) 0.02** 0.38*** 0.02** 0.38*** 
 
(2.33) (7.89) (2.33) (7.80) 
Efficiency (EFF) 0.95** -0.77*** 0.09** -0.75*** 
 
(2.41) (-2.87) (2.27) (-2.80) 
Constant 0.28*** 0.32 0.28*** 0.37 
  (3.30) (0.57) (3.27) (0.65) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
The Hausman test (9&11) shows Chi2(8)=7.15, with the Prob>Chi2=0.5210, while for 10 & 12 shows  
Chi2(8)=91.29 and Prob>Chi2=0.0000 . When P-value is insignificant i.e.  
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when is significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random effect models in column 11 &  Fixed effect in column10 are chosen for this analysis  
 
The results of the of Hausman test with chi2(8)=7.15 and probability value 
(Prob>chi2=0.5210) indicates that  random effect model in column 11 of 
table 4.9 is more appropriate for this analysis. The result in column 11 
shows that sustainability, OPSS, was significant and negatively related with 
the average loan size (AVLOAN). It shows that sustainable MFBs tend to be 
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more focused on the poor clients, which also implies increase in depth of 
MFBs outreach in Nigeria. The result conforms to Christen 2000; Navajas et 
al. 2000; Frank, 2008) that show negative coefficient of sustainability on 
average loan size and that increase in sustainability helps depth of outreach 
to the poor. This result has alley fear expressed by Yunus that clients who 
are better off could crowd out poorer customers in any microfinance credit 
scheme (Christen and Drake, 2002). Other factors that affect average loan 
size included interest rate of individual and group lending models, individual 
and group labour costs, MFBs scale and efficiency.   
The second mission drift regression model was estimated using the 
percentage of women borrowers to total active clients of MFBs as shown in 
column 10 and 12 of table 6.6. The results of the of Hausman test with 
chi2(8)=91.29 and probability value (Prob>chi2=0.0000) indicates that  fixed 
effect model in column 10 of table 4.9 is more appropriate for this analysis.  
The result in table 6.6 column (10) shows that operating self-sufficiency ratio 
(OPSS) is negatively related with percentage of women borrowers but not 
significant. Based on the result, we cannot conclude that sustainable MFBs 
tend less to women clients. In case of Cull et al. (2007) result, the coefficient 
was rather positive and significant as expected. The result also shows that 
interest rate (Yield) of MFBs negatively related with lending to women. 
However, allowing interest rate to interact with lending models, the result 
indicates that interest rate of group-based lender is negatively related with 
GENDER. An increase in group-based interest rate would reduce lending to 
women by 0.3 per cent. This result also suggests that women clients of 
group-based MFBs are more sensitive to increase in interest rate than 
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having access to loans.  The result further shows increasing MFBs‟ size 
seems to be associated with lending to women, as a unit increase in the 
size of MFBs would improve lending to women by 0.4 per cent.  
4.10.4 Women Outreach and Repayment Regression Results 
4.10.4.1 Correlation Coefficient 
The correlation in table 4.10 shows the correlation between female clients 
and repayment variables, namely portfolio at risk, provision expenses rate 
and write of rate. The correlation of -0.05 between female clients and 
portfolio at risk is negative. The negative correlation is according to 
expectation and suggests that female borrowers tend to have better 
repayment rate. It also implies that microfinance banks that have higher 
proportion of female clients are associated with low portfolio-at-risk. 
However, the correlations of two other repayment variables, provision 
expense rate and write-off rate with the female clients are 0.06 and 0.03, 
respectively are not as expected.  











Female Clients 1 
   Portfolio at risk -0.05 1 
  Provision expense 
rate 0.06 0.35 1 
 Write-off rate 0.03 0.22 0.25 1 
Note 
 
4.10.4.2 Repayment Regression Results 
This section of the thesis Adopted D‟espallier et al. (2011) that tested impact 
of female clients‟ loans on three measures of repayment, namely, portfolio-
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at-risk, write-off rate and provision expense rate. However, in this thesis, out 
of three repayment variables only two, namely, portfolio at risk and provision 
expense rate are used in the regression models while write-off rate was 
excluded because the few data points which could not be used for any 
meaningful estimation. We therefore use these two variables as the 
dependent variables in the models. The portfolio at risk models namely fixed 
effect and random effect models are in column (13) and (15) while that of 
provision expense rate models are in column (14) and (16) in table 4.11, 
respectively. Applying Hausman tests to choose the appropriate models, the 
test suggests random effect model in column (15) for the portfolio model 
and random effect model in column (16) for the provision expense rate 
model.  
The result of the portfolio at risk model in column (15) shows that increased 
lending to female client has negative effect on the portfolio at risk. An 
increase in lending to female clients will reduce portfolio at risk by 0.1 per 
cent, it implies that lending to women would improve repayment rate.  This 
finding corroborate the earlier finding of D‟espallier et al. (2011) that found 
negative impact of gender on portfolio at risk i.e. gender improved 
repayment by 0.05 per cent. It also supports Kari (2009) that finds increased  
lending to women significantly improve loan repayment. 
Aside the impact of gender on portfolio at risk, other control variables 
namely operating self-sufficiency (OPSS), interest rate (YIELD), MFBs 
scale, efficiency (EFF) and interest rate of group-based lenders also impact 
significantly. For example, the result shows that operating self-sufficiency 
and interest rate significantly and negatively impacted on the portfolio at risk 
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implying that a unit increase in these variables would reduce portfolio at risk 
by 0.1 and 1.2 per cent, respectively. This implies that a more sustainable 
MFBs would be more associated with low portfolio-at-risk. Further analysis 
suggests that increased interest of group-based lenders could reduce 
portfolio at risk by 0.1 per cent and by implication reduce the repayment 
rate. This is not surprising as most microfinance institutions prefer group 
lending to individual lending model because of moral hazard problem. The 
impact of MFBs scale on portfolio at risk is negative (-0.5) as expected, 














Table 4.11: Women and Repayment Regressions  
 
 




















Gender -0.12* -0.06** -0.11* -0.06** 
 
(-1.68) (-2.48) (-1.63) (-2.51) 
Operating Self-Sufficiency 
(OPSS) -0.08** -0.06*** -0.08** -0.06*** 
 
(-2.51) (-5.19) (-2.49) (-5.19) 
Yield 1.15*** 0.10 1.15*** 0.10 
 (5.65) (1.59) (5.70) (1.59) 
Yield x Individual Lending 
Model -0.03 -0.02** -0.03 -0.02** 
 
(-1.39) (-1.93) (-1.39) (1.96) 
Yield x Group Lending 
Model -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 
 
(-2.38) (0.67) (2.41) (0.72) 
Labour Cost x Individual 
Lending Model 0.05 0.10*** 0.05 0.10*** 
 
(0.81) (4.07) (0.78) (4.12) 
Labour Cost x Group 
Lending Model 0.03 -0.09*** 0.03 -0.09*** 
 
(0.34) (2.82) (0.37) (-2.88) 
Log of Scale (LSCALE) -0.04** -0.003 -0.04** -0.003 
 
(-2.74) (-0.63) (2.74) (-0.65) 
Efficency (EFF) -0.53*** 0.05** -0.54*** -0.06** 
 
(-5.78) (2.07) (-5.85) (-2.16) 
Constant 0.79*** 0.12** 0.79*** 0.12** 
  (4.58) (2.12) (4.57) (2.15) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
The Hausman test (13&15) shows Chi2(9)=0.31, with the Prob>Chi2=1.0000, while for 14 & 16 shows  
Chi2(9)=0.24 and Prob>Chi2=1.0000 . When P-value is insignificant i.e.  
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when is significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random  effect models in column 15 &  16 are chosen for this analysis  
 
Using the second indicator of repayment, provision expense rate (PROBAD) 
in column (16) of table 4.11. The result confirms the previous finding; 
increased lending to female client is negatively impacted on provision 
expense rate as expected. A unit increase in female lending reduces 
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provision expense rate by 0.1 per cent. This implies that MFBs with higher 
proportion of female clients are associated more with fewer provisions; this 
is also corroborating earlier finding of D‟espallier et al. (2011) and that of 
Sharma and Zeller (1997).  
The impact of operating self-sufficiency is negative and significant as 
expected. An increase in sustainability would reduce provision expense rate 
by 0.1 per cent, this implies that, the more sustainable a microfinance bank 
becomes the fewer the provisions for doubtful and bad loans.  
4.11  Conclusion  
The chapter examined sources of data and described data used for this 
study. It also presented the summary statistics. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that MFBs in Nigeria are divergent in sizes with state MFBs has the 
largest size. In term of sustainability of the industry, the Nigerian MFBs is 
unsustainable as the ratio of OPSS is below one; however, the degree of 
sustainability also differs among the three categories of MFBs. The statistics 
also indicated that MFBs in Nigeria lend more to men as 45 per cent of its 
total lending goes to women, on the average. Also, the pattern of lending to 
women differs among the various categories of MFBs, the national MFBs 
has the highest lending to women about 62 per cent. The thesis also 
explained the methodology and the hypotheses used for the study.  
The results of the drivers of sustainability and test for the role of interest rate 
in microfinance sustainability and repayment, using one-way error 
component panel data regression methodology to shed light on issues that 
surround microfinance sustainability debate and the role of interest rates. 
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The results showed that yield, labour cost, gender, orientation, efficiency 
and loan size are the major drivers of microfinance sustainability at the 
national level in Nigeria. The results indicate that interest rate is an 
important driver of sustainability as 1 per cent increases in interest rate 
elicits 0.6 per cent changes in sustainability of microfinance banks in 
Nigeria. It implies that, as expected, the higher the interest rate, the higher 
the profit accrued to MFBs. The results also indicated that labour cost is 
high and inimical to microfinance sustainability in Nigeria. Increase in loan 
size also improves sustainability by 0.3 per cent.  
The result further confirmed earlier findings from Cull et al. (2007) that 
individual lending model is significantly important and positively related to 
sustainability measures. An increase in individual lending interest rate elicits 
0.1 per cent impact on sustainability of MFBs.  
Further analysis shows increase in interest rate positively related with 
sustainability. However, at high interest rate only riskier borrowers have 
access to loan. By this result, it is clearly showed that too high interest rate 
can be detrimental to microfinance sustainability in Nigeria if raised too far 
Further analysis also showed that gross portfolio yield explained loan 
repayment (portfolio at risk) as indicated by the coefficients of its linear and 
squared terms. Even, after interacting gross portfolio yield with different 
lending models, the coefficient (-0.1) of group-based lenders‟ yield and the 
coefficient (0.2) of individual-based lenders‟ yield are as expected and 
significant in explaining changes on portfolio at risk.  
The results of the mission drift model showed that sustainability is significant 
and negatively related with the average loan size (AVLOAN). It also showed 
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that sustainable MFBs tend to be more focused on the poor clients which 
imply increase in depth of outreach. However, in the second model, the 
result shows that operating self-sufficiency ratio (OPSS) is negatively 
related with percentage of women borrowers, although, the coefficient was 
not significant. The third subsection examined the impact of greater focus 
on microfinance female clients on repayment rate in Nigeria. The findings on 
role of female clients on repayment showed that both correlation coefficient 
and regressions confirmed that lending to women improves repayment rate 
and corroborate the earlier finding of D‟espallier et al. (2011) that found that 
















Microfinance Sustainability and Outreach in Nigeria 
(Case Study of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja) 
 
5.1     Introduction 
Microfinance promises to reduce poverty through provision of small loans 
which the formal financial institutions adjudge unprofitable due to high 
transaction costs. The innovation from microfinance re-kindles hope among 
policy makers in developing countries especially in Nigeria that the 
challenge of abject poverty, which had earlier defied government 
interventions, could be surmounted. However of recent, the industry has 
also been accused of drifting away from it initial mission owing to its drive of 
increasing financial performances (Mersland and Strom, 2010). In order to 
garner insights from state-specific experiences of microfinance banks‟ 
sustainability and outreach, this chapter of the thesis provides experiences 
of microfinance banks in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja of Nigeria 
established by the Federal Capital Territory Act of 1976. 
The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is a land-locked state located in the 
North Central geo-political zone of Nigeria. The efforts of the Nigerian 
government in the time past to initiate poverty reduction target programmes 
such as Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Directorate for Food, Roads and 
Rural infrastructure (DFRRI), Better Life for Rural Women (BLRW), Family 
Support Programmes (FSP), National Economic Empowerment Strategy 
(NEEDS) and National Poverty Eradication Programme, amongst others, 
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which cut across all states did not yield expected results (Ehigiamusoe, 
2011). For example, UNDP (2009) puts the FCT human poverty index at 
21.0 while inequality or internal disparity within FCT was as high at 0.64. 
The subjective poverty survey based on self-assessment, 97.9 per cent of 
the people in FCT rated themselves as being poor (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2010). Some of the reasons adduce for the failure include undue 
political influences, corruption and inefficient allocation of resources, 
because of these, the prevalence of poverty and inequality in FCT still 
persist. The detail socio-economic background of FCT, Abuja is presented 
in appendix 4.   
In view of the reality of high incidence of poverty and income disparity in 
FCT, Abuja, it becomes imperative to adopt sustainable poverty reduction 
strategy. This chapter of the thesis provides insights to possible factors 
driving the sustainability of microfinance within the FCT, Abuja. The chapter 
therefore seeks to examine the operations and performance analysis of 
microfinance banks in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.  The first 
section uses data of 38 MFBs in FCT, available with the CBN during 2001 – 
2014 to examine the drivers of sustainability and to answer issues of 
surrounding mission drift and high interest rate within the FCT. The 
objective is to test whether the pattern displayed for the whole country in the 
previous chapters can be replicated in a single state. In addition, the second 
part of the chapter uses data from survey of some selected operators of 
microfinance banks within Abuja in 2014 to answer some questions relating 
to microfinance sustainability, interest rate, repayment, women lending and 
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the challenges confronting the industry in FCT, Abuja. The last section 
concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Data Analysis, Presentation of Regression Results 
This first section of chapter 5 analyses the characteristics of Abuja MFBs‟ 
data. It uses these data to estimate regression models with reference to the 
specified models in chapter 6 of the thesis.  
5.2.1 The Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics from table 5.1 suggests that in FCT microfinance 
banks lend more to male clients than female clients, on the average, out of 
64 observations, women account for 36 per cent of microfinance banks‟ total 
clients compared with 45 per cent for industry average in table 4.2. The 
pattern and composition of microfinance banks clients within FCT seems to 
be diverged as in some banks, women account for less than 1 per cent of 
their total clients while in some other cases, women composition is as high 
as 80 per cent of the total clients. Also, table 5.2 indicates that both state 
and unit MFBs lend 37 and 36 per cent of their loans to women within the 
FCT.  This also supports earlier finding of 45 per cent in table 4.2 for the 
whole industry that MFBs in Nigeria lend more to male clients than female 
clients 
The average portfolio at risk (PAR) within FCT microfinance banks is about 
37 per cent compared with 26 per cent of the industry average in table 4.2. 
This suggests that there are more loan delinquencies in FCT MFBs 
compared with the whole industry. The pattern of risks within the FCT vary 
from banks to banks, in some cases is as low as less than 1 per cent while 
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others are extremely high. The risk profile of state MFBs of 16 per cent in 
FCT seems not to be significantly different from 15 per cent for the entire 
state MFBs in Nigeria as shown in table 5.2 and 4.2, respectively. However, 
portfolio-at-risks differ for unit MFBs, the risk within FCT unit MFBs is 44 per 
cent, higher than 28 per cent for the entire unit MFBs in the country.  
Microfinance bank is said to be sustainable when its operating self-
sufficiency indicator equals to and above 1, but when less than 1 is termed 
un-sustainable. In FCT the sustainability indicator (OPSS), on the average, 
suggests that the industry is yet to be sustainable, the ratio is 0.40 
compared with national average of 0.56 in table 4.2. Within the FCT the 
minimum ratio is 0.03 while the maximum is 1.84, this implies that some 
microfinance banks are highly sustainable while some cannot keep their 
operations going without recourse to either external or internal subsidies, 
which also implies that they are not sustainable. Further analysis of OPSS 
in table 5.2 indicates that both state and unit MFBs are unsustainable at the 
ratios of 0.39 and 0.40, respectively.  
As shown in table 5.1, the MFBs‟ write-off rate (WRFR) of about 43 per cent 
in FCT is relatively higher when compared with the industry average of 
about 9 per cent as indicated in table 4.2. The high interest rate (YIELD) of 
38 per cent compared with 31 per cent for the industry might account for 
high write-off rate in FCT. Also, provision expense rate i.e. provision for bad 





Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics (FCT, Abuja) 
 
AVLOAN is the average loan size of microfinance banks. The average loan 
size of microfinance banks in FCT is US$2,350 million compared with 
industry average of US$1,590 million it implies that average loan size in 
FCT is relatively higher than the industry average. Within the FCT, some 
microfinance lend as low as US$1.00 while others has maximum average 
loan size is as high as US$15,260 as shown in table 5.1.  Further analysis 










0.40 0.03 1.84 
AVLOAN  
 Average loan 
balance per 
borrower  
2.35 0.001 15.26 
LOAN Total Loan Size 2,053 4.88 65,485 
LABCOST Labour Cost 0.18 0 6.6 
EFF Efficiency 0.76 0.02 14.02 
SCALE Total assets 3,423 54.12 87,101 
LOASS 
Loans to Assets 
Ratio 
0.52 0.04 2.09 





0.36 0 0.80 
YIELD 
Yield on gross 
loan portfolio  
0.38 0.05 7.78 




0.15 -0.14 1.39 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria's FinA Off-Site Surveillance System, data base. The 
values of AVLOAN, LOAN and SCALE are in US$'000 
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state MFBs and unit MFBs within the FCT, it valued at US$3,520 and 
US$1,950, respectively.  
Moreover, the MFBs‟ labour cost (LABCOST) is relatively lower in FCT than 
the whole industry. The average labour cost within the FCT is around 18 per 
cent as shown in table 5.1 compared with the industry average of 57 per 
cent in table 5.2. Also, table 5.2 further indicates that labour cost is as low 
as 4 per cent for state MFBs and 20 per cent for unit MFBs within the FCT. 
The interest rate (YIELD) of microfinance within the FCT, on the average, is 
about 38 per cent higher than the industry figure of about 31 per cent. The 
interest rate of about 38 and 31 per cent both the FCT MFBs and the 
industry average is well acceptable to promoters of microfinance 
commercialization since is well below 100 per cent and above of money 
lenders‟ interest rates. However, to the welfarists, such high interest rate 
could crowd out the poor which is the initial goal of the industry.  
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics  
 
  State MFBs Unit MFBs 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OPSS 0.39 0.17 0.08 0.69 0.4 0.33 0.03 1.84 
GENDER 0.37 0.14 0.17 0.59 0.36 0.17 0 0.8 
AVLOAN 3.52 3.03 0.39 9 1.95 3.06 0.001 15.26 
PAR 0.16 0.2 0.002 0.6 0.44 1 0 6.88 
LABCOST 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.2 0.83 0 6.6 
LOASS 0.58 0.15 0.29 0.75 0.5 0.7 0.003 19.75 
EFF 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.41 0.89 2.52 0.02 14.02 
YIELD 0.25 0.13 0.08 0.64 0.41 0.93 0.01 7.78 
PROBAD 0.01 0.04 -0.12 0.13 0.19 0.35 -0.14 1.39 
WRFR na na na na 0.43 0.81 0 2.18 
LOAN 10096.4 17620.9 656.5 65485.26 425.44 378.3 4.83 1947.15 
SCALE 15734 23588.33 938.09 87101.76 900.92 703.31 54.12 3275.9 
Source: Author's calculation based on the data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. The values of Outreach, Loan and Size 
are in US$'000 
127 
 
5.2.3 Sustainability Results   
To determine drivers of microfinance banks in FCT, we replicate the 
equation 4.3 specified in chapter 4 of the thesis. The results are presented 
in table 5.3. Hausman test is applied to choose the most appropriate 
between the two models in column 17 and 18. Based on the test, the fixed 
effect model in column 17 is chosen for this analysis.  The result of the 
regression model shows that two variables namely orientation (LOASS) and 
efficiency (EFF) and size of loans (LLOAN) significantly drive microfinance 
sustainability in FCT. Compared with the result in table 4.3 for the whole 
industry that indicated that all the six variables, namely, yield, labour cost, 
size of loan, efficiency, orientation and gender significantly drive MFBs‟ 
sustainability.  
The negative signs of LOASS (-0.3) and positive signs of LLOAN (0.03) for 
both MFBs in FCT and for that of the industry are the same, but the 
magnitude of impacts differ The positive coefficients of loan size show that 
sustainability of microfinance could be improved by increasing loan size in 
FCT, Abuja.  
The interest rate (YIELD) which play significant role in driving sustainability 
of microfinance banks for the whole industry in chapter 4 of the thesis 






Table 5.3: Sustainability Regression  
 






  17 18 
Yield 0.06 0.09 
 
(0.46) (0.73) 
Gender  0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.19) (-0.16) 
Labour costs to Assets 
(LABCOST) 0.03 -0.04 
 
(0.51) (-0.64) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) -0.34*** -0.27*** 
 
(-3.70) (-2.96) 
log of Loan (LLOAN)  0.33* 0.04*** 
 
(1.70) (1.74) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.04 -0.05 
 
(-1.02) (-1.28) 
Constant 0.13 0.09 
 
(0.58) (0.40) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (1&2) shows Chi2(5)=-99.17, with the Prob>Chi2=0.0000, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. Based on 
Hausman test, Fixed effect in column 17 is chosen for this analysis. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the CBN. 
 
In view of these findings, we probe further by squared the interest rate 
(YIELD) as previously done in chapter 4, to test the impact of high interest 
rate on sustainability in FCT. The result in column 20 of table 5.10 in 
appendix 5 shows that high interest rate (yield-squared) was not significant 
in explaining variations in sustainability in FCT.  
Also we probe further if microfinance banks in FCT still focus on its initial 
mission of poverty reduction or have been drifted away from it because of 
commercialisation. Two indicators of microfinance outreach are used 
namely average loan size and percentage of female clients as dependent 
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variables in each of the model as against operating self-sufficiency and 
other control variables as specified in equation 4.5 of chapter 4. 
Surprisingly, operating self-sufficiency was not significantly impacted on 
both measures of outreach, namely, average loan size and percentage of 
female clients as shown in column 23 and 22 of table 5.11, respectively, in 
appendix 5.  
Moreover, the debate that female client have better repayment records than 
female client microfinance banks could aggravate portfolio at risk thereby 
leading to low repayment of loans by the borrowers was examined as in the 
previous chapter. To test this assertion, two regression models are 
estimated as shown in table 5.12 column 27 and 28 in appendix 5 were 
chosen based on Hausman test, where portfolio at risk and provision 
expense rate represent the dependent variable for each regression model. 
The impacts of gender and other control variables are tested on the portfolio 
at risk and provision expense rate. The results of the two equations show 
that gender was not significantly impacted on both repayment measures in 
FCT, Abuja.   
5.3 The Survey Methodology and Results 
This second section explains the methodology and presents the results of 
survey of 30 microfinance banks within the FCT, Abuja, which the 
researcher conducted in 2014. The intension was to know the views and 
perceptions of operators of microfinance banks within FCT, Abuja, aside the 




5.3.1 The Survey Area 
The survey was conducted in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of 
Nigeria. The FCT was created in 1976 with the landmark of about eighty 
thousand square kilometers; it has about 2.2 million household and 
population of about 6.7 million people. The study area is surrounded on the 
North by Kaduna State, on the South by Kogi State, on the West by Niger 
State and on the East by Nasarawa Sate. The area consists of urban area 
mainly in the municipal, city centre area, semi-urban areas mainly in area 
council headquarters and 858 rural communities. The major occupation of 
the people in the area is farming, while others are civil servants and traders. 
5.3.2 Method 
The thesis designed a survey questionnaire to get some vital information 
about each microfinance banks‟ operations within FCT, Abuja. The intention 
was to get relevant variables, practices and views of operators about 
microfinance sustainability which could not be obtained from the data the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. To achieve this objective, questionnaire were 
administered to thirty operators of registered microfinance banks in FCT. 
Head offices of these microfinance banks in FCT, Abuja were visited and 
one questionnaire each was administered to a staff in management position 
of each MFB, staff that had good knowledge of the organisation to answer 
series of questions in the questionnaire (Appendix 2).  
5.3.3   Instrumentation and Procedure for Data Collection 
The primary data used were sourced from cross-sectional survey. To collect 
these data, Likert-type questionnaire were carefully structured, designed 
and administered to each microfinance bank. To really capture the 
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objectives of the study, the measuring instruments used mainly ranges from 
three-point to four-point Likert-type questionnaire depending on what the 
questions try to elicit. The questionnaire was made up of two sections. 
Section one requires the personal information of microfinance banks 
operators, while section two contains fifteen carefully structured Likert types 
questionnaire on sources of funding and revenue, operation cost, loan 
repayment, lending model, interest rate and challenges facing microfinance 
banks and possible solutions to the identified challenges.  
5.3.4   Method of Data Analysis 
Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied to analyse the 
data. At the collection stage, major segment of the responses from the 
collected questionnaire was qualitative. Then, a simple comparison was 
conducted in form of charts and tables to answer some research questions. 
5.3.5 Data Analysis and Results from the Survey 
This section of the thesis analyses the results of the survey conducted on 
the existing microfinance banks within the FCT, Abuja in 2014. 
5.3.5.1 Data Analysis 
A total of forty-seven (47) function microfinance banks exist in FCT, Abuja in 
2014, out of these 5 MFBs (10.6%) are State microfinance banks, while the 
remaining 42 MFBs (89.4%) are Unit microfinance banks. From the total 
number of the functional MFBs, 30 (63.8%) were randomly selected for the 
survey. Out of the 30 questionnaire distributed to the 30 selected MFBs, 27 
questionnaire (90.0%) were retrieved while the remaining 3 questionnaire 
(10.0%) were refused. Therefore, the rest of this analysis will be based on 
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the results of 27 questionnaire retrieved which constituted about 90.0% of 
the total surveyed MFBs (Table 5.4). 




Total number of Functional 
MFBs  47 
 Total number of MFBS 
Sample MFBs  30 63.8 
Number of Questionnaire 
Retrieved 27 90.0 
Number of Questionnaire 
Refused  3 10.0 
 
5.3.5.2 Source of MFBs’ Funding in FCT, Abuja 
Majority of the MFBs in FCT claim that sourced their fund from personal 
saving as about 81.5 % mainly sourced their fund either from personal 
savings or other self-funding sources. Also, 14.8% of the MFBs sourced 
their funding from borrowing, 3.7% depend on donors‟ funding, while none 
of them depend on the government for funding (figure 5.1). 















5.3.5.3 Major Objective of MFBs in FCT, Abuja 
The findings from table 5.5 and figure 5.2 suggest that the major motivation 
of establishing microfinance banks in FCT, Abuja is reach out to the poor. 
Out of 27 respondents, 18 MFBs (66.7%) indicated that their primarily 
objective is to help the poor. Also, 6 MFBs (22.2%) showed that they are 
mainly for community development while the remaining 3 MFBs (11.1%) 
said their mainly objective is to make profit. 





Development Profit Total 
Respondents 18 6 3 27 
Percentage 66.7 22.2 11.1 100.0 
 
 







To help the poor Community Development Profit
134 
 
5.3.5.4 Major Source of MFBs’ Revenue in FCT, Abuja 
Although, majority of MFBs in Abuja indicated that they are for the poor in 
section 5.6.5.3, further analysis revealed that they got their revenue mainly 
from interests on loans. Interests on Loans accounted for 92.6 per cent of 
their total revenue. This implies that MFBs in FCT, Abuja must have been 
charging high enough interest rate that could cover the costs so as to keep 
them in business. Other sources of revenue accounted for 7.4% of the total 
revenue while the charges on leasing seem to suggest no significant role in 
revenue generation (table 5.6). 





Leasing Others Total 
Number of MFBs 25 0 2 27 
Percentage 92.6 0.0 7.4 100.0 
 
5.3.5.5 Major Challenge in Accessing Loans in FCT, Abuja 
The finding from table 5.7 showed that 23 MFBs (85%) perceived that lack 
of collateral security constitute a major challenge why clients find it difficult 
to access micro loan as issue of trust play significant role who get the loans. 




Non Availability of 
Micro Loans Collateral Security Total 
Number of MFBs 0 4 23 27 
Percentage 0.0 14.8 85.2 100.0 
 
While 4 MFBs (14.8%) is of the opinion that non-availability of micro loans, 
especially in a medium and longer terms, is major challenge hindering 
clients from accessing loans from them. None of the MFBs believed that 
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high interest rate as major challenge. This confirms the general belief of 
MFBs that microfinance clients care less about high interest rate but are 
more concerned about access to loans.   
5.3.5.6 Perception of MFBs on Operation Costs in FCT, Abuja 
To examine MFBs perception about their operating costs, the costs were 
divided into three, namely, interest rate cost, personnel cost and 
disbursement & recovery cost. On average, 42.0% of MFBs are of the 
opinion that operating cost is medium, 32.1% believed that the cost is low 
while the remaining 25.9% thought that operating cost is high (table 5.8). 













Costs (% ) 
High 22.2 37.0 18.5 25.9 
Medium 40.7 40.7 44.4 42.0 
Low 37.0 22.2 37.0 32.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
The disaggregation of interest rate cost in figure 5.3 further showed that 
40.7% of MFBs believed that the rate is medium, 37.0% said is high, while 
22.2% believed is high. Also, in-depth analysis of personnel cost showed 
that 40.7% of MFBs ranked the cost as medium, but 37.0% ranked it as high 
while the remaining 22.2% of MBs ranked it low.  In addition, disaggregation 
of loan disbursement and recovery cost indicated that 42.4% of MFBs 
believed it is medium, 37.0% ranked it low and 18.5% ranked it high. 
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Figure 5.3: Perception of MFBs on Operation Costs  
 
 
5.3.5.7 Perception of MFBs on Clients’ Loan Repayment in FCT, 
Abuja 
In order to test if clients‟ loan repayment has improved or fallen since 
inception of microfinance banks in FCT, Abuja, the periods of existence of 
MFBs are divided into two namely, 1st  half since inception of business and 
2nd half since inception of business. Each MFB were asked to rank their 
perception giving them options of below 50%, 50%-69%, 70%-79%, 80%-
89%, and 90% and above. This is to test their perception whether 
customers‟ loan repayment has improved or not.  
Finding as shown in figure 5.4 indicated that 18 (66.7%) of the 27 MFBs is 
of the view that repayment rate has improved since the inception of 
business. While the remaining 8 (33.3%) of the MFBs believed that the 

































Figure 5.4: Perception on Clients’ Loan Repayment Rate 
 
 
5.3.5.8 Perception of MFBs on Lending to Women in FCT, Abuja 
Also, the perception of MFBs operators is tested on percentage of loan to 
women clients whether or worsened in FCT, Abuja. The periods of their 
operation also are divided into two namely, 1st half since inception of 
business and 2nd half since inception of business. Each representative of 
MFB were asked to rank their perception giving them options of below 50%, 
50%-69%, 70%-79%, 80%-89%, and 100%. This was done to test their 
perception whether lending to women has improved or not. The finding 
suggests that 10 of the total 27 MFBs which represent 37.0 % per cent of 
the total MFBs surveyed believed that lending to women has increased 
since the second half of business. Also, 9 MFBs (33.3%) were of the opinion 
that the percentage lending to women has fallen since the second half of 
inception of business, while the 8 MFBs (29.6%) were indifferent (figure 
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Figure 5.5: Perception of MFBs on Lending to Women 
 
 
5.3.5.9  Lending Models of MFBs in FCT, Abuja 
Analysis of the survey data showed that 51.9% of MFBs in FCT, Abuja 
majorly preferred individual lending model while the remaining 48.1% mainly 
used group lending model (figure 5.6). Reasons adduced for preference for 
individual lending model included easy accessibility to individual clients, 
difficulties in forming group in urban area where people come from different 
background and find it difficult to trust one another, individual clients are well 
known to the lender and lastly past experience of group lending did not 
encouraging continuity. However, the remaining 48.8% of MFBs that opted 
for group lending model believed that absence collateral securities on the 
part of clients required them to adopt cross guarantee methodology such as 
forming groups. They also believed that group lending would reduce high 
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Figure 5.6: MFBs Lending Models in FCT, Abuja 
 
 
5.3.5.10  Interest Rate and Repayment Rate of MFBs’ Loans in 
FCT, Abuja 
To test the views of MFBs on the likely impact of interest rate on 
microfinance clients‟ loan repayment, each respondent MFB were required 
to tick their responses as appropriate from the choice of very high, high, 
medium, low and very low. The finding indicated that 14 MFBs which 
constituted about 51.9 of total respondents believed that effect of interest 
rate low. While 8 respondent MFBs said it has medium effect, 3 MFBs 
(29.6%) believed the effect is high. Also, the remaining two MFBs which 
constitute 3.7% each of the total MFBs surveyed were of the opinions that 
the effects is very high and very low (table 5.9 and figure 5.7). 
Table 5.9: Interest Rate and Loan Repayment 
  
Very 
High High Medium Low 
Very 
Low Total 
Number of MFB 1 3 8 14 1 27 























Figure 5.7: Perception on Interest Rate and Repayment 
 
 
Majority of the surveyed MFBs believed that clients do not see microfinance 
loans as high as that of money lenders and as such not finding it difficult to 
pay back their loans, in the views of respondent MFBs, this explains the low 
effect of interest rate on loan repayment as indicated in figure 5.12 above. 
5.3.5.11 Challenges Confronting MFBs in FCT, Abuja 
There are different challenges identified by the respondents that inhibit the 
growth of the industry, these challenges can be categorized broadly into 
five, namely funding challenge, wrong customers and operators‟ perception, 
competition from Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) entering the industry, wrong 
government policies and high operating costs, amongst others.  
Finding showed that 51.9% of the respondents identified wrong perceptions 
by both lenders and borrowers as the major challenge in the industry. In 
some cases, borrowers believed that microfinance loans is government 
loans to help the poor and hence are not willing to repay their loans. While 
























therefore making repayment difficult, also, some clients do not believe 
MFBs are reliable enough to hold fund. In some other cases the risky 
behaviour of some customers scared MFBs to lend them micro loans. 
The second major challenge identified by the respondent is the lack of 
funding for microfinance activities or services. For example, 40.7% of the 
respondents said they do not enough fund to meet customers‟ demand and 
to reach the target group and some other MFBs find it difficult to raise 
deposits from the customers. In some cases where the findings are even 
available, the costs of it are not cheap making it difficult for onward lending 
to the poor. 
Moreover, 22.2% of the total respondents identified high operating cost as a 
major challenge to their services to the poor. The dearth of infrastructure 
such as adequate supply of power contributed to the increased overheads 
cost and more also connectivity challenge that makes it difficult to satisfy 
customers at appropriate time. Aside this challenge, 18.5% of the 
respondents also identified wrong government policies as a major 
challenge. These include tight regulatory policies, government taxation 
policies, non-government assistance of the industry in term of cheap funding 
and the frequent fear that some MFBs might be liquidated by the 
government and customers losing their investments. 
Lastly, 11.1% of the respondents mentioned competition resulting from 
DMBs entering the industry as a major challenge. In term of raising 
deposits, DMBs are better-off and enjoy clients‟ confidence more than 
typical microfinance bank, this seems to crown out activities of some MFBs. 
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter of the thesis has examined the issues that surround 
microfinance sustainability and outreach in Nigeria using the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja as a case study. Basically two methodologies were used to 
capture these issues, namely, panel data methodology during 2011-2014 
and survey methodology of MFBs conducted in 2014. The results from the 
panel regression model indicated that two variables drive microfinance 
sustainability in Abuja; they include orientation (LOASS) and loan size 
(LOAN) compared with six significant variables for the whole industry.  
Further result also indicated that interest rate was not significant in 
explaining variations in sustainability in Abuja. Also, operating self-
sufficiency was not  impacted significantly on the two measures of outreach 
namely, average loan size and percentage of female lending, even though, 
the coefficients are positive in both cases. The result also indicated that 
lending to female clients was not significant in explaining repayment of 
loans in FCT, Abuja.   
The survey results suggested that majority of MFBs in FCT, Abuja sourced 
their initial funding from personal savings; they primarily aimed at reaching 
out to the poor and depended mainly on interest rate for revenue 
generation. Findings also showed that wrong perceptions of clients about 
the reliability of MFBs activities and the perceived unethical behaviour of 
some clients by the MFBs, is the most challenging difficulty majority of the 
clients faced in accessing microfinance loans in Abuja. Also, findings 
indicated that majority of MFBs in Abuja believed that their costs of 
operations are moderate, they hold strong opinion that lending to women 
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had increased due to increased lending to women since the second half of 
business.  
In addition, majority of MFBs in Abuja believed that their interest rates are 
low and does not affect clients‟ repayment of loans. Further findings 
indicated that majority of MFBs preferred individual lending model because 
of easy accessibility to individual clients and difficulty in forming group in a 
mixed society with different backgrounds and values system. Lastly, the 
findings showed that, aside wrong perceptions, dearth of MFBs‟ funding, 
high operating due to lack of infrastructures and unfriendly government 













Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This thesis empirically examined microfinance sustainability and outreach in 
Nigeria during 2011-2014. The thesis tries to solve an important problem 
which has not been sufficiently answered in the literature, and remains un-
investigated in Nigeria due to non-availability of large microfinance data in 
the recent past: The implications of microfinance scaling up or sustainability 
on outreach. In attempt to solve this problem, the thesis reviewed relevant 
theories and empirical literature and also designed analytical framework 
which form the basis of the research questions, the thesis set to answer. To 
properly captured and addressed this problem, data on 752 microfinance 
banks in Nigeria were collected from the Central Bank of Nigeria to answer 
some of these questions. Also, the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja was 
chosen by the researcher and structured questionnaire administered to the 
officials of microfinance banks within the territory to test if the experience of 
whole country could be replicated in a single state.  
Following this introduction to the concluding chapter is the second section. It 
discusses the main findings of the thesis. Section three states the 
contributions of the study and policy recommendation. Section four 




6.2 Summary of Main Findings 
The main objective of thesis was to assess microfinance sustainability and 
outreach and the implications of such on the overall target of poverty 
reduction objective of microfinance institutions. Some research question 
were raised in section 1.3 of chapter one of the thesis. These research 
questions are individually addressed in chapters 4 and 5 with the insightful 
findings that contribute to the existing knowledge in microfinance field 
presented below.  
6.2.1 What are the drivers of microfinance sustainability and the 
effect of interest rate on microfinance repayment in Nigeria? 
In view of the increasing call for sustainability and the subsequent focus on 
commercialization of microfinance institutions, it is pertinent to examine 
factors aiding or driving sustainability and the implication of high interest 
rate on clients‟ repayment of loans. Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis examined 
these issues.  
Findings from chapter 4 showed that all the three categories of microfinance 
banks, namely, national, state and unit microfinance banks are 
unsustainable. The findings also showed that the three categories of MFBs 
differ in term of lending to women, risk profile and average loan size. 
National MFBs has the highest lending to women, highest average loan size 
and lowest portfolio at risk, while the unit MFBs recorded the lowest lending 
to women, highest portfolio at risk, highest labour cost and lowest average 
loan size. The findings from the regressions suggested that, at aggregate 
level, interest rate, labour cost, orientation, efficiency, gender and loan size 
are the principal variables driving microfinance sustainability in Nigeria. It 
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showed clearly that interest rate could initially promote sustainability but 
when the rate is too high, it is detrimental to microfinance sustainability as 
only riskier borrowers would have access to loans. Further finding showed 
that after interaction of interest rate with lending models, high interest rate of 
both individual-based and group-based lenders impacted on repayment 
rate, but the impact of individual-based lenders, is more severe than the 
group-based lenders. The findings from the state-specific regression in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis showed that two variables drive microfinance 
sustainability in FCT, Abuja; they include orientation and loan size. The role 
of interest rate which was significantly influenced sustainability for the whole 
microfinance industry was not significant in the regression for the Abuja 
case study. Also, regression showed that high interest rate was not 
significant in Abuja compared with what was obtainable when considering 
the whole industry. The survey result from selected MFBs in Abuja 
corroborates this finding as majority of MFBs interviewed in Abuja believed 
that their interest rates are low and does not affect clients‟ repayment of 
loans.   
6.2.2 Does microfinance sustainability lead to mission drift in 
Nigeria? 
The above stated research question was answered in chapters 6 and 7 of 
the thesis. Findings from chapter 4 using correlation coefficient suggested 
no evidence of mission drift. To further confirm this finding, the regression 
results in chapter 6 using sustainability as against average loan size 
indicated no evidence of mission drift both for the whole industry and for 
Abuja case study regression results in chapter 5. The survey result for 
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Abuja case study also alluded to this fact, as the majority of MFBs 
interviewed believed their lending to women has improved since the second 
half of their businesses.  The regressions findings also showed clearly in 
chapter 4 and 5 that lending to women promotes more outreach to the poor. 
All these findings suggest that the claim of microfinance mission drift is not 
evident in Nigeria. In view of these findings, it implies that the pursuance of 
microfinance sustainability will not in any way shift attention from the poor 
which is the initial target of the industry in Nigeria.  
5.2.3 Does increase in women outreach improve repayment rate in 
Nigeria? 
The findings from chapter 4 of the thesis tried to answer the research 
question stated above. Analysis of total active microfinance clients showed 
that, on average, 45 per cent are women and average portfolio-at-risk which 
is proxy for repayment was 26 per cent. Suggestions from correlations 
coefficients point to the possibility that lending to female clients could 
improve repayment rate as one out of the three repayment variables, 
namely, portfolio at risk, provision expense rate and write-off rate had the 
expected signs. Also, findings from the regressions confirmed positive effect 
of women outreach in improving repayment rate. The two repayment 
indicators used in the regressions showed that increasing lending to female 
clients would improve repayment, which implies that higher proportion of 
female client is associated with higher repayment and with fewer loan 
provisions. This finding corroborates earlier findings of other recent studies. 
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6.3 Contributions of the Study and Policy Recommendations  
This thesis has indeed contributed to the body of existing knowledge on 
microfinance sustainability and outreach. Some of these contributions are 
presented below: 
First, the findings of this thesis lay aside fear that microfinance sustainability 
always lead to mission drift and the quest for sustainability will lead to 
abandoning of the poor who are the primary target of microfinance 
programme in Nigeria. The study has also identified major drivers of 
sustainability of microfinance in Nigeria. This finding will serve as a veritable 
tool in the hand of policy institutions such as the Central Bank of Nigeria to 
design policies that target these identified factors so as to reduce the costs 
associated with the operations and improve sustainability and performance 
of microfinance banks in Nigeria. In addition, the findings of the study will be 
beneficial to microfinance operators in Nigeria in designing their outreach 
policy. The finding has shown clearly that repayment rate could be improved 
by giving more preference to women in microfinance lending policy contrary 
the present practice in the industry, especially in Nigeria. Therefore to move 
microfinance banks to the next level, microfinance banks must specifically 
target women clients in Nigeria. The thesis has also established that too 
high interest rate could impede microfinance sustainability in Nigeria; this 
finding could assist regulatory and supervisory agencies to design policies 
that will encourage borrower friendly interest rate in the process of scaling 
up. 
Aside these contributions, this thesis used large quantitative and reliable 
data from the Central Bank of Nigeria, the first of its kind, in Nigeria. The 
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findings from the quantitative data were complemented with primary data 
from microfinance operators (microfinance banks) through questionnaire 
within the FCT, Abuja to ensure the robustness of the findings from the 
thesis. 
In view of these findings, the thesis concludes that sustainability and 
outreach are not necessarily incompatible. However in pursuing 
sustainability greater attention should be on female clients, as greater 
lending to women would improve the repayment rate of MFBs and further 
engendered the industry sustainability. The thesis also recommends 
increased capital base of microfinance banks to improve lending to the poor 
as well as implement policies that would reduce operation cost by providing 
infrastructures, improve efficiency and orientation of MFBs. These 
measures would improve microfinance services to the poor; and depth of 
outreach of MFBs in Nigeria. 
6.4 Limitations of the Thesis 
The primary aim and objective of the thesis was to ensure that findings 
emanating from the study have general application to all microfinance 
institutions in Nigeria. However, due to non-availability of data on other 
microfinance institutions in Nigeria, only data from registered microfinance 
banks available with the Central Bank of Nigeria were used which serve as 
a major limitation for the study. Notwithstanding,   since most of the 
microfinance banks in Nigeria exhibit and possess characteristics of other 
microfinance institutions, there is strong probability that findings from this 
thesis could be applied to other microfinance institutions in Nigeria. 
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The last limitation of the study is the smallness of the time series dimension 
of the panel data, the time series only covered four years due to non-
availability of data for years preceding 2011.  However, this challenge is 
minimized because of large cross-sectional dimension of the series used for 
the study. The cross-sectional dimension covered 752 microfinance banks 
during the study period. 
6.5 Areas of Further Research 
This thesis examined sustainability and outreach of microfinance banks in 
Nigeria from the point of view of microfinance operators only. Further 
research could examine these issues from the point view of microfinance‟s 
clients as this will give clearer picture of microfinance outreach. Other area 
that could be exploited is to factor-in data of other microfinance institutions 
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As a candidate for the doctoral degree at University of Bradford, United 
Kingdom, I am conducting a research project on sustainability of 
microfinance banks in Nigeria.  The research is driven by my concern that 
sustainable microfinance banks could be effective tool to fight poverty in 
Nigeria. 
This enclosed survey questionnaire is used to seek your views on the 
issues of microfinance sustainability in Nigeria. 
I would appreciate if you could complete the questionnaire in its entirety. 
The information you provide will ultimately help to formulate policies that 
would improve the operations of microfinance banks in Nigeria. This 
questionnaire is designed to maintain your anonymity, which means that no 
one will know your organization‟s identity, opinions and concerns that you 
express in this questionnaire.  
Thank you in advance for your assistance and contribution in this academic 
inquiry. 
Please feel free to contact me at any time. 
Sincerely Yours, 
Toyin Segun Ogunleye 
Email: tsogunle@student.bradford.ac.uk or segto@yahoo.com 
Doctoral Candidate, 








DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD, UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I request for your kind attention to this questionnaire. The information 
you will provide in this questionnaire is strictly for academic purpose. 
Please note that your identity and that of your organization will remain 
anonymous. 
 




Year of Commencement of Business…………………………………….. 
 
1. What is the major source of your funding? 
(a) Personal/Self funding   (b)  Borrowing (c)  Donors funding  (d)  Government 
funding 
 
2. What is your primary motivation for establishing your Microfinance Bank? 
(a) To help the poor (b)  For community development  (c) For profit making 
 
3. What is your major source of revenue? 
(a) Interest on loans (b) Charges on leasing (c) Others, 
specify…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Identify the major challenge customers face from accessing loan from your 
Microfinance Bank 
(a) High Interest Rate (b) Non availability of Microfinance loan (c)   
Collateral Security 
        




6. Tick as appropriate your operation cost as itemised in the table below: 
 
Cost Items High Medium  Low 
Interest Rate Cost    
Personnel Cost    
Loan Disbursement & Recovery Cost    
 




8. Tick as appropriate your customers‟ loan repayment rate in the 1st and 2nd 





st Half since 
Inception of your 
Business 
2nd Half since 
Inception of your 
business 
Below 50%   
50% - 69%   
70% - 79%   
80% - 89%   





9. Tick as appropriate the percentage  of loan to women 
 
 1st Half since 
Inception of your 
Business 
2nd Half since 
Inception of your 
business 
Below 50%   
50% - 69%   
70% - 79%   
80% - 99%   
100%    
 
 
10. What is the major lending model of your Microfinance Bank?  
(a) Individual lending model (b) Group lending model (c) Village 
lending model         
 
 





12. To what extent does interest rate affect your customers‟ repayment rate? 
(a) Very High  (b)   High  (c) Medium  (d)  Low  (e) Very Low  
 




























































Review of Impact Studies 
Studies Methodologies Study 
Coverage 
Results 
Pipelines Approach  
Pipeline design tries to control for attrition and selection bias by comparing 
either purposively, accidentally or randomly chosen treated members and 
non-members against purposively, accidentally or randomly chosen future 
members and non-members (Duvendack et al. 2011). The chosen future 
members and non-members i.e. those that are about to receive the 
treatment for the first time is called the pipeline group. The approach has 
different variants such as, ex-post double difference, panel double 
difference, control function and panel and has become popular owning to its 
ability to produce acceptable control groups and its use of randomisation 
(Duvendack et al. 2011). This approach was revealed in the works of 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), Khanderker (2005) and 
Tedeschi (2008) using panel data. The methodology eases the biases 
present in cross-sectional studies by assuming existence of strict 
exogeneity between time-varying unobservable and selection variable 
through standard panel data fixed effects. While random effect allows 
arbitrary association between time-invariant unobservables or individual 
trends in time-varying unobservables and programme participation 










The results from the study, 
at the household level, 
showed that 37 per cent 
indicated falling real income, 
while those were yet to 
participate had falling 
income of only 28 per cent, 
this is an indication that 
about 9 per cent of 
borrowers were worse-off as 
a result of taking loan. 
Moreover, analysis at the 
enterprise level showed that 
there were no significant 
difference in profits between 
those that took loan and that 
of the control group. 
However, further analysis 
suggests significant 
difference in the growth rate 
of profits between those that 
obtained their first loan from 















Their studies further 
affirmed that difficulty of 
reaching the core poor 
through conventional 
financial instrument may not 
be unconnected with high 
risk involve which make it 






Asia  found that microfinance had 
overall positive effect on 
education and income, but 
had different results in 
magnitude and statistical 
significance across 





Bolivia Examined the role of 
microfinance in stimulating 
development. The author 
discovered that the project 
has no significant influence 
on the poor but has a little 
on women‟s empowerment 
and perceived improvement 
in the economic lives of the 
beneficiaries. The study 
therefore concluded that, 
though, microfinance has 
intrinsic value for the poor, it 
has limited influence on 
poverty reduction.   
With/without Studies 
Many practical microfinance impact studies use this methodology; it 
compares treated groups with comparable untreated groups without paying 
attention to randomisation. Although the approach is simple, it however 
associated with many challenges. For example, there is possibility that the 
treatment group excludes dropouts and the control group comes from 
different population make the approach susceptible to selection and 
placement biases (de Janvry et al. 2010). Selecting the control groups from 
different location risks placement bias unless the communities share the 
same characteristics (Duvendack et al. 2011). On the other hand, if the 
control group is drawn from the same location with treated group, there is 
the possibility of spill-over effects as microfinance intervention in a particular 
community has spill-over effects to the local economy and neighbours 












The impact of microcredit 
was tested on expenditure, 
poverty levels, income, 
literacy and employment 
using propensity-score 
matching and two years 
data on consumption, 
household income and 
expenditure survey. The 
findings from the study 
indicated that the 
programme had positive 
effect on the outcome 
variables, such that the total 
spending on health fell, 
illiteracy level reduced, 
poverty lowered, 
interventions in sanitation 
and transportation reduce 
household income. 
However, the effect of 
microcredit on household 
expenditure was high only in 
metropolitan and urban 
Upper Egypt. The result 
further showed that the 
benefits from road project as 
a result of the Social Fund 
for Development exceed the 
associated cost of the 
project and the microcredit 









The study indicated that the 
level of households‟ income 
level and income 
diversification, expenditure 
on food, school enrolment 
for boys improves. The 
results also showed that at 
the enterprise level, 
microfinance had positive 








The finding from the study 
showed significant positive 
relationship between 
programme participation 
and the non-credit aspects 





al. (1998)  
 With/without 
Approach 
Uganda The results indicated that, 
on the average, client 
household spent 35 per cent 
more than non-client 
households and have an 
average of one year of 
education more than non-










The result indicated that at 
enterprise level, micro credit 
had higher positive effect on 
the treatment group‟s 
microenterprise net revenue 
to the tune of US$1000 
more than ? the non-client 
households. The result also 
showed that in terms of 
fixed assets accumulation 
and employment generation, 
the treatment group worth 
more US$500 of fixed asset 
and provided about 9 more 
employment days than non-
clients households. 
However, the findings of 
household level analysis 
were varied, as it showed 
positive and negative effects 
in some outcomes. On the 
other hand, the finding 
indicates that micro credit 
allows female borrowers to 
prepare for the future and 






Bangladesh The result showed that 
microfinance reduces 
poverty by stimulating per 
capita consumption among 
the participants‟ households. 
Based on consumption 
impact, poverty was 
reduced each year to the 
tune of 5 per cent by the 
households that borrowed 
from the microfinance 
schemes. 
Analytical Approach Studies 
Analytical approach uses different econometrics method to mitigate the 
consequences of selection bias. These methods include propensity score 
186 
 
matching, the use of instrumental variables and the use of multivariate and 
control function. In the case of propensity score matching, participants who 
share similar observable characteristics in an intervention programme is 
compare with non-participants, their mean differences are matched and 
generated. The major weakness of this approach is that it fails to account 
for unobservable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Silber 2001, Morgan and 
Harding 2006, Duvendack et al. 2011).  The instrumental variables try to 
find appropriate variable or set of variables that correlate with the decision 
to participate in a programme but at the same time has no relationship on 
the outcome variable in order to control for both observable and 
unobservable characteristics. This method is difficult to implement due to 
inadequate use of appropriate instruments (Duvendack et al. 2011). Other 
variants of econometrics include control function, multivariate models which 











At enterprise level, the 
findings indicated that 
impact of microcredit differs 
between the two countries 
and in terms of the sources 
of credit. For Brazil, the 
results showed that 
microcredit programmes 
had strong impact for the 
credit sourced from banks 
while those from NGOs 
indicated weak positive 
impact. (Also, bank based 
microcredit programmes 
had weak positive impact 
















Findings from the study 
showed that the members 
that are four-year older in 
the RDP were economically 
better off than the new 
members and other non-
participating control group. It 
further showed that the 
older member households‟ 
asset and average weekly 
expenditure and per capita 
incomes were 112, 26 and 
15 per cent, respectively, 
higher than the households 
in the control group. The 
impact of RDP credit was 
also tested consumption 
expenditure and wealth 
using regression analysis. 
The result indicated that 
education was positively 
related with wealth 
accumulation, while RDP 
credit showed a weak but 
positive and significant 
coefficient, higher 
dependency ratio declined 
the level of consumption. 
Overall, findings from the 
study consistently confirmed 
that impacts on male 
headed households are 
higher than female headed 
households.   
Husain 
(1998)  






The results of the findings 
were not significantly 
different from Mustafa et al. 
(1996). RDP credit had 
significant impact on net 
worth, non-land assets and 
savings to the tune of 50, 
380 and 100 per cent, 
respectively higher than 
non-participating 
households. The result 
further showed that RDP 
credit improved children‟s 
schooling. The results could 
imply the possibility of 










Bangladesh The result from the study 
indicated that micro credit 
reduce the economic well-
being of the participants 
because about three-fourth 
of participants increase self-
employment, and abandon 
their traditional farming 
activities which is the major 
source of income, 
consequently, their income 
declined. Also, the result of 
the social outcomes showed 
that household expenditure 
of regular participant of the 
project increased and their 
children have higher access 
to education. In respect of 
women empowerment, as 
measured by expenditure 
decision, self-perception, 
income control, mobility and 
contraceptive use, the result 
indicated that women 
empowerment improved. In 
term of poverty reduction, 
the result showed that, 
overall, micro credit reduce 
poverty to the tune of 5.5 











The findings from the study 
were quite revealing as the 
effect of credits had no 
significant impact on the 
borrowing by males but had 
positive impact on per capita 
consumption of the 
borrowing female. The result 
further showed that between 
1991/92 and 1998/99 in the  
sample villages moderate 
poverty fell by 17 
percentage points and more 
than half declines in poverty 
was attributed to 
microfinance programmes 
alone, it further showed that 
microfinance programmes 
had spill-over effects on the 
welfare of non-participants 
in the sample villages.  
Cuong 
(2008)  
Panel Data Vietnam The study discovered 
positive impact of 
microfinance programme on 
expenditure and capita 
income, he however, found 
that non-poor received 
greater portion of the 
programme lending than the 
poor. This finding only 
corroborates the earlier 
finding of Colman (1999) 
and also the impact might 
be influenced by 
unobservable factors which 






Panel Data Pakistan The result of the study 
indicates that transitory 
poverty can be reduced 
drastically by polices 
designed to smooth 
households‟ income, while 
chronic poverty can be 
reduced in the long-run 
through large and sustained 
growth in households‟ 
incomes.  
Natural Experiments/Survey Studies 
This approach examines impact of microfinance intervention by exploiting 
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difference between treatment and control groups on the assumption that 
different territories are functionally comparable. The approach is simple to 
implement, however, Karlan (2001) showed that attributing the impact of 
microfinance to differences in the mean of two groups without addressing 
selection problem is the major weakness of the methodology. Also, Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) observed methodology that merely compare participant 
with nonparticipants are subject to programme placement and self-select 
into programme biases. Programme placement bias occurs due to failure of 
microfinance to randomize the placement of their programme, they base 
their decision on factors or characteristics that are not visible to researchers 














Findings from the study 
indicated that for most 
clients, micro-enterprises 
provided need impetus and 
sustained self- employment 
activities for households in 
the post war period. Among 
the households affected by 
the crises, income realized 
from micro-enterprise help 
them to meet their important 
needs in the reconstruction 
period. The paper 
suggested a more 
integrated approach of both 
financial and non-financial 
services as it could play a 
more substantial 
reconstruction role in post-
conflict areas.  
Mosley et 
al. (2004)  
Pilot Survey  Russia, 
Romania and 
Slovakia 
The result for all countries 
examined showed that 
microfinance had little 
impact on the associational 
membership. However, the 
interview data suggested a 
stronger connection 
between microfinance and 
finance to informal political 
organizations such as 
bonding within groups for 
social or political purposes, 





  Northern 
Philippines 
The study focused on 
women that had access to 
credit from Central Cordilera 
Agricutural Programme, the 
study indicated that only 
women that had existing 
crafts benefited from the 
programme, though many of 
them could not repay their 
loans when due. Also, 
vagaries of demand for 
crafts hinder business 
owners from transmitting  
gains to small producers. 
The author argued that 
microfinance required other 
social initiative other than 
credit for it to have tangible 
impact on its members.  
Ahmad 
(2003)  
Pilot Survey  Bangladesh Opinions of selected 
microfinance field workers 
were sought on how 
microfinance could really 
reach the poorest. The 
respondents were of the 
opinion that NGOs 
overemphasis on 
microcredit and repayment 
had brought NGOs 
development effort to 
question whereas 
challenges of non-
accessibility, misuse and 
low return persist among the 
poorest.  They conclude that 
clients remain dependent on 













The findings showed that 
microfinance improved 
income level of the poor and 
further confirmed positive 
relationship between 
customers‟ satisfaction level 







Bolivia the result showed that 
microfinance institutions had 
positive impact on assets 
and income levels, however, 
the income impact has a 
negative correlation with 
income of the poor 
household that choose to 
invest in low-return assets 
with low risk. Also, average 
debt-service ratio was high, 
indicating that microfinance 
could add to client 
vulnerability if the 
mechanism for repayment 
fails to materialise and 
therefore borrowers may be 
forced out of the scheme 
and further impoverish 
them. The result further 
showed that successful low-
income clients were those 
that have saving deposits 
and do not venture into fixed 
capital purchases in their 
early stage while those that 
collapse back to poverty do 





ew (2010)  
Primary and 
Secondary Data  
Ghana The result from the study 
indicated that microfinance 
only impacted marginally on 
the recipients of the credit 
facility socially and 
economically due to lack of 
enabling environment for 
rural financing, 
infrastructural deficiency, 
lack of pro poor policies and 
inability to extend credit 
facility to non-farm sector of 
the economy. The result is 
insightful and relevance 
especially for the developing 
countries of Africa, because 
transaction costs that could 
arise from the factors 
identified by the author 
could indeed limit the impact 








South India  The findings from the study 
are quite revealing, the 
study shows that when 
borrower obtain credit 
directly from the bank 
regardless of their gender 
status decision making 
patterns did not change. 
However, when social group 
are involved in bank‟s credit, 
the decision making process 
drastically changed in favour 
of more joint male-female 
decision making process 
and that the pattern of joint 
decision was further 
strengthen in the long-run 









The results show a positive 
impact on the beneficiaries 
of loans of the target areas. 
It also indicated that the 
degree of impacts vary 
between poor rural 
beneficiaries and not so 
poor urban beneficiaries as 
the later derived more 







The study revealed that 
microfinance has positive 
effect on the participants‟ 
social activities, women 
empowerment and public 
respect but showed 
negative effect on their 
family life. The findings 




housing expenditure such 
as expenditure on food, 






survey data  
Pakistan The study suggests that the 
missing link could be 
addressed by facilitating 
supply chains and 
networking them with 
microfinance services by 
leveraging on the existing 
Pakistan Postal service in 
order to reduce the cost 






survey data  
Asia and the 
Pacific 
The results from the study 
further showed that average 
income of those that have 
access to credit rise by 12.9, 
29.3, 15.6 and 46.0 per cent 
for Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
Sri-Lanka and India, 
respectively, while income 
of non-borrowers on 
increased by 3.0, 22.0, 9.0 
and 24.0 per cent for the 
respective countries. 
Zeller et al. 
(2001)  
Household 
survey data  
Bangladesh The study compares 
households that participate 
in microfinance in different 
social groups. The result 
showed annual averaged 
impact of Tk37 per Tk100 
credit available but noted 
that various groups were 
significantly influenced by 
seasons which accounted 












The findings indicate that 
credit increase labour 
income. The finding further 
showed that access to credit 
increased the hourly income 
of poor 4.8, 12.5 and 4.5 
percent in Bolivia, 
Guatemala and Haiti, 
respectively, compared with 
households without access 
to credit. However, the 
impact of credit is sensitive 
to the quantum or size of the 
loan.  
Randomised Control Trials Studies 
Randomised Control Trials Approach tries to link the effects of an 
intervention to its causes. This approach draws potential customers from yet 
to be implemented intervention programme and assigns potential customers 
into two groups namely treatment and control group, so that the general 
impact of the programme can be measured.  Selection of potential 
customers into either treated and control group is carried out randomly so 
that potential outcomes are independent from treated assignment. However, 
individual in either treated or control group must have the same both 
observed and unobserved characteristics. This will ensure that outcomes 
are not marred by self-selection into treatment and placement biases 
(Hulme 2000, Karlan and Goldberg 2007, Blundell and Costal Dias 2008). 
The major weaknesses of this approach include attrition problem, spill-over 
effects cannot be ruled out. Also, Karlan and Golberg (2007) noted that 
studies that randomized based on one period data could fail to capture the 
complete impact of microfinance credit because impact of credit can take 
longer period to be fully materialised. It has also been criticised on the 
ground that it is costly, time consuming and very difficult to implement both 







follow-up data  
  The result showed a 
marginal loan was beneficial 
to both borrowers and 
lenders, such that marginal 
loan improved borrowers 
welfare across different 
economic status and 




  Bimbo 
programme 
in Mexico 
Findings from the study 
were mixed; credit had 
positive impact on the 
smaller firms and negative 










The finding from the study 
revealed that longer 
exposure to the programme 
had positive relationship 
with asset accumulation, 
consumption and nutritional 
intake, while heterogeneity 
of the impact indicated that 
benefits from the 
programme exceeds it cost 







India The initial findings indicated 
improvement in total 
borrowing of microfinance 
institutions, consumption 
and investment of business 
enterprises also improved. 
However, the study also 
showed no impact of access 
to microcredit on per capita 
expenditure but increased 
durable expenditure after 15 
to 18 months. The authors 
further showed that 
nondurable spending of 
households that do not have 
business of their own 
increase while prospective 
business owners‟ 
households saw decrease in 
nondurable consumption but 
those existing business 
recorded improvement in 
their profit because they 
invested in durable goods. 
The study found no positive 
impact on women‟s decision 
making, education and 
health. 














Low poultry farmers‟ 
productivity were associated 
with low famers‟ education, 
less year of experience; 
high interest micro loan and 











  Lack of access to credit, 
high commodities prices and 
low profits were the major 
causes of poverty. The 
impact of microfinance was 
minimal, at initial stage and 
at the second stage, credit 








  Significant difference 
between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries of loan 
disbursement as the income 




















Cumulative loan, loan circle, 
education and experience 
with LAPO reduce poverty 






  More access to credit 
occurred where MFIs 
offered different financial 
products because 
microenterprises were less 
sensitive to availability of 
internal funds than locations 
where such opportunities do 







  Impact of microloans and 
savings on growth was first 
established, consequently, 
effect of growth on poverty 
index. The study identified 
microfinance development 
as key to poverty reduction 










Microfinance plays a major 
in the economy through 
employment generation and 
provision of financial 
services to the active poor 









  No significant difference in 
geographical location, 
genders, and occupation 
when using outreach and 









Increasing trend of outreach 
and sustainability in the 
region and recommended 
increasing use of relative 
small loans for further 






















Socio-economic Features of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja  
This section of the chapter gives brief descriptions of socio-economic 
features of the study area. The description was carried out along the lines of 
location demographic features, size, education services, agricultural 
services, health care services, social welfare, electricity, water and 
sanitation and employment. Since each area council within FCT, Abuja is 
unique discussion will also focus on peculiar features of each area council. 
The section uses FCT, Abuja baseline data derived from a comprehensive 
social, economic and infrastructural survey result of all 858 communities in 
FCT, Abuja for this section of analysis. 
Demographic Features of FCT, Abuja 
The FCT, Abuja is located within the north centre geo-political zone of 
Nigeria with the total land marks area of about 8,000 square kilometers; it 
has about 2.2 million house hold with a total population of about 6.7 million 
people. The FCT, Abuja was established by the Federal Capital Territory 
Act of 1976 with six Area Councils of Municipal, Kwali, Bwari, Kuje, Abaji 
and Gwagwalada. The six Area Councils is made up of 858 communities 
with 76 per cent of the communities depend on subsistence farming while 
the 16 per cent of the communities depend on salary and wages from the 
public sector. Among the 16 per cent communities that depend on salary 
and wages 53 per cent alone comes from Municipal area council, being the 
areas where most government offices operate and Gwagwalada and Kuje 
area councils account for 6 per cent.   
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Education Services in FCT, Abuja 
Using access to school as an indicator of social economic development, the 
development pattern seems to be uneven within the FCT, Abuja with some 
rural communities are denied of basic social amenities while in some cases 
there is concentration of education amenities in a particular locality. The 
distributions of those that have access to school within the area councils are 
also lopsided in favour of Municipal area council which accounted for 26%, it 
has highest number of access to school in FCT, Abuja followed by 19% for 
Kuje Council area. Others such as Kwali, Bwari, Abaji and Gwagwalada had 
percentage access to school of 17%, 15%, 12% and 10%, respectively.   
Access to School in FCT, Abuja  
 
On the whole, about 57 per cent of the existing 858 communities in the FCT, 
Abuja have access to school the remaining 43 per cent of the communities 
do not have access to school. In view of the large number of people in these 
communities that do not have access to school which are majorly poor rural 
people micro services such as loan to the poor become essential to 



















Community without School Community with School
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Access to School in FCT, Abuja 









1 ABAJI 41 58 99 
2 MUNICIPAL 96 128 229 
3 BWARI 41 75 116 
4 GWAGWALADA 53 51 104 
5 KUJE 75 91 166 
6 KWALI 64 85 149 
  Grand Total 370 488 858 
Source: FCT Baseline Data 
 
Agricultural Services in FCT, Abuja 
Agriculture is mainstay of FCT, Abuja economy being a major employer of 
labour and main source of revenue to the local communities. Majority of the 
communities in FCT, Abuja are farmers as farming employs about 76 per 
cent of the communities within the FCT, Abuja. Despite the importance role 
of agriculture could play in the economic development of FCT, Abuja, the 
ingredients for agriculture inputs except farmland are in short supply. For 
example, over 76 per cent of the communities do not have access to 
fertilizer though only 33 per cent have access to it, surprisingly Kwali and 
Kuje area councils which harbour rural poor people constitute largely part of 
the communities without access to fertilizer. 
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Access to Fertilizer in FCT, Abuja  
 
In view of this, agricultural production which should have contributed 
tremendously to the development of local communities is in small scale. 
Statistics indicate about 89 per cent of people in the local communities 
depend on cutlasses and hoes for their farming activities while only 2 per 
cent of the rural population have access to modern equipment such as 
tractor and plough bulls. Also, 93 per cent of communities are without 
access to agric-extension services while only 4 per cent has access to such 
services which underscore the low yields of most agricultural produce in 
FCT, Abuja. In addition, majority of local communities are without agro-
service centre estimated about 94 per cent while only 6 per cent has access 
to such services (FCT, Abuja, data baseline, 2009). 
Health Care Services in FCT, Abuja 
Statistics from FCT, Abuja baseline data indicated that 74 per cent of the 
communities in Abuja are without primary health care with the Municipal 
area council has the highest number of communities without primary health 























No Fertilizer With Fertilizer
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Access to Primary Health Car (PHC) in FCT Abuja 
 
In term of health care facilities functionality data showed that 53 per cent are 
not functional, 30 per cent are fairly functional while only 17 per cent of the 
facilities are functional. Overall, Municipal area council has the lowest 
number of not functional health facilities in 25 communities while Kwali area 


























Functionality of Health Facilities in FCT Abuja  
 
The total number of health workers in FCT, Abuja was estimated at 4,205 
seems to be fairly distributed across the six area councils. From the total 
health worker, 24 per cent operates within the Municipal area, 17 per cent in 
Bwari follow by 16, 16 15 and 12 per cent for Abaji, Gwagwalada, Kuje and 
































ABAJI MUNICIPAL BWARI GWAGWALADA KUJE KWALI
Fairly Functional Functional Not Functional
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Abaji 361 217 56 45 679 
Amac 480 334 100 78 992 
Bwari 340 231 86 56 713 
Gwagwa-
lada 
317 211 65 76 669 
Kuje 341 167 73 67 648 
Kwali 287 156 36 25 504 
Total 2126 1316 416 347 4205 
FCT Baseline Survey (2009) 
 In term of ante-natal awareness by pregnant women in FCT, Abuja, about 
78 per cent attend ante-natal while 21 per cent do not and 1 per cent use 
herbal traditional medicine to treat their pregnancies. Majority of those that 
do not attend ante-natal are poor women in rural communities of FCT, 
Abuja. Also the awareness of family planning is relatively low as only about 
43 per cent of the population practice family planning using abstinence, pills, 
withdrawal, condom, injectables and breast feeding while the remaining 57 
per cent are not. The highest number of people with no family planning 
resides in Gwagwalada estimated at 85 per cent of the total family in the 
area council, while the lowest 71 per cent reside in Abaji area council. In 
addition, the  HIV/AIDS awareness of the communities is low with 66 per 
cent of the communities are not aware various campaign put in place by the 





Social services in FCT, Abuja are low despite that Abuja is the capital city of 
Nigeria. Judging from the access to police post, security and recreational 
centers such as sporting activities, most social welfare services 
concentrated in the Municipal area council being social centre of FCT, 
Abuja.  For example, most sporting facilities have the highest concentration 
in the Municipal. In term of security system, about 76 per cent of the 
communities use vigilantes, community-based form of protection, while the 
remaining 24 per cent rely on police and other securities services and these 
communities are confine to the Municipal area council. Overall, about 72 per 
cent of people residing in FCT, Abuja believe they are unsafe in term of 
having adequate security protection. Also, emergency services are in short 
supply as about 91 per cent of communities rely on community-based 
emergency services for unexpected outbreaks such as fire outbreak and 
sicknesses, only 9 per cent of the communities have access to emergency 
services and are mostly found in Kwali and Municipal area councils.  
Electricity Supply 
Electricity supply is a major challenge hampering growth in Nigeria, the 
condition of electricity supply in FCT, Abuja is not different from the situation 
in other state of Nigerian federation. Out of the 858 communities in FCT, 
Abuja about 65 per cent do not have electricity supply; the remaining 35 per 
cent that have access do not enjoy regular supply of electricity. The majority 
of the communities only rely on kerosene and firewood for light and cooking. 
207 
 
Percentage of Communities with Electricity in FCT Abuja  
 
Distribution of electricity across the sixth area council are uneven, with 
Municipal area council has 53 per cent of the communities have access to 
electricity and Kuje area council only has 17 per cent of its communities with 
electricity. 
Employment, Income and Land in FCT, Abuja 
Employment pattern is an important factor in the economic life of any 
society, in FCT, Abuja, farming employs 76 per cent of the local 
communities, 18 per cent are government workers while the remaining 8 per 
cent are self employed.  Despite that farming constitutes highest employer 
of labour, accessibility to land for the purposes farming or property 
development in FCT, Abuja has become a serious challenge as vast of the 
land area have appropriated to the government which make it difficult for 
farmers to purchase, lease holding and rent for farmland. Therefore, the 









per cent to the Municipal, Bwari 15 per cent, Abaji 13 per cent, Kuje 11 per 
cent, Kwali 10 per cent and Gwagwalada 7 per cent.  
The earning capacity of families in the communities in the six area councils 
exhibit huge disparity as only 2 per cent of the families earn over  N50,000 
annually, while about 50 per cent of the families within the local 
communities earn between N20,000 – N50,000 and about 39 per cent earn  
between N10,000 – N20,000. 
Water and Sanitation 
Majority of the people living in the rural communities do not have access to 
safe drinking water, they drink water from rivers without any treatment which 
are capable of causing diseases. Overall, about 36 per cent of the 
communities have access to safe drinking water supply with 9 per cent has 
access to pipe water supply and 27 per cent to bore-hole water supply, the 
remaining 64 per cent are without save drinking water. In term of access to 
sanitary services, 36 per cent of the Municipal area council‟s communities 
engage in proper refuse disposal, 23 per cent for Bwari, 17 per cent for 
Abaji, kuje 12 per cent, Gwagwalada 9 per cent and kwali 3 per cent. 
The development of FCT, Abuja was not rapid until the seat of power was 
moved from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 and since then, efforts have been in 
place towards the development of the entire area. Majority of the people in 
rural communities are excluded from formal financial services. The result of 
the EFIna financial services survey conducted in 2008 showed that over 
60% of the people of the North Centre zone were financially excluded while 
less than 30% were banked. This data underscored the positive role 
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microfinance lending could play in the FCT in helping majority of rural poor 
people excluded from formal financial services to have access to finance, 
which are majorly farmers. 
Geographical Distribution of Microfinance Banks in the FCT, Abuja 
The CBN database indicated that the number of licensed and operational 
microfinance banks in FCT, Abuja at 50 which represented 41.0 per cent 
and 6.5 per cent of the total number of microfinance banks in the North 
Central geopolitical zone of Nigeria and the entire country, respectively. The 
patterns of the 50 microfinance banks in the FCT, Abuja across the six area 
councils are not evenly distributed but lopsided in favour of urban area. For 
example, Municipal area council which is the city centre accounted for 88 
per cent while area councils such as Gwagwalada, Kwali and Bwari only 
accounted for 6, 4 and 2 per cent, respectively. The remaining two area 
councils namely Abaji and Kuje do not microfinance bank in their locality 
except in some few cases where other microfinance branches are located 
within the area councils.  
Distribution of Microfinance Bank in Abuja 














Table 5.10: Sustainability Regression (Squared) 
 






  19 20 
Yield -0.03 0.01 
 
(-0.02) (0.06) 
Yield^2 0.05 0.06 
 
(0.59) (0.80) 
Gender 0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.19) (-0.14) 
Labcost  0.05 0.07 
 
(0.71) (0.92) 
Loan to Assets (LOASS) 0.35*** -0.29*** 
 
(-3.72) (-3.06) 
log of Loan (LLoan)  0.03 0.03* 
 
(1.68) (1.70) 
Efficiency Indicator (EFF) -0.05 -0.07 
 
(-1.17) (-1.50) 
Constant 0.16 0.13 
 
(0.66) (0.53) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The Hausman test (19&20) shows Chi2(7)=2.62, with the Prob>Chi2=0.9176, When P-value is insignificant i.e. 
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when it  is  not significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random effect in column 20 is chosen for this analysis. 










Table 5.11: Mission Drift Regressions  
 
 





















(OPSS) 0.91 -0.23 1.74 -0.21 
 
(0.63) (-1.15) (1.23) (-0.95) 
Yield 8.99 -0.20 10.00 -0.34 
 
(0.95) (-0.15) (1.02) (-0.22) 
Yield x Individual Lending 
Model -5.09 0.53 -3.94 0.18 
 
(-1.83) (1.41) (-1.59) (0.47) 
Yield x Group Lending 
Model 4.15 -0.63 2.96 -0.20 
 
(1.25) (-1.41) (0.99) (-0.43) 
Labour Cost x Individual 
Lending Model 24.77 -2.79 18.95 -0.40 
 
(1.42) (-1.19) (1.23) (-0.16) 
Labour Cost x Group 
Lending Model -27.10 3.19 -20.60 0.49 
 
(-1.38) (1.21) (-1.19) (0.18) 
Log of Scale (LSCALE) 0.26 -0.01 0.36 0.01 
 
(1.08) (-0.39) (1.49) (0.27) 
Efficiency (EFF) 0.08 0.08 -0.82 0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.46) (-0.68) (0.03) 
Constant 2.42 0.71 0.73 0.37 
  (0.82) (1.78) (0.26) (0.81) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
The Hausman test (21&23) shows Chi2(8)=4.99, with the Prob>Chi2=0.7583, while for 22 & 24 shows  
Chi2(8)=30.37 and Prob>Chi2=0.0002. When P-value is insignificant i.e.  
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when is significant fixed effect is selected. 








Table 5.12: Women and Repayment Regressions  
 
 




















Gender 1.43 -0.05 0.65 -0.04 
 
(1.16) (-0.33) (1.33) (-0.44) 
Operating Self-Sufficiency 
(OPSS) 0.72 0.16 0.34 0.15 
 
(0.87) (1.43) (0.77) (-1.12) 
Yield -2.48 -0.39 1.17 -0.10 
 (-0.45) (-1.06) (0.52) (-0.27) 
Yield x Individual Lending 
Model 0.78 -0.34 0.63** -0.23** 
 
(1.50) (-1.83) (1.93) (1.94) 
Yield x Group Lending 
Model -0.57 0.39 -0.83** 0.25** 
 
(-0.72) (1.91) (2.41) (1.96) 
Labour Cost x Individual 
Lending Model -3.54 3.56** -4.24** 2.73** 
 
(-0.95) (2.85) (-2.17) (2.98) 
Labour Cost x Group 
Lending Model 3.15 -3.89** 5.02** -2.96** 
 
(0.63) (2.77) (2.19) (-2.88) 
Log of Scale (LSCALE) -0.20 -0.03** -0.09 -0.02* 
 
(-1.24) (-2.20) (-1.53) (-1.76) 
Efficency (EFF) -0.27 0.01 -0.78 -0.05 
 
(-0.18) (0.21) (-0.85) (-0.82) 
Constant 2.22 0.40** 0.98 0.27* 
  (1.26) (2.05) (1.58) (1.93) 
( ) t-Statistic, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
The Hausman test (25 & 27) shows Chi2(9)=0.66, with the Prob>Chi2=0.9999, while for 26 & 28 shows  
Chi2(9)=2.63 and Prob>Chi2=0.9772 . When P-value is insignificant i.e.  
Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05, random effects is chosen but when is significant fixed effect is selected. 
Based on Hausman test, Random  effect models in column 27&  28 are chosen for this analysis  
 
